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Abstract
This dissertation mainly focuses on the models and the corresponding dy-
namic pricing problems that incorporate reference price effects, a concept
developed in economics and marketing literature that try to capture the de-
pendency of consumers purchasing behavior on past prices.
Conceptually, reference price is a price expectation consumers develop from
their observations of historical prices. Since it can not be physically ob-
served, various models have been proposed to operationalize its formation.
We empirically compare some of the models in the literature and extend the
literature by proposing a new reference price model. In addition, we present
analysis on the dynamic pricing problems under these models assuming con-
sumers are loss/gain neutral or loss-averse. We find that constant pricing
strategies are a robust solution to the problem regardless of which reference
price models one may choose.
Empirical evidences, however, indicate that loss/gain neutral or loss-averse
behavior may not be a universal phenomenon. We analyze the dynamic
pricing problem when consumers exhibit gain-seeking behavior. In sharp
contrast to the loss-averse case, even myopic pricing strategies can result
in complicated cyclic price paths. We show for a special case that a cyclic
skimming pricing strategy is optimal and provide conditions to guarantee the
optimality of high-low pricing strategies.
With the understanding of the qualitative behavior of the optimal pricing
strategies under various settings, we develop efficient algorithms to compute
the optimal prices in both loss-averse and gain-seeking case. We demon-
strate the efficiency and robustness of our algorithms by applying them to a
practical problem with real data.
Finally, we extend the above considered single-product setting to multi-
product setting and analyze the corresponding dynamic pricing problems.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Motivations
Over the last two decades, dynamic pricing has attracted considerable at-
tention from industry as well as academia. On the one hand, the scope of
industries that adopt dynamic pricing strategies has widened remarkably,
with examples ranging from airline, hotel industries whose use of dynamic
pricing has long been a well established practice to many other industries
such as retailing, manufacturing, cloud computing and energy, etc. In retail
industry, for instance, new information technology has enabled the retailers
to collect information about the sales and provided them the decision-support
tools for analyzing the collected data. E-commerce retailers with virtually
no cost in making price changes, in particular, have brought the practice of
dynamic pricing strategies to a new level. It is reported that Amazon.com,
a leading e-commerce retailer, can “adjust the prices of identical goods to
correspond to a customer’s willingness to pay (Weiss and Mehrotra, 2001)”.
On the other hand, the on-going research in academia has led the prac-
tice of dynamic pricing to grow more sophisticated over the years (see, for
example, Elmaghraby and Keskinocak, 2003; Chen and Simchi-Levi, 2012,
for a review). Major efforts have been devoted to several issues. First, how
to capture the relationship between demand and price accurately? A recent
progress in this direction is the incorporation of consumers’ behavior into
consideration, such as strategic or bounded rational behavior of consumers.
Second, in different business contexts, different pricing optimization models
need to be developed. As an example, the stream of literature that incorpo-
rates network effects into the pricing optimization models strives to tackle
various pricing problems associated with the emerging social networks such
as Facebook. The third issue is the coordination of pricing decisions with
1
other operations management decisions. A bulk of existing literature has
been focusing on the coordination of pricing and inventory decisions. Fi-
nally, associated with various models and problems mentioned above is the
computational issue. While the models with more realistic consumer behav-
iors or that incorporate other operations management decisions can bring up
lots of new managerial insights, these models usually lead to very complex
optimal solutions. Fortunately, the development of computational optimiza-
tion techniques in mathematical programming has significantly improved the
efficiency in finding optimal solutions or effective heuristics.
This thesis contributes to the existing literature in dynamic pricing through
an extensive analysis of the reference price models and the corresponding dy-
namic pricing problems. Traditionally, it is usually assumed that the demand
in a period only depends on the selling price of the current period. However,
in a market with repeated purchases such as supermarkets, intertemporal
changes in prices would have significant impacts on consumers’ perception of
the price and in turn influence consumers’ purchasing decisions. The concept
of reference price, developed in economics and marketing literature, is then
used to capture such relationship between demand and past prices. It argues
that consumers form price expectations and use them to judge the current
selling price. That is, reference price is used as an internal anchor formed
in consumers’ minds as a result of experience based on information such as
prices in observed periods (Kalyanaram and Little, 1994). Consumers then
make their purchasing decisions based on the relative magnitude of the ref-
erence price and the selling price. Here, a purchasing instance is perceived
by consumers as gains or losses based on whether the selling price is consid-
ered as discounts or surcharges relative to reference prices. Naturally, gains
induce consumers to buy while losses deter them from purchasing.
Chapter 2 provides an overview of the common reference price models used
in the literature. We empirically compare different reference price models,
present existing results in the dynamic pricing problems and extend those re-
sults. We provide answers to several important and practical questions. First,
can reference price help us to capture the relationship between demand and
prices more accurately? Are such findings consistent over different reference
price model specifications and robust to errors in estimations? Second, what
are the differences among various reference price models, both in terms of
empirical performance as well as managerial implications? Finally, what are
2
the missing elements in the current reference price models and how will such
elements change the pricing strategies of the firm?
In addition to reference price effects, behavioral asymmetry is another
important consideration in modeling consumers’ behavior. A common belief
is that people are loss-averse (Tversky and Kahneman, 1991) and existing
literature in dynamic pricing with reference price effects has been exclusively
focusing on this side of asymmetry. However, the assumption of loss-aversion
is not granted to hold in every pricing context. On the contrary, many
evidences including our empirical studies in Chapter 2 points to the other
side of asymmetry, the gain-seeking behavior. In Chapter 3, we argue that it
is necessary and important for researchers as well as practitioners to realize
the existence of gain-seeking behavior. We provide analytical as well as
numerical results on the dynamic pricing problem that can guide the firm in
choosing its pricing strategies if it faces gain-seeking demands.
In Chapter 4, we consider the computational issues in the dynamic pric-
ing problems with reference price effects. On the one hand, reference price
effects link all the intertemporal pricing decisions together. On the other
hand, behavioral asymmetry creates non-smooth optimization problems. In
order to apply reference price models in practice, where pricing decisions
for thousands of products are made and coordinated with other operations
management decisions, how to compute the optimal prices efficiently and ac-
curately becomes a critical question. Facing with such dynamic non-smooth
optimization problems, we develop a strongly polynomial time algorithm that
solves the optimal prices exactly. We identify general structural properties in
the problem that make such efficient algorithm possible and many of our tech-
niques are potentially applicable to other dynamic non-smooth optimization
problems as well. Our algorithm is shown to be very efficient when applied
to a practical problem with real data.
Most of the studies on dynamic pricing problems with reference price ef-
fects in the literature (including our results in previous chapters) are in a
single-product setting. While dynamic pricing problems with multiple prod-
ucts are inherently difficult due to curse of dimensionality, they are, never-
theless, practically relevant. Firms in retail industries, where most evidences
on reference price effects are found, usually manage hundreds and thousands
of products. In most cases, the demands for those products are interdepen-
dent through cross-price effects. Thus, it is crucial to understand whether
3
the results in the single-product setting can be generalized to multi-product
setting or not and if the answer is no, whether there is a simple heuristic
to the problem. Chapter 5 pushes our understanding to the dynamic pric-
ing problems with multiple products in this regard. We derive an explicit
solution to the multi-product problem and provide a confirmative answer to
the question of generalizing the results in the single-product setting for the
case where no behavioral asymmetry is present. When behavioral asymme-
try is considered, we provide a simple heuristic and prove several desirable
properties of the heuristic.
1.2 Organization of the thesis
Chapter 2 reviews and extends the existing results by comparing the empiri-
cal performance as well as managerial implications of different reference price
models and proposing new models to overcome the limitations in the existing
models. Section 2.1 gives a review of the empirical studies on reference price
models in the literature. Section 2.2 introduces the three memory-based ref-
erence price models used in the literature and the demand model to be used
throughout this thesis. In Section 2.3, we give an empirical comparison of
the three memory-based reference price models using real data from canned
tuna category. Section 2.4-2.6 present and compare the results in the dynam-
ic pricing problems under the three reference price models. A new reference
price model is proposed and analyzed in Section 2.7.
Chapter 3 examines the dynamic pricing problem when the demand is
gain-seeking. The evidences in the gain-seeking behavior and the relevant
literature is presented in Section 3.1. Section 3.2 briefly reminds the read-
ers of the mathematical formulation of the dynamic pricing problem. The
dynamics of the myopic pricing strategy is analyzed in Section 3.3 and that
of the optimal pricing strategy is analyzed in Section 3.4. Section 3.5 gives
an empirical study to examine the assumptions we made and numerically
examines the performance of simple pricing strategies.
Chapter 4 looks into the computational issue of the dynamic pricing prob-
lems with reference price effects. Section 4.2 gives the model for the finite
horizon problem. A strongly polynomial time algorithm is presented for the
loss-averse demands in Section 4.3. The efficiency and robustness of the al-
4
gorithm is examined through solving a practical industry problem in Section
4.4.
Chapter 5 considers the dynamic pricing problem with multiple products.
Section 5.1 reviews the models used in the literature for the multi-product
setting and Section 5.2 introduces the model we use in a continuous time
framework. In Section 5.3, we analyze the dynamic pricing problem with
multiple products and give an explicit solution for the loss/gain-neutral case.
For the loss-averse case, we construct a heuristic and prove some of the nice
properties of the heuristic with two products.
Finally, the last chapter concludes this thesis by summarizing the directions
for future research.
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Chapter 2
Reference Price Models: Empirical
Comparisons and Dynamic Pricing Problems
2.1 Introduction
The concept of reference price, as introduced in Chapter 1, postulates that
consumers form price expectations and use them to judge the current selling
price. However, reference prices cannot be physically observed and conse-
quently a large amount of literature is devoted to modeling the formation
of reference prices and investigating the impact of reference prices on con-
sumers’ purchasing behavior. This stream of literature can be divided into
two categories based on whether the study conducted is at an individual lev-
el or an aggregate level. Specifically, empirical studies based on individual
level can differ in terms of models, types of data and potentially implications
from the studies based on aggregate level. In most studies at the individual
level, a brand choice model in multi-product setting (usually a multinomial
logit model) is employed. That is, consumers’ utility function is dependent
on reference price and the utility will then determine purchase probability
and demands. In comparison, studies at the aggregate level demand usual-
ly impose a specific demand-price function form. Correspondingly, the data
used at the individual level is scanner panel data which tracks the purchasing
behavior of each household while the the data used at the aggregate level is
simply time series data containing price and demand pairs. Although at both
levels, there are abundant evidences of reference price effects, further impli-
cations on the model parameters can be different at the two levels. Readers
are referred to Chapter 3 for more details on the differences.
Although the focus of this thesis is not on individual level models, we give
a brief discussion of the reference price models in the literature at the indi-
vidual level here for completeness. Literature in this area has differed consid-
erably in how reference prices are formed and many alternative models have
6
been proposed and compared. There are two major different perspectives
in viewing the formation of reference price. One is called the memory-based
or temporal reference price, which is assumed by a majority of researchers.
They argue that reference price is based on the historical prices consumers
encountered during past purchasing occasions and have operationalized ref-
erence price as a weighted average of past encountered prices. For example,
Mayhew and Winer (1992) and Krishnamurthi et al. (1992) have simply tak-
en the price encountered in the last purchase occasion as the reference price.
On the other hand, Lattin and Bucklin (1989) and Kalyanaram and Little
(1994) use an exponentially smoothed prices which depend on consumer’s
whole purchasing history (we refer to as the exponentially smoothing model).
The other one is called the stimulus-based or contextual reference price. It
assumes that the current prices of certain brands serve as the reference price.
The underlying argument is that consumers may not have a strong memory
for past prices and the information provided by current prices of the brands
available in the store is most salient and convenient for consumers. For in-
stance, Hardie et al. (1993) use the current price of the brand that consumers
have purchased in latest occasion as the reference price while Mazumdar and
Papatla (1995) average the current prices of all brands by the weight based
on the loyalties to the respective brands. Briesch et al. (1997) provide com-
prehensive review of the above mentioned models and empirically compare
them using scanner panel data for peanut butter, liquid detergent, ground
coffee and tissue. They find that in four categories the memory-based refer-
ence price model performs the best. Rajendran and Tellis (1994) postulate
that a combination of both memory-based and stimulus-based reference price
model may be more realistic and provide empirical evidences to support their
premise.
Empirical studies at the aggregate level are relatively scarce, even though
most analytical analysis in the literature is based on aggregate level models
due to their simplicity. As pointed out above, aggregate level models focus
more on single-product settings and even if they are generalized to multi-
product settings, the brand choice behavior is not modeled explicitly. As a
result, the literature at the aggregate level usually assumes a memory-based
reference price model. Within the context of memory-based reference price,
various operationalizations have been proposed. Similar to the individual
level model, Raman and Bass (2002) use the price from the previous period
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as the reference price, and Greenleaf (1995) and Kopalle et al. (1996) employ
the more general exponentially smoothing model. More recently, different
memory-based models have been explored. Nasiry and Popescu (2011) pro-
pose a reference price model based on the peak-end rule (we refer to as the
peak-end model), which suggests that consumers remember the lowest (peak)
and most recent prices (end). Such a model is conceptually supported by sub-
stantial research in psychology, however, “an empirical investigation of the
peak-end rule in the pricing context is still lacking (Nasiry and Popescu,
2011)”. Nevertheless, they analyze the dynamic pricing problem under the
peak-end model and show that a constant pricing strategy is optimal with
loss-averse consumers. Interestingly, to the best of our knowledge, neither
the exponentially smoothing model nor the peak-end model is implemented
in practice. Instead, it is reported in Natter et al. (2007) that bauMax, an
Austrian do-it-yourself retailer, implements a further generalization of the
exponentially smoothing model in their decision-support system (we refer to
as the adaptation-rate-based model). In their model, consumers adapt their
reference prices faster to price decreases than to price increases. They argue
that quicker adaptation in case of price decreases is due to the fact that retail-
ers tend to aggressively advertise price reductions while price increases may
well go unnoticed by consumers. Unfortunately, no empirical comparisons to
the exponential smoothing model are made in their report. In addition, since
bauMax uses a price grid, they can simply evaluate all different strategies
in their dynamic pricing problem and no analytical characterizations of the
optimal pricing strategy are provided in the report.
This chapter then serves for the following three purposes. First, we com-
plement the above mentioned literature at the aggregate level by providing
an empirical comparison of different memory-based reference price models.
In addition, we analyze the dynamic pricing problem with the adaptation-
rate-based model and compare it with the existing results in the exponential
smoothing model as well as the peak-end model. Second, we restate the es-
tablished results in the literature on dynamic pricing problem for the bench-
mark model: the exponential smoothing model with loss-averse demands,
which not only lays down some fundamental ideas that will be used in the
thesis but also gives a nice comparison to later results in Chapter 3. Finally,
we point out some of the limitations of currently available reference price
models and we propose by following Zhang (2011) a reference price mod-
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el that incorporates randomness to address these limitations. While Zhang
(2011) derives an explicit solution for the dynamic pricing problem under
the stochastic reference price model, we extend his results by providing an
analysis of the limiting distribution of the steady state as well as a sensitivity
analysis of the expected steady state.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section 2.2 we
present the mathematical formulation of each of the memory-based reference
price models discussed above as well as the aggregate level demand model.
In Section 2.3, we empirically compare the performance of the exponential
smoothing model, the peak-end model and the adaptation-rate-based model
using the real data on the canned tuna category. Section 2.4 presents the
established results in the literature on the dynamic pricing problem under
the exponential smoothing model, which serves as our benchmark model. For
completeness, the results in Nasiry and Popescu (2011) for dynamic pricing
problem under the peak-end model is presented in Section 2.5. The dynamic
pricing problem under the adaptation-rate-based model is analyzed in Sec-
tion 2.6. We introduce the stochastic reference price model and analyze the
corresponding dynamic pricing problem in Section 2.7. The last section sum-
marizes our findings and points out directions for future research. Proofs for
the results in Section 2.7 are quite lengthy and are relegated to Appendix A.
We remark here that, throughout this chapter, we consider either loss/gain-
neutral or loss-averse demands and readers are referred to Chapter 3 for
dynamic pricing problems with gain-seeking demands.
2.2 Reference Price and Demand Models
This section introduces the three memory-based reference price models and
the demand model that describes how reference price effect affects the de-
mand for a firm’s product. In the following, we use rt to denote consumers’
reference price at period t and pt to denote the shelf price of the product at
period t.
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2.2.1 Exponential smoothing model
As introduced in Section 2.1, the exponential smoothing model is widely used
by researchers at both individual (Lattin and Bucklin, 1989; Kalyanaram and
Little, 1994) as well as aggregate level (Greenleaf, 1995). It assumes that the
reference price in period t+ 1 is a weighted average of the reference price in
period t and the shelf price consumers observed in period t. Mathematically,
the reference price evolves according to the following recursive formula
rt+1 = αrt + (1− α)pt, (2.1)
where α ∈ [0, 1] is called the memory factor, since it captures the rate at
which consumers adapt to the new price information. In the extreme case,
when α = 0 consumers immediately take the price they observed in the
last purchase occasion as the reference price (Raman and Bass, 2002), while
when α = 1 consumers never adapt to the new price information. Usually,
one would restrict α < 1, because in empirical studies α = 1 would result
in pathological estimation (see Section 2.3) and in the analysis of dynamic
pricing problem it would result in a static price (see Section 2.4).
2.2.2 Peak-end model
The peak-end rule postulates that memory-based decisions are made accord-
ing to a combination of the most extreme and most recent experiences. By
adopting this rule in the pricing context, Nasiry and Popescu (2011) assume
that the peak-end experiences to be the lowest and latest price respectively.
Specifically, let mt denote the lowest price consumers observed up to period
t, then the reference price follows
rt+1 = βmt + (1− β)pt, (2.2)
where β ∈ [0, 1] measures how much consumers anchor on the lowest price.
Again, in the extreme case when β = 0, reference price is simply the price
observed in the previous period. Note here that
mt+1 = min{mt, pt+1}
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and together with (2.2), they specify the evolution of a reference price path.
2.2.3 Adaptation-rate-based model
The adaptation-rate-based model generalizes the exponential-smoothing
model in that it allows different adaptation rates based on whether con-
sumers experience a price reduction or price increase:
rt+1 = pt + α
+ max{rt − pt, 0}+ α−min{rt − pt, 0}, (2.3)
where 0 ≤ α+ ≤ α− ≤ 1 captures the rate at which consumers incorporate
the new price information depending on whether they experience a price
decrease or increase. To see this more clearly, we can write (2.3) explicitly
as
rt+1 =
{
α+rt + (1− α+)pt, rt ≥ pt,
α−rt + (1− α−)pt, rt ≤ pt.
The assumption α+ ≤ α− then implies consumers adapt to the new price
information pt at a faster rate when there is a price decrease than when
there is a price increase. In the special case when α+ = α− := α, the above
model reduces to the exponential smoothing model introduced in (2.1).
2.2.4 Demand model
Here, we formally introduce the aggregate-level demand model that will be
used throughout this thesis. Following Greenleaf (1995), Kopalle and Winer
(1996), Fibich et al. (2003) and Nasiry and Popescu (2011), the demand
depends on the price p and reference price r via the model
D(r, p) =

b− ap+ η+(r − p), r > p,
b− ap, r = p,
b− ap+ η−(r − p), r < p,
(2.4)
where b, a > 0 and η+, η− ≥ 0. More concisely, we can write
D(r, p) = b− ap+ η+ max{r − p, 0}+ η−min{r − p, 0}.
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Here, D(p, p) = b − ap is the base demand independent of reference prices,
η+(r − p) or η−(r − p) is the additional demand or demand loss induced by
the reference price effect, where r − p is usually referred to as a perceived
surcharge/discount. If r < p, consumers perceive this as a loss, while if
r > p, they perceive it as a gain. Consumers or the aggregate level demands
are classified as loss-averse, loss/gain neutral and gain-seeking depending
on whether η+ < η−, η+ = η− or η+ > η−. The dynamic pricing problems
analyzed in this chapter all focus on either the loss-averse or loss/gain neutral
case. The gain-seeking case is studied in detail in Chapter 3.
The linear form of the demand function is for the purpose of simplifying
the exposition. Most of the results introduced in this thesis can be gener-
alized to nonlinear forms by imposing appropriate assumptions on demand.
Furthermore, the linear form allows us to conveniently estimate the corre-
sponding parameters from real data on historical prices and sales using linear
regression (see Section 2.3).
2.3 Model Comparison
This section complements the literature by empirically comparing the three
memory-based reference price models based on the data in canned tuna cat-
egory. We conduct a detailed analysis using one brand in the data set and
present a summary of the performances of the models for all the brands in
the data set.
2.3.1 Data and method of estimation
We utilize the data set provided by Chevalier et al. (2003) of the canned
tuna product category in the Bayesm Package of the R software. The data
set includes volume of canned tuna sales as well as a measure of display
activity, log price and log wholesale price of seven different brands over 338
weeks.
The data set is extracted and aggregated from the Dominick’s Finer
Foods database maintained by the University of Chicago Booth School of
Business at http://research.chicagobooth.edu/marketing/databases/
dominicks/index.aspx. The original database records comprehensively the
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weekly store-level data of each product sold by Dominick’s Finer Foods, a
large supermarket chain in the Chicago area.
Note here that if the initial reference price and α, β, α+/α− in (2.1), (2.2),
(2.3) respectively are known, then reference prices can be generated from the
historical prices and the parameters b, a, η+, η− in the demand function (2.4)
can be estimated using ordinary least squares (OLS). However, α, β, α+/α−
are usually unknown and need to be estimated from the data. There is no
established explicit formula for computing these parameters. Here, we follow
the simple approach employed by Greenleaf (1995). For the exponential
smoothing model, for instance, OLS is performed repeatedly for each value
of α varying in increments of 0.025 from 0 to 1 (excluding 1) and our estimator
αˆ is chosen to be the one that maximizes R2. We exclude α = 1 here because
it will result in perfect collinearity problem and OLS cannot be applied. βˆ,
αˆ+ and αˆ− are computed similarly. For initial reference price, we set it to be
the average price for convenience throughout this section.
Table 2.1 shows the descriptive statistics of the sales, prices and reference
prices computed under each of the reference price models for one item in the
data set called “Chicken of the Sea 6 oz”. The corresponding estimates of α,
β and α+/α− are included in the parenthesis. One interesting observation
Table 2.1: Descriptive Statistics (Chicken of the Sea 6 oz)
mean median st.dev. min max
unit sales 16104 6633 49633 2525 579037
retail price ($/oz) 0.80 0.82 0.09 0.29 0.92
reference price (αˆ = 0.325) 0.80 0.81 0.07 0.48 0.91
reference price (βˆ = 0.3) 0.67 0.67 0.09 0.29 0.88
reference price (αˆ+ = 0.15, αˆ− = 0.975) 0.64 0.67 0.10 0.34 0.88
from Table 2.1 is that reference prices generated under peak-end model and
adaptation-rate-based model are much lower than that under exponential
smoothing model. The underlying intuition is that under peak-end model
the lowest price can be remembered indefinitely which drags the reference
price low while under adaptation-rate-based model, as argued in Section 2.2,
consumers adapt more quickly to low prices.
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2.3.2 Comparison results
We first present the regression results for the item “Chicken of the Sea 6
oz” and discuss some of the issues in estimation and comparison. As noted
by Greenleaf (1995), the linear demand model (2.4) suffers from a multi-
collinearity problem. As a result, the standard errors can be huge for some
parameters and the OLS estimate to η− has a wrong sign (see, for example,
the second column in Table 2.2). To tackle this problem, Greenleaf (1995)
uses equity estimator and ridge estimator and obtains the correct signs. Sim-
ilar regularization technique is used in the case study in Chapter 4 to another
data set. However, for the canned tuna category, though ridge regression can
reduce the standard errors, the estimator to η− still has a wrong sign. In-
stead, we look at the restricted model by imposing η− = 0 and we report
the regression results for the full model specified by (2.4), the static model
which ignores reference price effects (η+ = η− = 0) and the restricted model
(η− = 0).
Table 2.2-2.4 summarize the regression results for the three memory-based
reference price models respectively. Two observations that are consistent in
all three models can be made here. First, incorporating reference price effect-
s significantly improves the goodness of fit measured by R2 across all three
models. The exponential smoothing model improves R2 by 90%, the peak-
end model by 138% and the adaptation-rate-based model by 158% respec-
tively. Second, we find the demand for this item to be gain-seeking (η+ > η−)
regardless of which memory-based reference price model one chooses. In ad-
dition, the estimate of η− is statistically insignificant in all three models and
the more parsimonious restricted demand model performs as good as the full
demand model.
Comparing across the three tables, it is clear that the adaptation-rate-
based model performs the best in terms of R2 or adjusted R2 for both the
full demand model and the restricted demand model. It outperforms the
exponential smoothing model by 36%. However, it only outperforms the
peak-end model by 8%. Thus, one needs to be cautious when directly com-
paring the three models in terms of R2 since the adaptation-rate-based model
has one more degree of freedom than the exponential-smoothing model or
the peak-end model. In other words, besides the demand parameters, the
adaption-rate-based model has two additional parameters (α+ and α−) to be
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estimated instead of one (either α or β). Therefore, it is not surprising to see
a better performance from the adaptation-rate-based model. Comparatively,
it is interesting to see that the peak-end model, having the same degree of
freedom as the exponential smoothing model, can still outperform it by 25%.
Table 2.2: Exponential Smoothing Model
αˆ = 0.325 Full Model Static Model Restricted Model
Intercept (bˆ) 21248 257970 14160
(0.90) (12.71)** (0.61)
Price (aˆ) 27521 302613 16720
(0.96) (11.99)** (0.60)
Perceived discount (ηˆ+) 572630 573060
(14.40)** (14.38)**
Perceived surcharge (ηˆ−) -57630
(-1.64)
R2 0.570 0.300 0.567
Adjusted R2 0.566 0.297 0.564
t-statistics are in parentheses.
** significant at 1%, * significant at 5%
Table 2.3: Peak-End Model
βˆ = 0.30 Full Model Static Model Restricted Model
Intercept (bˆ) 85423 257970 81488
(5.42)** (12.71)** (5.34)**
Price (aˆ) 98498 302613 90162
(4.78)** (11.99)** (4.79)**
Perceived discount (ηˆ+) 920533 917964
(22.06)** (22.04)**
Perceived surcharge (ηˆ−) -20297
(-0.99)
R2 0.715 0.300 0.714
Adjusted R2 0.712 0.297 0.712
t-statistics are in parentheses.
** significant at 1%, * significant at 5%
Actually, the issue of degree of freedom arises when reference price models
are compared to the static demand model where adjusted R2 does not penal-
ize on the addition of parameters α, β or α+, α− in reference price models.
Here, we check the robustness of our model comparisons by performing a
worst case analysis. That is, for each memory-based reference price mod-
el, we choose the parameters α, β or α+, α− that minimizes R2 instead of
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Table 2.4: Adaptation-Rate-Based Model
αˆ+ = 0.15, αˆ− = 0.975 Full Model Static Model Restricted Model
Intercept (bˆ) 61669 257970 64732
(4.32)** (12.71)** (4.76)**
Price (aˆ) 61997 302613 67949
(3.29)** (11.99)** (4.05)**
Perceived discount (ηˆ+) 1191648 1190498
(26.67)** (26.68)**
Perceived surcharge (ηˆ−) 10498
(0.70)
R2 0.776 0.300 0.776
Adjusted R2 0.774 0.297 0.774
t-statistics are in parentheses.
** significant at 1%, * significant at 5%
maximizing it. The results are summarized in Table 2.5.
Table 2.5: Check of Robustness (Worst Case Analysis)
Static Model ES PE ARB
α/β/(α+, α−) 0.975 1 (0.975,0.975)
R2 0.300 0.486 0.502 0.486
Adjusted R2 0.297 0.481 0.498 0.481
ES: exponential smoothing model
PE: peak-end model
ARB: adaptation-rate-based model
We first observe that even under the worst case, all memory-based ref-
erence price models still outperform the static demand model that ignores
reference price effects. This finding is consistent with the extensive literature
on reference price effects (for example Greenleaf, 1995) and further confirms
the robustness of reference price effects with respect to different models and
possible errors in estimations. However, under the worst case analysis, the
adaptation-rate-based model no longer outperforms the peak-end model. We
remark here that we have restricted α+ ≤ α− when computing the worst case
for the adaptation-rate-based model. Otherwise, it will be even worse than
the exponential smoothing model (with R2 merely 0.34). It is yet interesting
to note that within the constraint α+ ≤ α−, the worst case is attained at
α+ = α−. That is, allowing consumers to adapt faster to price decreases will
always improve the model, which supports the intuition provided in Natter
et al. (2007).
Finally, we summarize the performance comparisons for the three memory-
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Table 2.6: Performance Comparisons for All Brands
Static Model ES PE ARB
Star Kist 6 oz 0.190 0.359 0.449 0.360
Chicken of the Sea 6 oz 0.300 0.570 0.715 0.776
Bumble Bee Solid 6.12 oz 0.406 0.490 0.514 0.519
Bumble Bee Chunk 6.12 oz 0.259 0.640 0.664 0.650
Geisha 6 oz 0.513 0.545 0.545 0.550
ES: exponential smoothing model
PE: peak-end model
ARB: adaptation-rate-based model
based reference price models for all the brands in the data set in Table 2.6.
We have excluded the two brands with large volume size: “Bumble Bee
Large Cans” and “HH Chunk Lite 6.5 oz” because the estimate for a, the
price sensitivity, has a wrong sign. One can see that generally, the peak-end
and the adaptation-rate-based models perform better than the exponential
smoothing model but the degree of improvements differ case by case. For
the last three brands, the three models perform roughly the same while the
peak-end model has quite an improvement over the exponential smoothing
model for the first two brands. The adaptation-rate-based model, despite
of the increased degree of freedom, only has significant improvement in the
brand “Chicken of the Sea 6 oz”.
2.4 Dynamic Pricing under the Exponential
Smoothing Model
In this section, we present the results on the dynamic pricing problem under
the benchmark model: the exponential smoothing model with loss-averse
demands. This problem has been analyzed by many researchers including
Kopalle et al. (1996), Fibich et al. (2003), Popescu and Wu (2007) and Asva-
nunt (2007). In addition to stating existing results, we offer a new perspective
in proving the steady state results in Popescu and Wu (2007). We utilize the
tools from discrete dynamic system to provide a simple visualization of con-
vergence and such tools enable a clearer comparison to the results to be
developed in Chapter 3.
Given an initial reference price r0, we define the firm’s dynamic pricing
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problem under the exponential smoothing model as follows:
V (r0) = max
pt∈[0,U ]
∞∑
t=0
γtΠ(rt, pt)
s.t. rt+1 = αrt + (1− α)pt, t ≥ 0,
(2.5)
where Π(rt, pt) = ptD(rt, pt) is the one-period profit function and D(·, ·) is
defined in (2.4). Here, we have implicitly assumed that the marginal cost is 0
without loss of generality. We also assume for the remaining of this chapter
that η− ≥ η+. Note that the assumptions η− ≥ η+ and p ≥ 0 allow us to
rewrite the one-period profit as
Π(r, p) = min{Π+(r, p),Π−(r, p)},
where
Π+(r, p) = p[b− ap+ η+(r − p)], (2.6a)
Π−(r, p) = p[b− ap+ η−(r − p)]. (2.6b)
The Bellman equation to problem (2.5) can then be written as
V (r) = max
p∈[0,U ]
{min{Π+(r, p),Π−(r, p)}+ γV (αr + (1− α)p)}, (2.7)
and we use p∗(r) to denote the solution to (2.7). To solve (2.7), we introduce
the following two problems:
V +(r) = max
p∈[0,U ]
Π+(r, p) + γV +(αr + (1− α)p), (2.8a)
V −(r) = max
p∈[0,U ]
Π−(r, p) + γV −(αr + (1− α)p). (2.8b)
The solutions of (2.8a) and (2.8b) are denoted respectively as p+(r) and
p−(r). The following proposition gives a characterization of the solution to
(2.7).
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Proposition 2.1. There exists 0 ≤ r− ≤ r+ ≤ U such that
p∗(r) =

p−(r), 0 ≤ r ≤ r−,
r, r− ≤ r ≤ r+,
p+(r), r+ ≤ r ≤ U,
and the optimal value function is given by
V (r) =

V −(r), 0 ≤ r ≤ r−,
Π(r, r)
1− γ , r
− ≤ r ≤ r+,
V +(r), r+ ≤ r ≤ U.
The proof to Proposition 2.1 can be found both in Popescu and Wu (2007)
and Asvanunt (2007) and is omitted here. One is also referred to Section 2.6,
where we prove similar results for the more general adaptation-rate-based
model. We remark here that Proposition 2.1 does not rely on the linear
form of the demand function and readers are referred to Popescu and Wu
(2007) for the assumptions on demand and profit functions that are necessary
for Proposition 2.1 to hold. With a linear form in (2.4), one can compute
that r− = b(1−γα)
2a(1−γα)+(1−γ)η− and r
+ = b(1−γα)
2a(1−γα)+(1−γ)η+ . Asvanunt (2007) also
provides explicit expressions for p−(r), p+(r) and V −(r), V +(r).
Given an initial reference price r0 and p
∗(r), the sequence of reference
prices {rt} which evolves according to (2.1) is referred to as the reference
price path. A consequence of Proposition 2.1 is the following convergence
result of the reference price path, which essentially says that in the long-run
a constant pricing strategy is optimal.
Proposition 2.2. When r0 < r
−, then {rt} is monotonically increasing and
limt→∞ rt = r−, when r0 > r+, then {rt} is monotonically decreasing and
limt→∞ rt = r+. When r− ≤ r0 ≤ r+, then rt = r0 for any t ≥ 0. Any
reference price r ∈ [r−, r+] is then referred to as a steady state.
Again, the mathematical proof for Proposition 2.2 is omitted here. Instead,
we give a graphical visualization of the reference price path in Figure 2.1 to
illustrate both Proposition 2.1 and Proposition 2.2. In Figure 2.1, the bold
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Figure 2.1: Convergence result for benchmark model
lines represent the discrete dynamic system:
rt+1 = αrt + (1− α)p∗(rt),
which maps rt to rt+1. The double arrowed lines specify the structures il-
lustrated in Proposition 2.1 and the arrowed lines illustrate a reference price
path. Specifically, the vertical arrowed lines indicate that the trajectory e-
volves from rt to rt+1 while the horizontal arrowed lines visually aid us in
thinking the function value rt+1 as an argument of the next iteration. One
can see that starting from an initial reference price r0 = 0.8 > r
+, the refer-
ence prices will then converge monotonically to r+.
2.5 Dynamic Pricing under the Peak-End Model
The dynamic pricing problem under the peak-end model described by (2.2)
has been analyzed by Nasiry and Popescu (2011). In this section, we briefly
restate their main result for completeness.
Under the peak-end model, as consumers anchor on both the lowest price
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as well as the previous period price, two states are needed to describe the
evolution of system. Given the initial state (m0, p0), the firm’s dynamic
pricing problem under the peak-end model is then:
V (m0, p0) = max
pt∈[0,U ]
∞∑
t=1
γt−1Π(rt, pt)
s.t. rt+1 = βmt + (1− β)pt, t ≥ 0,
mt+1 = min{mt, pt+1}, t ≥ 0,
(2.9)
and the Bellman equation for problem (2.9) is
V (mt−1, pt−1) = max
pt∈[0,U ]
{min{Π+(rt, pt),Π−(rt, pt)}+ γV (min{mt−1, pt}, pt)},
rt = βmt−1 + (1− β)pt−1.
(2.10)
Let p∗(mt−1, pt−1) denote the optimal pricing strategy that solves (2.10) and
given the initial state (m0, p0), {p∗t} denote the optimal price path given by
p∗t = p
∗(mt−1, p∗t−1). Proposition 2.3 summarizes the main result from Nasiry
and Popescu (2011), to which one is referred for detailed analysis and proofs.
Proposition 2.3. Given any initial state (m0, p0), {p∗t} converges monoton-
ically to a steady state price, which depends only on m0.
Again, Proposition 2.3 implies that a constant pricing strategy is optimal
in the long-run. However, Nasiry and Popescu (2011) note that the range
of constant prices that are optimal is wider than that under the exponential
smoothing model and unlike the exponential smoothing model, the optimal
constant prices do not reduce to a single point when consumers are loss/gain
neutral.
2.6 Dynamic Pricing under the
Adaptation-Rate-Based Model
In Section 2.3, we see that the adaptation-rate-based model achieves the best
fit in one of the brand and it is actually used in practice (Natter et al., 2007).
In this section, we complement the literature by analyzing the dynamic pric-
ing problem under the adaptation-rate-based model.
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Similar to (2.5), the firm’s dynamic pricing problem is
V (r0) = max
pt∈[0,U ]
∞∑
t=0
γtΠ(rt, pt)
s.t. rt+1 = pt + α
+ max{rt − pt, 0}+ α−min{rt − pt, 0}, t ≥ 0.
(2.11)
Note that we assume α+ ≤ α−, which allows us to rewrite (2.3) as
rt+1 = min{α+rt + (1− α+)pt, α−rt + (1− α−)pt},
and since V (·) is continuous and monotonically increasing, the Bellman e-
quation can be written as
V (r) = max
p∈[0,U ]
{min{Π+(r, p) + γV (α+r + (1− α+)p),
Π−(r, p) + +γV (α−r + (1− α−)p)}},
(2.12)
with p∗(r) denoting the optimal solution to (2.11). Similarly, we consider the
following two problems
V +(r) = max
p∈[0,U ]
Π+(r, p) + γV +(α+r + (1− α+)p), (2.13a)
V −(r) = max
p∈[0,U ]
Π−(r, p) + γV −(α−r + (1− α−)p), (2.13b)
with the corresponding solutions denoted as p+(r) and p−(r) respective-
ly. Proposition 2.4 characterizes the optimal pricing strategy under the
adaptation-rate-based model which generalizes Proposition 2.1.
Proposition 2.4. Let r− = b(1−γα
−)
2a(1−γα−)+(1−γ)η− and r
+ = b(1−γα
+)
2a(1−γα+)+(1−γ)η+ ,
then
p∗(r) =

p−(r), 0 ≤ r ≤ r−,
r, r− ≤ r ≤ r+,
p+(r), r+ ≤ r ≤ U,
and the optimal value function is given by
V (r) =

V −(r), 0 ≤ r ≤ r−,
Π(r, r)
1− γ , r
− ≤ r ≤ r+,
V +(r), r+ ≤ r ≤ U.
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Proof. For 0 ≤ s ≤ 1, we consider the following problem:
V s(rs0) = max
pt∈[0,U ]
∞∑
t=0
γtΠs(rst , pt)
s.t. rst+1 = αsr
s
t + (1− αs)pt, t ≥ 0,
(2.14)
where Πs(r, p) = p(b− ap + (sη+ + (1− s)η−)(r − p)) and αs = sα+ + (1−
s)α−. Note that this is simply the problem with the exponential smoothing
model (the memory factor is αs) and loss/gain neutral demands (the marginal
reference price effect is sη+ + (1 − s)η−). The superscript “s” on reference
price is to distinguish it from the reference prices generated in problem (2.11).
In the extreme case when s = 0, V s(r) = V −(r) and when s = 1, V s(r) =
V +(r). By Theorem 2 in Popescu and Wu (2007), problem (2.14) admits
a unique steady state rs =
b(1−γαs)
2a(1−γαs)+(1−γ)(sη++(1−s)η−) and for any initial
reference price rs0, the reference price path under the optimal pricing strategy
converges monotonically to rs. It is easy to see that r
− and r+ are simply
the steady states when s = 0 and s = 1 respectively.
Next, we show that V s(r) ≥ V (r) for any 0 ≤ s ≤ 1. We make two simple
observations here. First, (sη+ +(1−s)η−)(r−p) ≥ min{η+(r−p), η−(r−p)}.
Second, αsr+ (1−αs)p ≥ min{α+r+ (1−α+)p, α−r+ (1−α−)p}. The first
observation leads to Πs(r, p) ≥ Π(r, p). For any initial reference price rs0 = r0
and fixed price path {pt}, the second observation implies rst ≥ rt for any t ≥ 0.
Since Πs(r, p) is increasing in r, we have Πs(rst , pt) ≥ Πs(rt, pt) ≥ Π(rt, pt),
which is true for any feasible price path {pt}. Therefore, fixing an optimal
price path {p∗t} for problem (2.11) and letting rs0 = r0, we then have
V s(rs0) ≥
∞∑
t=0
γtΠs(rst , p
∗
t ) ≥
∞∑
t=0
γtΠ(rt, p
∗
t ) = V (r0).
In particular, this implies V −(r) ≥ V (r) and V +(r) ≥ V (r).
When r− ≤ r ≤ r+, there exists 0 ≤ s ≤ 1, such that r = rs. As rs is
the steady state for problem (2.14), the pricing path {pt = rs} is optimal for
problem (2.14). On the other hand, it is feasible for problem (2.11) while
resulting an objective value V s(rs). By V
s(r) ≥ V (r), {pt = rs} is optimal for
problem (2.11) as well. In other words, p∗(r) = r and V (r) = V s(r) = Π(r,r)
1−γ
for r− ≤ r ≤ r+.
When 0 ≤ r ≤ r−, similarly, p−(r) is an optimal solution to (2.13b) and
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by monotonic convergence to r− it holds p−(r) > r for 0 ≤ r ≤ r−. For
any initial reference price r0 < r
−, {p−(rt)} is a feasible solution to problem
(2.11) and by r− ≥ p−(rt) > rt for all t ≥ 0, it will result in an objective value
V −(r0). That is, {p−(rt)} is optimal to problem (2.11), i.e., p∗(r) = p−(r)
and V (r) = V −(r) for 0 ≤ r ≤ r−. The case for r+ ≤ r ≤ U can be proven
in a same way.
One can see from the proof of Proposition 2.4 that Proposition 2.2 can
be directly generalized here. That is, the steady states for the dynam-
ic pricing problem (2.11) are [r−, r+], where r− = b(1−γα
−)
2a(1−γα−)+(1−γ)η− and
r+ = b(1−γα
+)
2a(1−γα+)+(1−γ)η+ . Although the derivation of the analytical results is
similar to the exponential smoothing model, managerial implications under
the adaptation-rate-based model are more in line with that of the peak-end
model. Specifically, our results also imply the range of steady state prices,
i.e., r+ − r−, is wider than that under the exponential smoothing model. In
the special case of loss/gain neutral demands, the optimal constant prices do
not degenerate to a single price point.
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Figure 2.2: Ratio of steady state ranges
Figure 2.2 illustrates the ratio of the steady state range under the exponen-
tial smoothing model to that under the adaptation-rate-based model, where
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we have fixed α = α+ = 0, η+ = 1 and b = 4, a = 1. One can see that when
the loss-aversion effect is small, the adaptation-rate-based model results in
relatively larger steady state ranges. Intuitively, this is due to the fact that
the asymmetry in consumers’ adaptation rate dominates the asymmetry in
gain/loss effects.
2.7 Stochastic Reference Price Model
In this section, we introduce a continuous time model by following Fibich
et al. (2003) and along with Zhang (2011) we complement the literature by
proposing a new reference price model called “stochastic reference price”.
Under the stochastic reference price model, we demonstrate the behavior of
reference prices and analyze the dynamic pricing problem under the assump-
tion of loss/gain-neutral demands.
We first introduce the continuous time demand model as well as the con-
tinuous time counterpart of exponential smoothing model (2.1). As in Fibich
et al. (2003), the demand rate is still specified by (2.4) and under the as-
sumption of loss/gain-neutral demands, i.e. η+ = η− = η, we can further
simplify (2.4) as
D(r, p) = b− ap+ η(r − p).
Given a price path {p(t)}, the continuous time counterpart of the expo-
nential smoothing model is given by{
dr = α¯[p(t)− r(t)]dt
r(0) = r0
(2.15)
where r0 is the initial reference price. We use α¯ ≥ 0 to distinguish the
parameter from the memory factor in (2.1), since here as α¯ increases, con-
sumers incorporate the new price information at a faster rate while in (2.1)
consumers adapt to the new price information faster as α approaches 0. Ac-
cording to (2.15), with a given initial value r0 and a given price process
{p(t)}, the reference price at any given time is a fixed value for the entire
consumer population.
However, there are two common features of the market that (2.15) does
not capture. First, a consumer population is rarely homogeneous. For ex-
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ample, brand loyal consumers and brand switchers can make different brand
choice and purchase quantity decisions (Krishnamurthi et al., 1992). Thus,
it is natural to postulate that each consumer should have her own perception
of the prices as well. Second, other exogenous factors like advertisement ac-
tivities and competitors’ prices may influence consumers’ memory processes.
As argued in Section 2.1, consumers’ reference price may also be affected by
contextual effects, i.e. other prices consumers observe at the time of purchase
(Rajendran and Tellis, 1994).
In this section, we try to incorporate heterogeneity as well as exogenous
shocks and describe the more complex behavior of consumers by using a
stochastic differential equation (SDE) (see Øksendal, 2002, for a reference on
the topic of SDE) to model reference price evolution process:
dr(t) = α¯[p(t)− r(t)]dt+ σ
√
r(t)dW (t), (2.16)
where W (t) is the standard Wiener process and reference price r(t) is now a
stochastic process.
Note here that for a pre-determined price path {p(t)}, dE[r(t)] = α[p(t)−
E[r(t)]]dt. That is, if the firm pre-commits to a price path that is indepen-
dent of the realization of randomness, then the evolution of the expected
reference prices coincide with the deterministic model (2.15) used in Fibich
et al. (2003). We illustrate in Figure 2.3 a sample path of (2.16) as well
as E[r(t)] under a constant pricing strategy with two price levels: the high
price pH = 0.92 and the low price pL = 0.29 (the highest and lowest price
in Table 2.1) respectively. In Figure 2.3, we take the initial reference price
r0 =
pH+pL
2
= 0.605, α = 0.5 and σ = 0.2. One can see that r(t) has a high-
er variance under pH than under pL which reflects the square-root diffusion
term in (2.16).
There are two main considerations in our choice of models. From a mod-
eling perspective, we want a model that can give a good approximation to
the above mentioned two features. To model consumer heterogeneity, incor-
porating randomness is a common practice used in economics and marketing
(see Allenby and Rossi, 1998, for instance). One possible way is to assume α¯
to be random. However, it is easy to see that if the price is a predetermined
constant, i.e., p(t) = p, for all t ≥ 0, the variance of r(t) will go to zero as
t → ∞. That is, the firm can eliminate such heterogeneity in consumers’
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Figure 2.3: E[r(t)] and sample paths of r(t) under pH and pL
reference prices by employing a constant pricing strategy. While this could
be plausible in some scenario, we believe, in general, variability in consumer-
s’ perception of prices should persist under the common pricing strategies,
such as constant, skimming or penetrating pricing strategies. On the other
hand, variability in reference prices always exists (unless p(t) = 0 for all t)
in (2.16). In addition, (2.16) has the nice property that the probability of
r(t) going negative is always zero. To model exogenous factors, one usually
adds a random shock to represent those exogenous factors. The square-root
diffusion process (2.16) has the additional merit of allowing reference price
level dependent variance. It predicts that the variance of the r(t) gets smaller
as r(t) itself becomes smaller. Such property is desirable in many scenarios.
For instance, if competitors’ prices are a major factor affecting consumers’
memory processes, then the competitors prices would be much more attrac-
tive and thus creating more variability in consumers reference prices when
consumers reference prices are high rather than low.
From an analysis perspective, the square-root diffusion process (2.16) can
provide analytical tractability and has found applications ranging from term-
structure modeling (Cox et al., 1985) to option pricing (Heston, 1993). In
our application, in particular, it enables a closed-form solution and results
in a simple steady state distribution. As a result, we are able to compare
analytically the expected steady state to the steady state derived from the
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deterministic reference price model.
Under our stochastic reference price model, the firm’s dynamic pricing
problem is
V (r0) = max
p(t)
E
[∫ ∞
0
e−γtp(t)D(r(t), p(t))
]
dt,
s.t. dr(t) = α¯[p(t)− r(t)]dt+ σ
√
r(t)dW (t),
(2.17)
where γ is the discount factor. The corresponding Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman
(HJB) equation can then be written as
γV (r) = max
p
{pD(r, p) + α¯(p− r)dV (r)
dr
+
σ2
2
r
d2V (r)
dr2
}. (2.18)
Readers are referred to Miranda and Fackler (2004), for instance, for an
intuitive derivation of the HJB equation (2.18). We denote p∗(r) to be the
optimal solution to (2.18) and r∗(t) to be the reference price path under p∗(r)
which satisfies the SDE
dr∗(t) = α¯[p∗(r∗(t))− r∗(t)]dt+ σ
√
r∗(t)dW (t).
Note here that by seeking a state feedback solution p∗(r), we have implicitly
assumed that the firm has the ability to measure or observe the realization
of consumers’ reference price and can set a price accordingly. Similar to the
problems analyzed in the previous sections, we are interested in the long-run
behavior of the optimal prices as well as the resulting reference price path.
Specifically, as t goes to infinity, will r∗(t) converge to a steady state? The
following result gives a complete answer to this question.
Proposition 2.5. The optimal reference price path r∗(t) converges in distri-
bution to the steady state, denoted as R∗s. The density of R
∗
s is
fR∗s (r) =
(2λ/σ2)2λµ/σ
2
Γ(2λµ/σ2)
r2λµ/σ
2−1e−2rλ/σ
2
,
where Γ(·) is the gamma function. That is, R∗s follows a gamma distribution
with shape parameter 2λµ/σ2 and rate parameter 2λ/σ2. The constants λ
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and µ are defined by
λ = α¯
2a+ η − 2α¯Q
2(a+ η)
, µ = α¯
α¯R + b
2λ(a+ η)
,
where Q and R are given by
Q =
γ
2α¯2
(a+ η) +
2a+ η
2α¯
− a+ η
2α¯2
∆,
R =
[
b
α¯
+
σ2(a+ η)
α¯2
]
γ −∆
γ + ∆
+
[
b+
σ2(2a+ η)
2α¯
]
2
γ + ∆
,
and ∆ is
∆ =
√
γ2 + 2α¯
2a(γ + α¯) + γη
η + a
.
Proposition 2.5 not only claims the convergence to a steady state, but
also gives an explicit expression for the steady state distribution in terms of
problem parameters. Our result differs from the previous literature in a sense
that the steady state R∗s is a random variable rather than a deterministic
value. This confirms our motivation in modeling consumer heterogeneity:
even under optimal pricing strategy, variability in consumers’ reference prices
still persist.
Figure 2.4 illustrates the steady state distributions under different levels
of α¯. In Figure 2.4, we have fixed a/b = 0.8, η/b = 0.5, γ = 0.01 and
σ2 = 0.2. One can see that as α¯ grows, the spread of the distribution shrinks.
Intuitively, this is due to the fact that as α¯ grows, the drift term in (2.16) will
have a relatively stronger effect compared to the diffusion term and result in
less variance. In other words, if consumers in the population adapt to the new
price information at a faster rater, then the variability in their perception of
the fair prices can be reduced.
Using Proposition 2.5, we can easily compute the expected steady state
reference price as well as the variance of steady state reference price. Their
explicit expressions are summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 2.6. Let ∆, µ and λ be the constants defined in Proposition
2.5. The expected steady state reference price r∗s = E[R∗s] is given by
r∗s = µ = r
∗
D +
σ2
2a(γ + α¯) + γη
[
a+ η
α¯
(
γ
2
− ∆
2
)
+
2a+ η
2
]
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Figure 2.4: Shape of fR∗s (r) under different α¯
where r∗D is the steady state in the deterministic problem (σ
2 = 0):
r∗D =
(γ + α¯)b
2a(γ + α¯) + γη
.
The variance of steady state reference price is given by
var(R∗s) =
µ
2λ
σ2.
We remark here that r∗D is exactly the steady state derived by Fibich et al.
(2003) in the deterministic reference price model. Clearly, when σ = 0,
our model reduces to the deterministic model in Fibich et al. (2003) and r∗s
agrees with their solution. When σ > 0, on the other hand, it is easy to verify
that r∗s > r
∗
D. That is, the expected steady state reference price is always
higher than the steady state reference price when there is no randomness.
This result is in sharp contrast with the intuition developed in some previous
pricing literature. Recall in Figure 2.3 that a higher price induces a higher
variability in reference price, and consequently higher variability in demands.
Such variability in demands are undesirable in many settings. For example, in
a joint inventory and pricing setting, by comparing the optimal price with the
riskless price (the price obtained from deterministic demands), the optimal
price is always set in a way such that variability in demands is reduced
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(Petruzzi and Dada, 1999). In our dynamic pricing problem, however, the
firm does not need to worry about the risk of mismatch between supply and
demand and demand variability will not be a concern. On the contrary, it
will bring more opportunities to the firm since higher variability in reference
prices will allow the firm to take advantage of the possible high reference
price level.
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Figure 2.5: Comparisons of r∗s and r
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D
Figure 2.5 illustrates the gap between r∗s and r
∗
D under a range of values of
α¯ and different levels of η/b with other parameters fixed at the same values
in Figure 2.4. One can see that the gap decreases as α¯ increases and η/b
decreases. As α¯ grows, consumers adapt to the new price at a faster rate
and in the extreme case it adjusts to the current price instantaneously. Note
that this is different from the discrete time model in which case the fastest
rate consumers can achieve is to adjust according to the last period price
rather than the current price. Such decrease in the average gap between
reference price and price reduces the (stochastic) reference price effects and
consequently results in a smaller difference between r∗s and r
∗
D. Similarly,
when η/b is small, reference price effects play a minor role and in the limiting
case when η/b approaches zero, both r∗s and r
∗
D get closer to the static price,
the optimal price under the static demand model, and consequently their gap
goes to zero.
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More interestingly, the expected steady state reference price r∗s and its
deterministic counterpart r∗D can have different behaviors relative to some
problem parameters. When reference price effects are significant (η/b is
large), r∗s is decreasing in α¯ while r
∗
D is increasing in α¯. It is easy to see
the monotonicity of r∗D. Since the static price is always higher than r
∗
D, as α¯
increases, the model more closely resembles the static demand model and as
a result, r∗D increasingly approaches the static price. The opposite direction
of r∗s is less obvious. One possible explanation is that when α¯ becomes larger,
the benefit of having larger variations in reference price decreases. Similar
explanations apply to the sensitivity of r∗s and r
∗
D to η/b. As η/b becoming
smaller, the effects of reference price gradually vanish and r∗D increases to
the static price while r∗s decreases to it.
2.8 Conclusion
This chapter summarizes and extends the existing literature in reference
price effects by comparing various reference price models and presenting the
analysis of the dynamic pricing problem with loss/gain neutral or loss-averse
demands under these models.
We empirically compare the widely used exponential smoothing model with
the two recently proposed peak-end model and adaptation-rate-based model.
We find that the peak-end model being as parsimonious as the exponential s-
moothing model, in general, performs the best. However, in one example, the
adaptation-rate-based model still provides a better fit at a cost of increasing
the degree of freedom of model parameters. It would be an interesting future
research direction to further confirm our findings to other product categories
and determine the market conditions under which one model outperforms
another.
Despite the differences in their empirical performances, the managerial im-
plications from the dynamic pricing problems under the three reference price
models are similar. All three models predict that a constant pricing strat-
egy is optimal in the long-run when demands are either loss/gain neutral
or loss-averse. However, based on our analysis of the adaptation-rate-based
model, which is not explored in the previous literature, we find that a range
of constant prices can be optimal even in the case of loss/gain neutral de-
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mands. This is different from the prediction of the exponential smoothing
model in which case only a single constant price is optimal. We numerically
show that the relative range of steady states compared to the exponential s-
moothing model grows as asymmetry in consumers’ adaption rate dominates
the asymmetry in loss-aversion.
Finally, we extend the literature by introducing a stochastic reference price
model in a continuous time framework. Our motivation in introducing ran-
domness in consumers’ memory processes is to model consumer heterogene-
ity and exogenous factors. We obtain an explicit solution to the steady state
distribution and derive several interesting new insights from analyzing the
dynamic pricing problem under the stochastic reference price effects. Specif-
ically, we find that the expected steady state reference price (price) is higher
than the steady state reference price (price) under a deterministic model
and the larger the variance in consumers’ memory processes, the higher the
steady state reference price (price). In addition, we find that the gap be-
tween the two shrinks as reference price effects diminishes (α¯ increases or
η/b decreases) and they can have opposite sensitivity to the magnitude of
reference price effects.
An interesting future research direction along the line of stochastic refer-
ence price effects would be empirical justification of our models and compar-
isons to other possible ways of modeling consumer heterogeneity or exogenous
factors. Also, we only focus on the case of loss/gain neutral demands, which
enable us to apply tools from stochastic optimal control theory. However,
whether the steady state result can be generalized to loss-averse demands is
still a challenging open question.
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Chapter 3
Dynamic Pricing Problem with Gain-Seeking
Reference Price Effect
3.1 Introduction
In Chapter 2, we have introduced the results in several papers (Fibich et al.,
2003; Popescu and Wu, 2007; Nasiry and Popescu, 2011) which all focus on
loss-averse demand model. The conceptual support for loss-aversion follows
from prospect theory (Tversky and Kahneman, 1991) and as a result a widely
beheld belief in the reference price literature postulates that consumers are
loss-averse.
In this chapter, however, we point out that, in practice, it is also pos-
sible for the firm to face gain-seeking demands and the underlying reasons
for this could be either consumers are indeed gain-seeking or the effect of
aggregation. We then study the dynamic pricing problem of a firm facing
gain-seeking demand. We remark here that although the term “loss-seeking”
is used in the previous literature (see, for instance, Popescu and Wu, 2007),
we feel the term “gain-seeking” is more accurate in capturing the fact that
consumers/aggregate demands are more sensitive to gains rather than losses
and note that it has also been adopted in several recent papers (Aflaki and
Popescu, 2013; Kallio and Halme, 2009; Kopalle et al., 2012) as well.
Unlike the common belief that loss-averse behavior is prevalent, it is ad-
mitted in the survey paper by Mazumdar et al. (2005) that “evidence of
loss-aversion is mixed”. In fact, there are empirical evidences that support
gain-seeking behavior at both individual and aggregate level. At an individ-
ual level, two out of five papers reviewed by Mazumdar et al. (2005) that
study the effects of loss-aversion show little or no evidence of loss-aversion.
Specifically, Krishnamurthi et al. (1992) observe that consumers not loyal
to any brand respond more strongly to gains than to losses in all six but
one brand, and Bell and Lattin (2000) suggest through extensive empirical
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studies across different product categories that loss-aversion may not be a
universal phenomenon in grocery products due to price response heterogene-
ity. More recently, Kopalle et al. (2012) find that for a large number of
households the impact of a gain is greater than that of a loss and on average
the effect of losses is almost negligible compared to that of gains. At an
aggregate level, Greenleaf (1995) shows that the aggregate demand can be
10 times more responsive to gains than losses. Deploying the methodology
of switching regression on the aggregate level data, Raman and Bass (2002)
also encounter gain-seeking behavior in one of their brands.
One also needs to be cautious that loss-aversion at an individual level does
not necessarily imply loss-aversion at an aggregate level. Kallio and Halme
(2009) explicitly define the loss-aversion at an individual level as loss averse
in value and loss-aversion at an aggregate level as loss averse in demand and
give possible conditions under which loss averse in value does not imply loss
averse in demand. One important implication of their conditions in a single
product setting is that when market conditions are harsh (consumers have
overall small probability of purchasing the product, i.e., mainly promotion-
driven consumers), then the market should be more sensitive to gains which
boost the market rather than losses which further make the market more
miserable. Greenleaf (1995) also points out that the presence of gain-seeking
at an aggregate demand level does not necessarily contradict with prospect
theory. Specifically, he argues that the market usually consists of “light”
households who are price-sensitive and have a low probability of purchas-
ing at the regular price, and “heavy” households who have a high purchase
probability at the regular price even when there is a loss. As a result, during
a promotion, when there is a gain, many more light households than heavy
ones are attracted. Consequently, market demand is more sensitive to gains
than losses even though each household may be more sensitive to losses than
gains.
Therefore, one should realize the existence of gain-seeking at an aggregate
level and it can be caused either by gain-seeking behavior at an individual
level (with aggregation not changing the gain-loss asymmetry) or by aggrega-
tion under harsh market conditions. Even if, under certain market conditions,
the gain-seeking model analyzed in this chapter is not fully consistent with
the model aggregating individual level behaviors, it may still be used as a
prescriptive model to provide a plausible tractable approximation.
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Despite the necessity of analyzing how the firm should respond if gain-
seeking is present in the aggregate level demand, analytical results on the
dynamic pricing problem of a firm in the gain-seeking case are very limited.
To the best of our knowledge, the only result in this case is the non-optimality
of the constant pricing strategy as observed by Kopalle et al. (1996) and
Popescu and Wu (2007). Moreover, Popescu and Wu (2007) postulate that
“High-low pricing, is provably optimal if consumers are focused on gains.”
However, we cannot find any rigorous proof in the literature. Indeed, there
are many practical and interesting open questions left for the dynamic pricing
problem. For example, is high-low pricing, in which only a regular price and
a discount price are employed periodically, indeed optimal in general? If not,
what are the conditions that guarantee its optimality? Furthermore, when
high-low pricing is not optimal, what can we say about the optimal pricing
strategy and the performance of the high-low pricing strategy?
This chapter strives to answer the above questions. Specifically, we find
that even the myopic pricing strategy, where the firm ignores the effect of cur-
rent prices on future revenues and focuses on maximizing short-term revenue,
does not always admit a cyclic high-low price pattern and its long-run behav-
ior can be very complicated. We provide necessary and sufficient conditions
for the existence of a cyclic high-low price pattern in the myopic pricing s-
trategy. In addition, conditions are derived such that the myopic pricing
strategy leads to either a cyclic penetrating pricing strategy in which the re-
sulting reference prices increase within a cycle, or a cyclic skimming pricing
strategy in which the resulting reference prices decrease within a cycle. Our
numerical studies show that high-low pricing is generally not optimal and
the dynamics of the optimal pricing strategy is likely to be significantly more
complex than that resulted from the myopic pricing strategy. Interestingly,
under the assumptions that consumers only remember the most recent price
and the aggregate demand is insensitive to the negative part of the difference
between reference price and price, we prove that the optimal pricing strategy
is a cyclic skimming pricing strategy. In other words, when consumers have
a low reference price, the firm should charge a high price and then gradually
offer deeper and deeper discounts until consumers’ reference price drops low
again and repeat the cycle. The assumptions we made are also found to be
very plausible in our empirical studies. We further provide sufficient condi-
tions for the high-low pricing strategy to be optimal. Our numerical studies
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suggest that the high-low pricing strategy, when fails to be optimal, can still
achieve over 90% of the optimal profit.
Our work is in sharp contrast to the stream of works in the dynamic pricing
problem when loss-aversion is present at a market level. All these works ar-
rive at the conclusion that a constant pricing strategy is optimal in the long
run. Specifically, Kopalle et al. (1996) observe through numerical studies
that optimal prices converge monotonically and conjecture that a constant
price is optimal in the long run. Fibich et al. (2003) explicitly solve the op-
timal pricing strategy in a continuous time optimal control framework, and
confirm the observation by Kopalle et al. (1996) when demand is piece-wise
linear in price and reference price. Popescu and Wu (2007) extend the result
of Fibich et al. (2003) to general demand functions in a discrete time infinite
horizon setting. Nasiry and Popescu (2011) consider the dynamic pricing
problem with a peak-end based reference price model; they also conclude
the observation by Kopalle et al. (1996). Vast empirical literature, however,
suggests that it is important for practitioners not to take loss-averse assump-
tion as granted. When facing gain-seeking demands, our findings show that
constant pricing strategy can result in as much as 50% loss in profit while
simple cyclic pricing strategies (cyclic skimming or high-low pricing strate-
gies) are optimal or close to optimal in many scenarios. This discrepancy
in results between the loss-averse case and the gain-seeking case is due to
the differences in the underlying structures of the optimization problems. In
essence, under loss-aversion, the single period profit function, though non-
smooth due to the asymmetric responses to losses and gains, is a concave
function of the current price. The gain-seeking demand, on the other hand,
changes the structure of the problem completely. The resulting optimization
problem is neither smooth nor concave.
A few papers have considered dynamic pricing problems in various settings
that also lead to cyclic pricing strategies. Conlisk et al. (1984) assume that
consumers are strategic with two possible valuations and will remain in the
market (possibly forever) until making a purchase. They establish that a
cyclic skimming pricing strategy is optimal. Besbes and Lobel (2015) consider
strategic consumers that are heterogeneous both in valuations and the time
they may spend in the market. They prove that a cyclic pricing strategy is
optimal but a cyclic penetrating or a cyclic skimming pricing strategy may
yield arbitrary poor performance. Ahn et al. (2007) study both production
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and pricing decisions when consumers have uniformly distributed valuations
and tend to buy the product as soon as the price drops below their valuations.
They show, in a special case where consumers wait at most one period and the
firm has no capacity constraint, that high-low pricing strategy is optimal. Liu
and Cooper (2014) consider a pricing setting similar to Ahn et al. (2007) and
demonstrate that a cyclic skimming pricing strategy is optimal even when
consumers have general valuation distributions and can wait for multiple
periods. We emphasize here some key distinctions of our work from these
papers. In terms of modeling, the argument behind reference price models
is that consumers’ purchase decisions are affected by the prices in the past
rather than anticipated prices in the future. In terms of proofs, we form
a dynamic programming problem and identify the cyclic pricing strategy
by analyzing properties of the value function whereas the above papers all
tackle their problems directly by utilizing the notion of a regeneration point.
Essentially, the driving force that leads to a cyclic pricing strategy in our
model is the gain-seeking behavior of consumers while in these papers is the
waiting behavior of consumers. Another related paper is Geng et al. (2010)
who restrict to high-low pricing strategies and use a different approach by
taking weighted average between the regular price and the discount price
to model reference price. They show that when demand is gain-seeking,
high-low pricing strategy outperforms constant pricing strategy. Our work
following Fibich et al. (2003); Kopalle et al. (1996) and Popescu and Wu
(2007), on the other hand, models the dynamics and intertemporal effects of
reference prices explicitly and settles the conjecture in the existing literature
by showing that high-low pricing strategy may not be optimal.
Our work is also closely related to the on-going research in the one-
dimensional discontinuous map in the dynamic system and chaos community.
Sharkovsky and Chua (1993) examine a certain type of discontinuous maps
that arise in electric circuits. They find that their class of discontinuous maps
has strong temporal chaos and the behavior of trajectories can only be char-
acterized by using probability language. Jain and Banerjee (2003) present a
classification of border-collision bifurcations in discontinuous maps. Depend-
ing on parameters, the resulting dynamics can have various periodic orbits or
chaos. Rajpathak et al. (2012) analyze in detail the stable periodic orbits of
one type of discontinuous maps and explore the possible patterns exhibited
by these orbits. It turns out that the myopic pricing strategy in our work
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can be reduced to the type of discontinuous maps analyzed in Rajpathak
et al. (2012). However, to the best of our knowledge, the class of discontinu-
ous maps with multiple discontinuous points, into which our optimal pricing
strategy typically falls, has not been considered in the previous literature.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section 3.2, we
remind the readers of the mathematical formulation of our model introduced
in Section 2.2. In Section 3.3, we analyze the dynamics of the myopic pricing
strategy and relate it with the work in discontinuous maps. The structural
results for the optimal pricing strategy are presented in Section 3.4. Section
3.5 presents an empirical study and conducts numerical experiments to test
the performance of simple pricing strategies. Finally, we conclude the chapter
in the last section with some suggestions for future research. The proofs are
all relegated to Appendix B.
3.2 Model
In this section, we restate the exponential smoothing model introduced in
Section 2.2 and introduce the dynamic pricing problem with gain-seeking
demands. Recall that under the exponential smoothing model, the reference
prices evolve according to
rt+1 = αrt + (1− α)pt, t ≥ 0. (3.1)
In the above evolution equation, pt ∈ [0, U ] is the price charged by the firm
at period t, where U is the upper bound on feasible prices. The parameter
α ∈ [0, 1) is called the memory factor or carryover constant (Kalyanaram and
Little, 1994). When α = 1, reference prices remain a constant over the whole
planning horizon and consequently a constant pricing strategy is optimal
irrespective of gain-loss asymmetry. We restrict α < 1 to avoid such a case
that past prices have no impact on demand. As reference prices are generated
from historical prices, it is also reasonable to assume that r0 ∈ [0, U ].
Recall the demand function defined in (2.4). To avoid negative demand,
we further assume that D(0, U) ≥ 0, i.e., U ≤ b
a+η− . Since this chapter
focuses on the gain-seeking case, we have η+ > η− in (2.4).
The firm’s one-period profit is denoted as Π(r, p) = pD(r, p). Here, the
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marginal cost is assumed to be 0 for simplicity. All our results can be ex-
tended to cases with a non-zero marginal cost. We assume U ≥ b
2a
such that
Π(p, p), called the base profit, is not monotone in p ∈ [0, U ]. This assump-
tion allows us to “rule out pathological boundary steady states (Popescu and
Wu, 2007).”, but our analysis can be carried over similarly by distinguish-
ing those boundary steady states when this assumption fails. Note that the
assumptions η+ > η− and p ≥ 0 allow us to rewrite the one-period profit as
Π(r, p) = max{Π+(r, p),Π−(r, p)},
where Π+(r, p) = p[b− ap+ η+(r − p)] and Π−(r, p) = p[b− ap+ η−(r − p)].
Contrary to the loss-averse case, the one-period profit function is no longer
a concave function in p.
Given an initial reference price r0, the firm’s long-term profit maximization
problem is then:
V (r0) = max
pt∈[0,U ]
∞∑
t=0
γtΠ(rt, pt), (3.2)
where γ ∈ [0, 1) is a discount factor and we interpret 00 = 1. The infinite
horizon problem is of particular interest in the literature since it is often
more tractable than the finite horizon counterpart and provides valuable
insights into the long-run behavior of the optimal pricing strategy, which
in turn may shed light on the development of efficient heuristics for finite
horizon models. It is worth noting here that two assumptions commonly
imposed on optimization problems: differentiability and concavity in the
decision variables, are both absent in the one-period profit function Π(r, p),
which makes the analysis of problem (3.2) quite challenging.
The Bellman equation for problem (3.2) is
V (r) = max
p∈[0,U ]
Π(r, p) + γV (αr + (1− α)p). (3.3)
A pricing strategy p(r) is a function from [0, U ] to [0, U ] that specifies a
feasible solution to (3.3) for a given reference price r. Given any pricing
strategy p(r), the sequence {rt} of reference prices which evolve according
to rt+1 = αrt + (1− α)p(rt), is referred to as the reference price path of the
pricing strategy p(r). We say p(r) has a periodic orbit of period n or is a
cyclic pricing strategy with cycle length n if and only if there exists r0 ∈ [0, U ]
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such that the reference price path of p(r) satisfies rn = r0 and rt 6= r0 for
all 0 < t < n. Clearly, if rn = r0, then by rt+1 = αrt + (1 − α)p(rt), the
sequence {r0, ..., rn−1} is repeated infinitely over time and this sequence is
referred to as the periodic orbit of p(r). In particular, when n = 1, we say
p(r) admits a steady state r0 and when n = 2, p(r) is a high-low pricing
strategy. If there exists a periodic orbit that has the additional property
that r0 < r1 < ... < rn−1, then we refer p(r) to as a cyclic penetrating
pricing strategy. If, on the other hand, r0 > r1 > ... > rn−1, then we
refer p(r) to as a cyclic skimming pricing strategy. Note that in the special
case when α = 0, r0 < r1 < ... < rn−1 (r0 > r1 > ... > rn−1) if and
only if p(rn−1) < p(r0) < ... < p(rn−2) (p(rn−1) > p(r0) > ... > p(rn−2)),
i.e., the monotonicity of reference prices is equivalent to the monotonicity
of charged prices. However, for α > 0, it is possible to have monotone
reference prices with non-monotone charged prices. Recall that in practice, a
skimming (penetrating) pricing strategy is used to describe pricing strategy
with decreasing (increasing) price path overtime. Here, we use the term
“skimming” (“penetrating”) to reflect the fact that a skimming (penetrating)
pricing strategy is usually designed to capture consumers with decreasing
(increasing) valuations (an analogy of the notion “reference price” in our
model) overtime. Since [0, U ] is compact and the objective function can be
easily shown to be continuous, the optimal pricing strategy that solves (3.3)
exists and is denoted by p∗(r). As mentioned in Section 3.1, Kopalle et al.
(1996) and Popescu and Wu (2007) prove that p∗(r) does not admit a steady
state. That is, for any r ∈ [0, U ], p∗(r) 6= r.
In the following, we will also use the term pattern to describe the existence
of various monotonic structures within a periodic orbit. One is referred to
Rajpathak et al. (2012) for a rigorous definition in the context of discontin-
uous maps. Here, we illustrate the term through a simple example. Con-
sider a periodic orbit with period 4 that consists of four different reference
prices 1, 2, 3, 4. Then, depending on different orderings, the periodic orbit
can demonstrate different patterns or monotonic structures as illustrated in
Figure 3.1. The upper left and lower right panels show the reference price
patterns that are of penetrating and skimming pricing strategy respectively.
However, the upper right panel shows a pattern that has reference prices in-
crease in the first two periods accompanied by a decrease in the third period
while the lower left panel shows a pattern that the reference prices alternate
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Figure 3.1: Possible patterns of a periodic orbit
between increasing and decreasing in each period.
3.3 Dynamics of the Myopic Pricing Strategy
In this section we demonstrate the complicated nature of problem (3.2) by
analyzing the dynamics of the myopic pricing strategy. We present conditions
to guarantee that the myopic pricing strategy admits a high-low price pattern.
We then reveal the complexity of the underlying dynamics by showing that
even the myopic pricing strategy can result in a cyclic pricing strategy with
a cycle length arbitrary long.
By definition, the myopic pricing strategy pm(r) is given by solving the
following problem:
pm(r) = arg max
p∈[0,U ]
Π(r, p).
Define the constant
R =
b
a+
√
(a+ η+)(a+ η−)
. (3.4)
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Lemma 3.1. Let RU =
2(a+η−)U−b
η− . Then, if R ≤ RU ,
pm(r) =

η−r + b
2(a+ η−)
, r ≤ R,
η+r + b
2(a+ η+)
, r > R.
(3.5)
If R > RU , then
pm(r) =

η−r + b
2(a+ η−)
, r ≤ RU ,
U, RU < r ≤ R′,
η+r + b
2(a+ η+)
, r > R′,
where R′ is the unique positive root for
η+r2 + [2bη+ − 4(a+ η+)η−U ]r + b2 − 4(a+ η+)U [b− (a+ η−)U ] = 0.
To keep the presentation clear and simple, we assume for the rest of this
section that R ≤ RU . That is, pm(r) is determined by (3.5). The analysis p-
resented in this section can also be extended to the other case with additional
discussions on whether U will appear on the periodic orbit or not.
Note that pm(r) is not a continuous function. As a result the dynamics of
reference prices under the myopic pricing strategy
rt+1(rt) = αrt + (1− α)pm(rt), t = 0, 1, ..., (3.6)
ends up with a discontinuous map from [0, U ] to [0, U ]. The analysis of the
dynamics (3.6) is not trivial at all. In fact, the study of dynamic systems
with discontinuous maps is originated in the analysis of electrical circuits
and is considered as “... a very complicated research subject and we can
obtain useful and interesting results only for various special classes of maps
(Sharkovsky and Chua, 1993).” For example, let mod denote the modulo
operation, then the dynamics of the famous doubling map D : [0, 1]→ [0, 1]
defined byD(x) = 2x mod 1 is chaotic, which means such a dynamical system
is highly sensitive to initial conditions (Hirsch et al., 2004).
Interestingly, we show that under some conditions, there exists a high-low
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price pattern under the myopic pricing strategy.
Proposition 3.1. pm(r) is a high-low pricing strategy with a periodic orbit
{r0, r1} for some r0, r1 ∈ [0, U ] and r0 6= r1 if and only if the following
inequality holds
4(1− α2)a2 + 4(1− α− α2)aη+ + 4aη− − (1 + α)2(η+)2 + 4η+η− ≥ 0. (3.7)
Notice that (3.7) holds when α = 0 (consumers only remember the price
of the previous period) and when the direct price effect weakly dominates
the reference price effect (4a ≥ η+).
0.27 0.28 0.29 0.3 0.31 0.32 0.33 0.34
0.27
0.28
0.29
0.3
0.31
0.32
0.33
0.34
0.35
0.36
rt
r t+
1
b = 581.96, a = 569.39, η+ = 2671.2, η− = 0, α = 0.8
 
 
α rt + (1−α)p
m(rt)
rt+1 = rt
0.27 0.28 0.29 0.3 0.31 0.32 0.33 0.34
0.27
0.28
0.29
0.3
0.31
0.32
0.33
0.34
0.35
0.36
rt
r t+
1
b = 581.96, a = 569.39, η+ = 2671.2, η− = 0, α = 0.85
 
 
α rt + (1−α)p
m(rt)
rt+1 = rt
Figure 3.2: Discontinuous map (3.6) and periodic orbits for the myopic
pricing strategies when α = 0.8 and α = 0.85 respectively
Unfortunately, condition (3.7) will be violated when α is close to 1. Figure
3.2 gives examples to illustrate the possible dynamics when condition (3.7)
fails. The demand parameters used in Figure 3.2 come from our empirical
examples in Section 3.5. One should interpret Figure 3.2 in the same way as
Figure 2.1, where the bold lines here represent the discontinuous map (3.6)
and the arrowed lines illustrate the dynamics of the system. In each panel,
the arrowed lines form a closed loop so it is a periodic orbit. In fact, the
periodic orbit in the left panel has period 3 and is of skimming pattern. The
periodic orbit in the right panel, on the other hand, has period 16 and the
myopic pricing strategy in this case is neither a cyclic penetrating nor a cyclic
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skimming pricing strategy. By comparing the two panels, one can see that a
mere increment of 0.05 in α can result in dramatic changes in the dynamics.
As illustrated in Figure 3.1, when the period is greater than or equal
to 4, there could exist other patterns rather than penetrating or skimming
pattern that have the same period. Our numerical experiments illustrate that
both the period and pattern of a periodic orbit can be very sensitive to the
changes in parameters, a phenomenon termed as border collision bifurcation
in the dynamic system and chaos community (Jain and Banerjee, 2003). In
the following, we identify necessary and sufficient conditions for the myopic
pricing strategy to admit a cyclic penetrating pattern and a cyclic skimming
pattern with cycle length n respectively. To simplify the expressions of our
conditions, define constants
µ =
a+ η+ −√a2 + aη+ + aη− + η+η−
η+ − η− ,
A = 1 + α− α η
−
2(a+ η−)
, B = 1 + α− α η
+
2(a+ η+)
,
and denote for n ≥ 0 the sum of geometric series ∑ni=0 ki by Skn (for n < 0,
let Skn = 0).
Proposition 3.2. For n ≥ 2, pm(r) is a cyclic penetrating pricing strategy
with cycle length n if and only if the following inequalities hold
An−1
SAn−1
< µ ≤ A
n−2
An−2B + SAn−2
. (3.8)
On the other hand, pm(r) is a cyclic skimming pricing strategy with cycle
length n if and only if the following inequalities hold
ABn−2 + SBn−3
ABn−2 + SBn−2
< µ ≤ S
B
n−2
SBn−1
. (3.9)
Note that when n = 2, both (3.8) and (3.9) reduce to A
1+A
< µ ≤ 1
1+B
,
which can be simplified to (3.7) by substituting the expressions for A, B and
µ, and by definition, a high-low pricing strategy is both a cyclic penetrating
and a cyclic skimming pricing strategy. For n large enough, there exists other
range of parameters other than (3.8) and (3.9) resulting periodic orbits of
period n that are neither penetrating nor skimming. In fact, corresponding
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to different parameter regions, there are exactly φ(n) different patterns of
periodic orbits of period n, where φ(·) is the so-called Euler totient function
(Rajpathak et al., 2012).
3.4 Optimal Pricing Strategy
Unlike the myopic pricing strategy, we do not have an explicit solution for
the optimal pricing strategy, which makes the analysis significantly more
challenging. To illustrate the difficulty, we first present a few properties on
the value function and optimal solution.
Since Π(r, p) = max{Π+(r, p),Π−(r, p)}, the Bellman equation can be cor-
respondingly rewritten as
V (r) = max
p∈[0,U ]
{max{Π+(r, p),Π−(r, p)}+ γV (αr + (1− α)p)}. (3.10)
We assume, without loss of generality, that p∗(r) and the optimal solutions
for other optimization problems in this section always take the largest one
among multiple solutions.
Consider the following two problems:
V +(r) = max
p∈[0,U ]
Π+(r, p) + γV (αr + (1− α)p), (3.11a)
V −(r) = max
p∈[0,U ]
Π−(r, p) + γV (αr + (1− α)p). (3.11b)
The solutions of (3.11a) and (3.11b) are denoted respectively as p+(r) and
p−(r). An observation here is that V (r) = max{V +(r), V −(r)} and p∗(r) ∈
{p+(r), p−(r)}. We next characterize properties of V ±(r) and p±(r).
Lemma 3.2. Both V +(r) and V −(r) are increasing and convex in r while
p+(r) and p−(r) are increasing in r.
Although problem (3.10) is difficult to analyze due to the term
max{Π+(r, p),Π−(r, p)}, Lemma 3.2 shows that the decomposed problems
(3.11a) and (3.11b) have some desired properties, i.e., monotonic solutions
and optimal objective values. We are interested in how p+(r) and p−(r) re-
late to the optimal pricing strategy p∗(r), and whether it is possible to obtain
simple characterizations for p+(r) and p−(r). For this purpose, we draw in
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Figure 3.3 the (numerically approximated) optimal pricing strategy for the
example used in the left panel of Figure 3.2 with a discount factor γ = 0.9.
In Figure 3.3, we observe that, similar to the myopic pricing strategy, there
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Figure 3.3: Optimal pricing strategy when α = 0.8, η− = 0 and γ = 0.9
exists a point rˆ ∈ [0, U ] such that p∗(r) is given by p−(r) for r ≤ rˆ and
p+(r) for r > rˆ. Unfortunately, though this observation seems to hold in
all our numerical experiments, we do not have a proof for general parameter
configurations. Of course, even if this observation is indeed true, Figure 3.3
suggests that both p+(r) and p−(r) can have numerous discontinuous points,
in contrast to the two linear pieces in the myopic pricing strategy. This
implies that they may not admit any simple characterizations.
In terms of dynamics, we have already demonstrated the dynamics of the
myopic pricing strategy (which has only one discontinuous point and admits
explicit expression) in Section 3.3. Here, we further give a side-by-side com-
parison of the dynamics of the optimal pricing strategies and their periodic
orbits in Figure 3.4 for the examples used in Figure 3.2 with the discount fac-
tor γ = 0.9. The bold lines in Figure 3.4 represent the map αrt+(1−α)p∗(rt)
and as α is close to one in both instances, many discontinuous points observed
in Figure 3.3 become difficult to be distinguished in Figure 3.4 through vi-
sual inspection. When comparing Figure 3.2 and Figure 3.4, it is clear that
the period lengths under optimal pricing strategies can be much larger than
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these under myopic pricing strategies, which indicates that the dynamics of
the optimal pricing strategy can be much more complicated and the analy-
sis, if possible, is likely to be significantly more challenging than that for the
myopic pricing strategy.
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Figure 3.4: Periodic orbits for the optimal pricing strategies when α = 0.8
and α = 0.85 respectively
Thus, for the rest of this section, we focus on a special case satisfying the
following assumption.
Assumption 3.1. Consumers only remember the most recent price (i.e. α =
0) and the demand is insensitive to the perceived surcharge (i.e. η− = 0).
Assumption 3.1 seems restrictive but has very plausible explanations. First
of all, consumers are unlikely to remember many historical prices and form
reference price by averaging them. Several papers, for example, Raman and
Bass (2002); Krishnamurthi et al. (1992); Mayhew and Winer (1992), also
assume that α = 0. It captures the fact that “consumers. . . experience con-
siderable difficulty in recalling accurately even the most recently encountered
prices . . . Thus, it is unlikely that consumers would retrieve from memory and
use prices encountered much beyond the immediate past purchase occasion
(Krishnamurthi et al., 1992).” On the other hand, η− = 0 models the mar-
ket of promotion-driven products, where the demand of product consists of
the base demand b−ap and promotion stimulated demand η+ max{r−p, 0}.
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This also reflects a harsh market condition under which the firm is very likely
to face a gain-seeking demand (Kallio and Halme, 2009).
Assumption 3.1 also provides good approximation to some practical sce-
narios. Specifically, we provide empirical examples in Section 3.5, in which
by imposing Assumption 3.1 does not result in much loss in the goodness of
fit of the model.
An immediate consequence from Assumption 3.1 is that both V −(r) and
p−(r) are now constant functions. In the sequel, we will use constants p−
and V − to denote the function values of p−(r) and V −(r). V −(r) being a
constant function is critical for the simplification of the problem, as it allows
us to relate p+(r) and p−(r) with p∗(r) in a simple way as demonstrated in
the following lemma.
Lemma 3.3. Under Assumption 3.1, there exists R0 ∈ (0, U) such that if
r ≤ R0, then V (r) = V − and p∗(r) = p− > r. If r > R0, then V (r) = V +(r)
and p∗(r) = p+(r) < r.
Lemma 3.3 gives us a broad picture of what p∗(r) looks like. That is,
when r ≤ R0, p∗(r) is a constant function and is always above r. At the
point R0, there is a “downward jump” from p
− > R0 to p+(R0) < R0. When
r > R0, p
∗(r) is then monotonically increasing in r. In the sequel, we will
briefly sketch the idea of how to characterize p+(r), which leads to a complete
characterization of the optimal pricing strategy p∗(r).
Let us reconsider problem (3.11a) when r ∈ [R0, U ] and keep in mind that
p+(R0) < R0 and p
+(r) is increasing on [R0, U ]. We distinguish between two
cases.
Case 1: For any r ∈ [R0, U ], p+(r) ≤ R0. In this case, V (p+(r)) = V − and
there is no loss of optimality to write (3.11a) as
V +(r) = max
p∈[0,U ]
Π+(r, p) + γV −,
from which we can explicitly solve
p+(r) =
η+r + b
2(a+ η+)
.
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Then, we have completely characterized the optimal solution as
p∗(r) =

p−, 0 ≤ r ≤ R0,
η+r + b
2(a+ η+)
, r > R0.
Case 2: There exists R1 ∈ (R0, U) such that p+(r) ≤ R0 for any r ∈
[R0, R1] and p
+(r) ≥ R0 for any r ∈ [R1, U ]. In this case, going through the
same argument in Case 1, we arrive at
p+(r) =
η+r + b
2(a+ η+)
, r ∈ [R0, R1],
and
V +(r) =
(η+r + b)2
4(a+ η+)
+ γV −, r ∈ [R0, R1].
When r ∈ [R1, U ], however, we need to again distinguish between two cases
based on whether p+(r) < R1 for all r ∈ [R1, U ] or not.
Essentially, repeating the analysis sketched above, we can arrive at the
main result of this section. Let m1 = 0 and for k > 1, mk =
γη+
2(a+η+)−mk−1η+ .
Proposition 3.3. Under Assumption 3.1, there exists an integer N ≥ 0 and
0 < R0 < R1 < ... < RN < U = RN+1 such that
p∗(r) =

p−, 0 ≤ r ≤ R0,
η+r + b
2(a+ η+)
, R0 < r < R1,
η+r + b+
∑k
i=0(
∏i
j=0mk+1−j)b
2(a+ η+)−mk+1η+ , Rk ≤ r < Rk+1, k = 1, ..., N.
Now we have a complete picture of the optimal pricing strategy p∗(r).
After a “downward jump” at R0, p
∗(r) follows a piece-wise linear function
with finitely many “upward jumps” at Rk for k = 1, ..., N . Moreover, the
slopes of these linear pieces increase after each of the “upward jump” by the
expression of p∗(r) given in Proposition 3.3.
Another important insight from our analysis is that for k = 1, ..., N , p∗(r)
maps [Rk, Rk+1] to [Rk−1, Rk] and finally p∗(r) maps [R0, R1] to [0, R0]. This
leads us to the study of the dynamics of p∗(r), which is a discontinuous map
with more than one discontinuous point. Even though the dynamics of a
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discontinuous map with only one discontinuous point is already complicated,
the characterization presented in Proposition 3.3 allows us to find simple
dynamics for p∗(r). Denote p∗1(r) = p
∗(r) and p∗i (r) = p
∗(p∗i−1(r)) for i > 1.
To make the notation clearer, in the following, we alternatively use r∗ to
denote the constant p−.
Proposition 3.4. Let N be the integer in Proposition 3.3. Under Assump-
tion 3.1, there exists an integer n with 2 ≤ n ≤ N + 2, such that p∗n(r∗) = r∗
and for all r0 ∈ [0, U ], the optimal reference price path r∗t converges in at
most N + 2 periods to the unique periodic orbit: {r∗, p∗1(r∗), ..., p∗n−1(r∗)},
i.e., there exists 0 ≤ τ ≤ N + 2 such that r∗τ = r∗. Moreover, the periodic
orbit has the property r∗ > p∗1(r
∗) > ... > p∗n−1(r
∗), i.e., p∗(r) is a cyclic
skimming pricing strategy.
Proposition 3.4 suggests that the following pricing strategy for practition-
ers when the demand they face is gain-seeking and promotion-driven: when
consumers’ initial reference price is low (below R0), the firm should use a
regular price (r∗). Then the firm applies a skimming pricing strategy by
gradually discounting the regular price over time until consumers’ reference
price falls below R0, and repeats such pricing strategy. The intuition behind
is easy to understand. When consumers have a low reference price, as they
are gain-seeking, it will not hurt the firm too much by setting a high price
in order to drag consumers’ reference price to a higher level. After such ma-
nipulation, the firm will benefit greatly by offering discounts since consumers
are sensitive to gains and there will be a boost in demand.
An illustration of the optimal pricing strategy and the periodic orbit is
provided in Figure 3.5. The parameters used for Figure 3.5 are taken from
one of the empirical examples provided in Section 3.5, except γ = 0.1 here.
One can see that, indeed, there are more than one discontinuous point and
in this particular example the periodic orbit has period 3 (n = 3).
Next, we identify conditions on parameters such that a high-low pricing
strategy is optimal. Define the constant K =
a+η+−
√
(a+η+)2−γ(η+)2
η+
and recall
the constant R = b
a+
√
(a+η+)(a+η−)
= b
a+
√
a(a+η+)
(here, by Assumption 3.1,
η− = 0), which is the discontinuous point in the myopic pricing strategy,
defined in (3.4).
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Figure 3.5: Optimal pricing strategy and a periodic orbit
Proposition 3.5. Under Assumption 3.1, if the following inequality also
holds,
η+U + 1
1−K b
2(a+ η+)−Kη+ ≤ R, (3.12)
then a high-low pricing strategy {pH , pL} is optimal, where pH = r∗ and
pL =
η+r∗+b
2(a+η+)
.
Proposition 3.5 above formally settles the conjecture of Popescu and Wu
(2007) in the sense that it provides a verifiable condition from problem pa-
rameters that guarantees the optimality of high-low pricing strategy. One
direct implication of condition (3.12) is that a high-low pricing strategy is
always optimal if the feasible prices are not too high, i.e., U is sufficiently
small. This is intuitive since if the firm’s highest possible price is already
low, then there is not much room for the firm to set different discount levels.
Condition (3.12) is only a sufficient condition, a necessary and sufficient con-
dition is hard to obtain since we have no prior knowledge on N , R0, ..., RN ,
nor r∗ and it is possible that n < N , which means it is not clear which linear
piece pL will lie in. However, Proposition 3.5 suggests a possibility of solving
explicitly the optimal cyclic pricing strategy. That is, if we know the period
is exactly n, then we are able to exploit such structures to solve for r∗ and
the discontinuous points R0, R1, ..., RN given in Proposition 3.3. Next, we
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identify conditions such that the period of the optimal cyclic pricing strategy
is at most n.
Proposition 3.6. Let R0 = R and for k ≥ 1 recursively define Rk to be the
unique solution of the equation
η+r + b+
∑k
i=0(
∏i
j=0 mk+1−j)b
2(a+ η+)−mk+1η+ = Rk−1.
Under Assumption 3.1, if the following inequality holds for some k ≥ 0
η+U + 1
1−K b
2(a+ η+)−Kη+ ≤ Rk, (3.13)
then the length of period n must satisfy n ≤ k + 2.
Note that the recursively defined constants Rk provide lower bounds for
the unknown constants Rk given in Proposition 3.3, i.e., Rk ≤ Rk for
k = 0, 1, ..., N (see the proof of Proposition 3.6 in Appendix B). Similar
to Proposition 3.5, one practical implication here is that the cycle length or
the complexity of the pricing strategy depends on the flexibility of pricing,
i.e., the range of feasible prices. When U is small, there is less room for the
firm to apply intricate pricing strategy that will result in a large cycle length.
The advantage of condition (3.13) is that it can be easily verified from the
problem parameters. For instance, from the parameters we used in Figure
3.5 and with U = 1, it is straightforward to compute that
η+U + 1
1−K b
2(a+ η+)−Kη+ = 0.502
and
R0 = 0.302, R1 = 0.493, R2 = 0.949.
Applying Proposition 3.6, we know that the optimal solution has a periodic
orbit with period less than or equal to 4. Indeed, one can see from Figure
3.5 that the optimal solution has a periodic orbit with period 3.
Finally, we present how to solve for r∗ and R0, R1, ..., RN if we know the
period is exactly n. First, it is straightforward to see from our previous
analysis that if the period is n then r∗ ∈ [Rn−2, Rn−1). Next, let V0(r) = V −,
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V m0 (r) = 0 and recursively for k = 1, ..., N define
Vk(r) = max
p∈[0,U ]
Π+(r, p) + γVk−1(p),
V mk (r) = max
p∈[0,U ]
Π+(r, p) + γV mk−1(p).
Note that the expressions for V mk (r), k = 1, ..., N can be explicitly computed
and it is not difficult to see that
Vk(r) = V
m
k (r) + γ
kV0(r) = V
m
k (r) + γ
kV −.
In the proof of Proposition 3.3, given in Appendix B, we have shown that
V (r) = Vn−1(r), r ∈ [Rn−2, Rn−1).
Recall that
r∗ = p− = arg max
p∈[0,U ]
p(b− ap) + γV (p),
V − = max
p∈[0,U ]
p(b− ap) + γV (p).
Thus, without loss of optimality, r∗ and V − can be explicitly solved by
r∗ = arg max
p∈[0,U ]
p(b− ap) + γVn−1(p) = arg max
p∈[0,U ]
p(b− ap) + γV mn−1(p),
V − = max
p∈[0,U ]
p(b− ap) + γVn−1(p) = 1
1− γn [r
∗(b− ar∗) + γV mn−1(r∗)].
Once the expression for V − is obtained, we have the explicit expressions
for all Vk(·) for k = 0, ..., N . By continuity of V (·), for k ≥ 0, Rk can be
sequentially computed by solving the equation
Vk(Rk) = Vk+1(Rk),
and finally, N is obtained by N = sup{k : Rk ≤ U}.
Combined with Proposition 3.6, if we can find some k ≥ 0 such that (3.13)
holds, then we can repeat the above computations by assuming the period
n = 2, ..., k + 2. As the value function is the unique solution to the Bellman
equation (3.3), the process we suggested is also guaranteed to yield a unique
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solution. We illustrate the computing process above by continuing with the
example in Figure 3.5. By Proposition 3.6, the period n ≤ 4. As a start, we
assume n = 2, then
r∗ = arg max
p∈[0,U ]
p(b− ap) + γV m1 (p) = 0.5890
and consequently we can solve
R0 = 0.3290, R1 = 0.5691.
Notice that r∗ 6∈ [R0, R1) which leads to a contradiction with n = 2.
We proceed to assume n = 3, then
r∗ = arg max
p∈[0,U ]
p(b− ap) + γV m2 (p) = 0.5915
and
R0 = 0.3291, R1 = 0.5692, R2 > 1.
Here, r∗ ∈ [R1, R2) is consistent with our assumption that n = 3. Thus, we
have solved explicitly r∗ and R0, R1.
3.5 Numerical Study
In this section, we first provide some empirical examples and try to under-
stand what are the implications of real data for the gain-loss asymmetry as
well as other parameters used in our model. In particular, we show that
Assumption 3.1 generally gives a more parsimonious model while retaining
most of the explanatory power of the full model. We then study the perfor-
mance of several simple pricing strategies as opposed to the optimal pricing
strategy. We further examine the performance of simple cyclic pricing strate-
gies and the robustness of Proposition 3.4 numerically when Assumption 3.1
is violated.
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3.5.1 Empirical Examples
We utilize the same data set analyzed in Section 2.3. Readers are referred
to Section 2.3 for the description of the data set as well as the method in
estimating memory factor α.
The following table reports the estimates of the key parameters that of
interest, i.e., α, η+ and η− for five brands. The rest two brands, belonging
to larger volume category, are excluded from the analysis since the estimate
for a, the price sensitivity, has a wrong sign. We also report the goodness of
fit measurements, i.e., R2 and adjusted R2, for the comparison between the
full model and the restricted model in which Assumption 3.1 is imposed. All
the standard errors are computed via the bootstrapping procedure described
in Freedman (1984).
Table 3.1: Parameter Estimates and Goodness of Fit
αˆ ηˆ+ ηˆ− R2 Adjusted R2
Star Kist 6 oz.
Full Model 0 268587 -17356 0.360 0.354
(0.064) (34198.15) (24011.89)
Restricted Model 0 267124 0 0.359 0.355
Chicken of the Sea 6 oz.
Full Model 0.33 573859 -58196 0.570 0.566
(0.074) (44329.31) (39511.26)
Restricted Model 0 502684 0 0.558 0.555
Bumble Bee Solid 6.12 oz.
Full Model 0.99 15787 -4195 0.496 0.491
(0.008) (5305.44) (4823.14)
Restricted Model 0 7646.8 0 0.462 0.459
Bumble Bee Chunk 6.12 oz.
Full Model 0.15 343059 -11904 0.640 0.637
(0.066) (18962.34) (17330.99)
Restricted Model 0 333538 0 0.639 0.637
Geisha 6 oz.
Full Model 0.48 7062.1 574.0 0.545 0.541
(0.15) (1466.40) (1194.65)
Restricted Model 0 5402.0 0 0.537 0.534
Standard errors are in parenthesis and are obtained from bootstrapping.
In Table 3.1, for all five brands, ηˆ+ is statistically significant and indicates
that the perceived discount term max{rt − pt, 0} has a large impact on the
sales. On the other hand, ηˆ− has the wrong sign in all but one brand and
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is statistically insignificant in all cases. As a result, restricting ηˆ− = 0 will
give a more parsimonious model while retaining the explanatory power. By
comparing the full model with the restricted model, we find surprisingly and
uniformly across all five brands, except “Bumble Bee Solid 6.12 oz”, that
restricting αˆ = 0 also has little effect on the goodness of fit of the model.
Our result, in agreement with that by Greenleaf (1995), shows that the
coefficient of the perceived discount is greater than the perceived surcharge.
As we have pointed out in Section 3.1, this result does not necessarily contra-
dict with the prediction made by prospect theory (Tversky and Kahneman,
1991). We consider the demand for the canned tuna in Chicago area was
mainly driven by promotions. In other words, when there is no promotion,
consumers’ reference price tends to be below price and max{rt − pt, 0} = 0.
The only demand left is base demand b−apt. On the other hand, promotion-
s will reduce price below consumers’ reference price and increase the sales
greatly by η+ max{rt − pt, 0}.
In summary, our empirical study illustrates that Assumption 3.1 is statis-
tically plausible for some realistic settings and practical applications.
3.5.2 Performance of Simple Pricing Strategies
In this subsection, we first compare the performance of several simple pricing
strategies with that of the optimal pricing strategy based on one of the em-
pirical examples (“Star Kist 6 oz.”) in Section 3.5.1. Note that Assumption
3.1 is satisfied in the “Star Kist 6 oz.” case in Section 3.5.1. To examine
what happens when Assumption 3.1 fails, we first design different parame-
ter configurations that violate Assumption 3.1 and study the performance
of simple cyclic pricing strategies under all these scenarios. Then, we nu-
merically illustrate how the optimal pricing strategies will change when the
assumption η− = 0 is relaxed.
Since the numerical values of the parameter estimates are quite large, for
convenience we divide all the parameters in demand function by 100 without
affecting the optimal solutions. The demand function for the item “Star Kist
6 oz.” is then given by
D(r, p) = 581.96− 569.39p+ 2671.2 max{r − p, 0},
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and the reference price formulation is
rt+1 = pt.
We set the price range to be [0, 1] which includes the price range of historical
data and the initial reference price to be the average price in the data set,
i.e., r0 = 0.8.
Now we compare the performance of three simple pricing strategies with
the optimal pricing strategy over a horizon of T = 100. For the rest of this
section, we set the discount factor γ = 0.9. The optimal pricing strategy here
is solved by using the algorithm developed in Hu (2012) (one is also referred
to Chapter 4) for the finite horizon problem when Assumption 3.1 holds.
One simple strategy we consider is the constant pricing strategy or Every
Day Low Price (EDLP) mentioned in Fibich et al. (2003), Popescu and Wu
(2007) and Nasiry and Popescu (2011). In this case, the constant pricing
strategy pEDLP amounts to solving
max
p∈[0,1]
100∑
t=0
γtp(581.96− 569.39p+ 2671.2 max{rt − p, 0}),
s.t. rt+1 = p, 0 ≤ t ≤ 99, r0 = 0.8.
It is easy to see that the optimal solution is pEDLP = 0.48. Note that similar
to the method by Fibich et al. (2003), here pEDLP depends on r0.
Another simple strategy we consider is the high-low pricing strategy. The
high-low pricing strategy pH and pL amount to solving
max
p1,p2∈[0,1]
100∑
t=0
γtpi(581.96− 569.39pi + 2671.2 max{rt − pi, 0}),
s.t. rt+1 = pi, 0 ≤ t ≤ 99, r0 = 0.8,
i = t mod 2, 0 ≤ t ≤ 100.
The above problem turns out to be difficult to solve exactly. Instead, we
discretize the prices and search for the optimal high-low pricing strategies.
The optimal solution is solved as pH = 1 and pL = 0.49.
Finally, we consider the myopic pricing strategy which is explicitly solved
as (3.5).
We plot the relative ratio of the profit obtained up to time t to the optimal
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Figure 3.6: Profit comparison of simple pricing strategies
profit up to time t, for 0 ≤ t ≤ T , under the constant, high-low, and myopic
pricing strategies in Figure 3.6. Our result shows that even though in the
first two periods constant and myopic pricing strategies obtain a profit higher
than the optimal pricing strategy, their performances decay quickly. Over
the whole planning horizon, the high-low pricing strategy, which achieves
more than 99% of the optimal profit, is much better than both the constan-
t and myopic pricing strategies. By checking the dynamics of the optimal
pricing strategy for the infinite horizon problem, we find that the optimal
pricing strategy in this particular case is indeed a high-low pricing strategy
and a time horizon of T = 100 is long enough to exhibit the long-run be-
havior. Interestingly, Figure 3.6 shows that even myopic pricing strategy can
outperform the constant pricing strategy.
With the understanding that the high-low pricing strategy performs quite
well in our empirical example, we next examine the performance of the high-
low pricing strategy when Assumption 3.1 is not satisfied. More specifically,
we consider the following demand functions
D(r, p) = 581.96− 569.39p+ 2671.2 max{r − p, 0}+ η−min{r − p, 0},
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where η− is chosen such that the ratio η−/η+ ∈ {0, 0.02, 0.04, ..., 0.98} with
η+ = 2671.2. We also let α ∈ {0, 0.2, 0.4, 0.6, 0.8} in the reference price
formulation (3.1). In total, these parameters include 250 scenarios.
Instead of solving for an exact optimal solution, we numerically approxi-
mate the optimal solution through discretization and value iterations. Both
the price and reference price are discretized with a step size of 0.0005 (a
total of 2000 points for each of them). The ratio of the profit attained by
the high-low pricing strategy over the profit attained by the optimal pricing
strategy is reported in Figure 3.7 for all 250 combinations.
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Figure 3.7: Relative profit under different parameter combinations
From Figure 3.7 we note that there is no clear monotonic relationship be-
tween relative profit and the two parameters η− and α. However, we observe
that even in the worst case (α = 0.8, η− = 0) the high-low pricing strategy
achieves above 90% of the optimal profit. This is somewhat surprising given
how complex the optimal pricing strategy in the worst case is as illustrated
in Figure 3.3.
One might wonder in the worst scenario whether other cyclic pricing strate-
gies with relatively short cycle will achieve better performance. We answer
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this question in Table 3.2.
Table 3.2: Performance of Cyclic Pricing Strategies
Cycle Length 1 2 3 4 5
Relative Profit 89.87% 90.74% 96.76% 98.34% 98.30%
Note that for this particular parameter configuration, even the constant
pricing strategy (cycle length is 1) can have a decent performance and a
cyclic pricing strategies with cycle length of 3 or 4 can already achieve more
than 95% of the optimal profit. Another interesting fact is that increasing
the length of cycle, though complicating the optimization process, does not
necessarily result in a better performance as indicated in the last two columns
in Table 3.2. This is because, when the optimal pricing strategy is of cycle
length 2, for instance, imposing a constraint that cycle length equals to 3 or
any odd numbers will only make the resulting cyclic pricing strategies more
different from the optimal.
Finally, we check to what extent Proposition 3.4 will still hold if the as-
sumption η− = 0 is relaxed. For this purpose, we fix α = 0 and vary η−
such that the ratio η−/η+ ∈ {0, 0.02, 0.04, ..., 0.98}. When η−/η+ < 0.16, it
is found that high-low pricing strategy is always optimal and the dynamics
proposed in Proposition 3.4 holds true. For conciseness, in Figure 3.8, we on-
ly report the results for the values η−/η+ ∈ {0.16, 0.18, 0.20, 0.22, 0.24, 0.26}.
When η−/η+ = 0.16, 0.18, similar to the cases for η−/η+ < 0.16, there is only
one discontinuous point in the optimal pricing strategies and the high-low
pricing strategy is optimal. For η−/η+ = 0.20, 0.22, 0.24, there are multiple
discontinuous points appearing in the optimal pricing strategies, however, the
periodic orbits in these figures indicate that a cyclic skimming pricing strate-
gy with cycle length 3 is still optimal. That is, the conclusion of Proposition
3.4 still holds for η−/η+ ≤ 0.24. However, the last figure shows that anoth-
er 2% increment in the ratio will result in a very different optimal pricing
strategy.
3.6 Conclusion
In this chapter we analyzed a dynamic pricing problem in a market with
gain-seeking consumers. In this model, demand depends on both current
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Figure 3.8: The optimal pricing strategies when α = 0 and
η−/η+ ∈ {0.16, 0.18, 0.20, 0.22, 0.24, 0.26}
62
selling price and reference price, where the latter evolves according to an
exponentially smoothing process of past prices.
We showed that even employing the myopic pricing strategy can result in
a very complicated dynamics of reference prices. We identified conditions
that lead to simple pricing dynamics, for example, high-low pricing, cyclic
skimming pricing or cyclic penetrating pricing.
Realizing the complexity of the problem, we restricted ourselves to an em-
pirically validated special case and proved that a cyclic skimming pricing
strategy is optimal over an infinite horizon. We further provided condition-
s on the upper bound of the cycle lengths. Although our characterization
of the optimal pricing strategy built on a piece-wise linear demand model,
both Proposition 3.3 and Proposition 3.4 can be extended to general nonlin-
ear demand functions proposed in Popescu and Wu (2007) by imposing an
assumption similar to Assumption 3.1.
Our work is only a start in exploring the effects of gain-seeking behav-
ior/phenomenon on dynamic pricing problems. It would be very interesting
to both categorize and characterize the possible patterns of the optimal pric-
ing strategy under the general case. As one may see from our analysis of the
special case, the structure of the optimal solution has intimate connections
with the dynamics of the optimal solution. Thus, it is important to under-
stand how the structure and the dynamics of the optimal solution interact
with each other under more general settings.
Finally, it would be interesting to study the impact of gain-seeking ref-
erence price effects on the joint pricing and inventory decisions. Pricing
and inventory integration has received much attentions in the past few years
(see, for example, Chen and Simchi-Levi, 2004a,b, 2006, 2012). Recently,
Chen et al. (2013) incorporated reference price effect into coordinated pric-
ing and inventory models. However, their model focuses only on loss-averse
consumers.
63
Chapter 4
Efficient Algorithms for Dynamic Pricing
Problem
4.1 Introduction
Part of Chapter 2, Chapter 3 and many of the references therein are devoted
to understanding the qualitative behavior of the optimal pricing strategies
when the firm faces reference price dependent demand and many manageri-
al insights are obtained. However, to our best knowledge, how to compute
the optimal prices accurately and efficiently remains largely unexplored. As
Fibich et al. (2003) point out, “calculations of optimal strategies were limit-
ed to numerical simulations using dynamic programming”. In practice, the
revenue of many firms in retail industry, where a large portion of empirical
evidences on reference price effects are found, can exceed $30 billion per year
(see Talluri and Van Ryzin, 2005). This fact highlights the importance of
even small incremental gains from revenue management. Thus, computing
the optimal prices accurately becomes a critical question. On the other hand,
a firm not only needs to coordinate pricing decisions with other operations
management decisions such as inventory decisions but also makes all those
decisions for over thousands of products. When the more realistic reference
price models are incorporated in such decision support systems, the efficiency
of computing the simplest basic model becomes crucial.
In this chapter, we look into the computational issue of the dynamic pric-
ing problem under the exponential smoothing reference price model. In this
model, a firm sells a product over a finite time horizon and faces possibly
time-varying demands, which depend on not only the price the firm sets in
that period but also all the historical prices the firm set through reference
price effects. Like most of the previous literature, the demand in each pe-
riod is assumed to be deterministic. This assumption is plausible in many
practical settings, in which a firm can predict future demands quite accurate-
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ly from historical sales data. As we have discussed in Chapter 3, a unique
feature and also a significant challenge in this model is the asymmetry in
reference price effects, i.e., consumers’ perception of gains and losses could
be different. This leads to a non-smooth optimization problem, for which no
standard optimization methods can be applied.
Hu (2012) attempts to address the computational issue in the dynamic
pricing problem with reference price effects in a deterministic joint inventory
and pricing model, which includes the problem analyzed in this chapter as a
subproblem. However, one of the central algorithm in Hu (2012) ignores the
fact that the value function may be non-differentiable, which can cause the
running time of algorithm presented in Hu (2012) to be exponential in the
problem horizon. Indeed, it is still an open question that even for the loss-
averse demands whether the dynamic pricing problem can be solved exactly
in polynomial time or not.
Facing with such challenges, in this chapter we follow the idea in Hu (2012)
to develop an algorithm which we prove to be a polynomial time algorithm
for the loss-averse demands under a certain mild technical condition on the
input parameters. Although our model assumes piecewise linear demand
function, the core part of the algorithm may also be used to other forms
of demand function. In addition to the algorithm itself, a few properties
we found along with the algorithm are potentially applicable to other non-
smooth optimization problems as well. We refer the readers to Hu (2012) for
another polynomial time algorithm that solves a special case of the problem
when demands are gain-seeking and for a heuristic that can be used for any
input parameters. We apply the algorithm in this chapter along with that
developed in Hu (2012) to a practical problem from industry with real data
and demonstrate the efficiency and robustness of the algorithm.
Aside from the stream of literature on dynamic pricing problems with ref-
erence price effects, there are a few recent attempts that incorporate reference
price effects into integrated inventory and pricing models. Gimpl-Heersink
(2008) analyzes a stochastic periodic review finite horizon model in which
demand is a function of both the current price and the reference price with
additive random noise. Chen et al. (2013) study a similar model and intro-
duce a novel transformation technique to convert a non-concave single-period
revenue function to a modified revenue function that is concave. They charac-
terize various structures of optimal solutions. Based on a different mechanism
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rather than the reference price models, Ahn et al. (2007) develop algorithm-
s for a periodic review finite horizon deterministic model in which demand
depends on past prices. Even though the concentration of this chapter is on
developing algorithms for the pure pricing problem, our algorithms can serve
as a building block in a deterministic joint inventory and pricing problem.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section 4.2 the
mathematical formulation of our model is presented. In Section 4.3, we ana-
lyze the model with loss-averse consumers and develop a strongly polynomial
time algorithm to solve the optimal prices exactly. Our algorithm along with
the algorithms in Hu (2012) are tested on real data in Section 4.4 to solve
a practical industry problem with analysis on the efficiency as well as the
robustness of the algorithms. Finally, we conclude the chapter in the last
section with some suggestions for future research. To maintain a clear pre-
sentation, all technical proofs are presented in Appendix C.
4.2 Model
We assume that the firm sells a product over a finite horizon of T periods.
As in Chapter 3, we restrict ourselves to the exponential smoothing model,
i.e.,
rt+1 = αrt + (1− α)pt, t = 1, 2, · · · , T, (4.1)
where we restrict α < 1 to avoid the case that past prices have no impact on
demand.
Following Chapter 2 and Chapter 3, the demand at period t, with a given
price p and a reference price r, is modeled as
Dt(p, r) = bt − atp+ η+ max{r − p, 0}+ η−min{r − p, 0},
where Dt(p, p) = bt−atp is the base demand independent of reference prices,
η(r − p) is the additional demand or demand loss induced by the reference
price effect. Here, the potential market size bt and the price sensitivity at
are non-negative, but unlike previous chapters, they are allowed to be time-
varying to reflect a dynamic market conditions. In this chapter, we consider
both loss-averse (loss/gain neutral) case and gain-seeking case and make
no assumption on the relative magnitudes of η+, η−. However, since these
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two coefficients, along with the memory factor α reflect consumers’ internal
perceptions of reference prices, losses and gains, they are assumed to be time-
invariant even though our algorithms can be easily extended to the case when
they vary with time.
Facing the reference price dependent demands and an initial reference price
r1, the firm then maximizes its total profit over the planning horizon by
determining the optimal price in each period. That is,
max
pt:1≤t≤T
pi1(r1, p1) + pi2(r2, p2) + · · ·+ piT (rT , pT ) (4.2)
s.t. rt+1 = αrt + (1− α)pt, pt ∈ [Lt, Ut], t = 1, · · · , T.
In the problem formulation (4.2), pit(rt, pt) = ptDt(rt, pt) is the profit col-
lected in period t, 1 ≤ t ≤ T , where we have implicitly assumed that the
marginal cost is zero for simplicity and all our results can be extended to
the case when there is a non-zero marginal cost. The lower bounds Lt and
upper bounds Ut on prices are non-negative and are also allowed to be time-
varying. One reason for this lies in our formulation of time-varying demands.
Since demands can not be negative, this naturally generates a time-varying
upper-bounds on prices. Also, in some scenarios, firm has other objectives
such as minimum sales or maximum allowable discount on prices which could
vary season by season and result in a time-varying constraints on prices.
Since the effect of past prices on period t’s demand is summarized by the
reference price rt, it will be sometimes convenient to express profit in terms
of reference prices. In particular, given the reference prices rt, rt+1 at periods
t, t + 1, respectively, the price pt and the profit, denoted by Πt(rt, rt+1), at
period t can be expressed as
pt =
rt+1 − αrt
1− α , Πt(rt, rt+1) = pit
(
rt,
rt+1 − αrt
1− α
)
.
4.3 Loss-averse Consumers
In this section we focus on the case when consumers are loss-averse, i.e.,
η− > η+. We remark here that in the loss-neutral case (η− = η+), if there
are no constraints on prices, then explicit solutions can be computed via
standard linear-quadratic control techniques with computational complexity
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of O(T ) (see, for instance, Anderson and Moore, 2007). On the other hand,
with price constraints, the loss-neutral case can be reduced to a special case
analyzed in this section and consequently our algorithms can be applied.
In the following, we formulate problem (4.2) as a dynamic programming
problem and discuss the potential challenges in solving exactly the dynamic
programming problem. In the first subsection, we lift our discussion to a more
general problem setting and explore the essential properties in the problem
that help us to overcome the challenges. In the second subsection, we then
show that under a technical assumption, these properties hold in our dynamic
programming problem and we develop a strongly polynomial time algorithm
to solve the problem exactly.
We first formulate problem (4.2) as a dynamic programming problem. Let
Gt+1(rt+1), t ≤ T , be the maximal accumulated profit up to period t when
reference price rt+1 is specified at period t+ 1. That is,
Gt+1(rt+1) = max Π1(r1, r2) + Π2(r2, r3) + · · ·+ Πt(rt, rt+1),
s.t. αrs + (1− α)ps = rs+1, ps ∈ [Ls, Us], s ≤ t.
Apparently solving problem (4.2) amounts to maximizing GT+1(r). Thus,
it suffices to determine the expression of GT+1(r), which can be iteratively
derived for t = 2, · · · , T through solving the problem
Gt+1(q) = max
r
{Πt(r, q) +Gt(r) : q − αr
1− α ∈ [Lt, Ut]},
rt(q) = arg max
r
{Πt(r, q) +Gt(r) : q − αr
1− α ∈ [Lt, Ut]},
(4.3)
where G2(q) = Π1(r1, q) for q ∈ [αr1 + (1 − α)L1, αr1 + (1 − α)U1]. Note
here that due to the price constraints p ∈ [Lt, Ut], Gt+1(q) is only defined
for those states that lead to feasible solutions. For convenience we specify
Gt+1(q) = −∞ if q leads to an empty feasible set in the above problem and
the effective domain of Gt+1(q) is then defined as {q : Gt+1(q) > −∞}. In
particular, the first profit-to-go function G2(q) is of the following form
G2(q) =
{
g2(q), if q ∈ [αr1 + (1− α)L1, αr1 + (1− α)U1],
−∞, otherwise,
where g2(q) = Π1(r1, q) consists of two quadratic pieces and is concave and
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continuously differentiable except at r1.
The main challenge in solving problem (4.3) efficiently is associated with
non-differentiability in the objective function. For instance, even for t = 2,
both Gt(r) and Πt(r, q) are non-differentiable functions and consist of two
different quadratic pieces. Thus, we need to answer the question that in
general for t > 2, how “simple” can Gt(r) be? In other words, at how many
points will Gt(r) be non-differentiable and how many quadratic pieces will
Gt(r) be consisted of?
Here, we give a brief sketch of our approach in dealing with the above
challenge. Suppose we already have the analytical expressions for Gt(r). As
we will later show that there exist rt, rt such that Gt(r) follows the form
Gt(r) =
{
gt(r), r ∈ [rt, rt],
−∞, r ∈ (−∞, rt) ∪ (rt,+∞),
where gt(r) is a continuous function defined on the whole real line. We
consider the following problem first:
f(q) = max
r
{Πt(r, q) + gt(r)},
r∗(q) = arg max
r
{Πt(r, q) + gt(r)}.
(4.4)
Note that in problem (4.4), we ignore the price constraints and extend the
effective domain of Gt(r) to the whole real line by replacing Gt(r) with gt(r).
This allows us to concentrate on the issue of non-differentiability, which is
addressed in the following subsection in a more general problem setting.
Specifically, we develop an efficient algorithm to solve problem (4.4) and
show that the structure of f(q) is “as simple as” gt(r).
We then consider the problem
fc(q) = max
r
{Πt(r, q) + gt(r) : q − αr
1− α ∈ [Lt, Ut]}},
r∗c (q) = arg max
r
{Πt(r, q) + gt(r) : q − αr
1− α ∈ [Lt, Ut]}},
(4.5)
where we use subscript “c” in the solution and optimal value function to
emphasize the presence of price constraint in problem (4.5). The second
subsection deals with the issue of computing r∗c (q), fc(q) from r
∗(q), f(q) and
computing rt(q), Gt+1(q) from r
∗
c (q), fc(q).
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4.3.1 A General Problem
The purpose of this subsection is two fold. First, we believe the presentation
of the algorithm can be made clean and organized by highlighting only those
properties that are essential for our algorithm. Second, the treatment in a
more general setting naturally makes our algorithm robust to other forms
of demand function. Furthermore, some of the properties we identified are
potentially applicable to other problems as well. The following problem,
which is a generalization of problem (4.4), is considered in this subsection.
f(q) = max
r
{Π(r, q) + g(r)},
r∗(q) = arg max
r
{Π(r, q) + g(r)}.
(4.6)
We impose the following two assumptions on both the input functions
Π(r, q) and g(r) as well as the output functions f(q) and r∗(q) throughout
this subsection.
Assumption 4.1. (a) Π(r, q) : R2 → R is continuous, strictly supermodular
in (r, q) and strictly concave in r. Furthermore, Π(r, q) has the form
Π(r, q) =
{
Π+(r, q), q ≤ r,
Π−(r, q), q ≥ r,
where Π+(r, q) and Π−(r, q) are continuously differentiable functions defined
on R2. We denote pi(q) = Π(q, q) = Π+(q, q) = Π−(q, q).
(b) g(r) : R→ R is concave and continuously differentiable except at finite
points r1, ..., rm, with −∞ = r0 < r1 < ... < rm < rm+1 = +∞. More
specifically,
g(r) =

g1(r), r0 ≤ r ≤ r1,
...
gm+1(r), rm ≤ r ≤ rm+1,
where gj(·), 1 ≤ j ≤ m+1 are all continuously differentiable functions defined
on R. We call r1, ..., rm the kink points of g(r).
An immediate consequence from the strict concavity and continuity as-
sumptions in Assumption 4.1 is that r∗(q) is single valued and continuous
(see, for example, Ok, 2007). We further impose the following assumptions
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on f(q) and r∗(q).
Assumption 4.2. (a) f(q) is concave.
(b) q − r∗(q) satisfies the single crossing property. That is, for q′ > q′′,
q′′−r∗(q′′) > 0 implies q′−r∗(q′) > 0, and q′′−r∗(q′′) ≥ 0 implies q′−r∗(q′) ≥
0.
Finding general conditions on Π(r, q) and g(r) such that Assumption 4.2
holds is an interesting research topic itself (for instance, Assumption 4.2 (a)
will hold if we further assume Π(r, q) to be jointly concave) and is beyond
the scope of this chapter. However, by using a transformation technique
developed in Chen et al. (2013) we will prove in the next subsection that
under some mild conditions Assumption 4.2 holds for our dynamic pricing
problem.
The rest of this subsection is divided into three parts. (a) We first prove
that r∗(q) can be decomposed into the solutions of two simpler problems and
r∗(q) has certain monotonic structures. (b) Then we show that even though
Π(r, q) may not be differentiable along the line r = q, f(q) is, surprisingly,
continuously differentiable except at at most m points, whose candidates are
exactly r1, ..., rm, the kink points of g(r). In the extreme case, when g(r)
is continuously differentiable, then f(r) is also continuously differentiable.
That is, the kink points of g(r) are, in some sense, “preserved” under the
maximization of problem (4.6). This observation connects the algorithm
developed in this subsection with the dynamic programming algorithm in
the next subsection. (c) Finally, we consider the computational issue. We
show how the structures of r∗(q) allow us to develop an efficient algorithm to
compute explicitly r∗(q) and f(q) once we know the functional form of the
input functions g(r) and Π(r, q).
(a) Structures. We introduce the following two problems
f+(q) = max
r
{Π+(r, q) + g(r)},
r+(q) = arg max
r
{Π+(r, q) + g(r)},
(4.7)
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and
f−(q) = max
r
{Π−(r, q) + g(r)},
r−(q) = arg max
r
{Π−(r, q) + g(r)}.
(4.8)
Our first result states that r∗(q) can be decomposed into r+(q), r−(q) in the
following way.
Proposition 4.1. There exist Q ≤ Q, such that
r∗(q) =

r+(q), q < Q,
q, Q ≤ q ≤ Q,
r−(q), q > Q,
and f(q) =

f+(q), q < Q,
pi(q) + g(q), Q ≤ q ≤ Q,
f−(q), q > Q.
Next, we closely examine the structure of r+(q) and r−(q).
Lemma 4.1. There exist −∞ = q0 < q1 ≤ q1 < q2 ≤ q2 < ... < qm ≤ qm <
q
m+1
= +∞ such that for 1 ≤ j ≤ m, r+(q) = rj on [qj, qj] and r+(q) is
strictly increasing elsewhere.
Lemma 4.1 also holds for r−(q). That is, for 1 ≤ j ≤ m, r−(q) = rj
on [q
j
, qj] and r
−(q) is strictly increasing elsewhere. However, the threshold
values q
j
and qj may be different from that for r
+(q). Now combining this
observation and Proposition 4.1 we arrive at the following result. With a
slight abuse of notations, we still use q
j
and qj to denote the new threshold
values.
Proposition 4.2. There exist −∞ = q0 < q1 ≤ q1 < q2 ≤ q2 < ... < qm ≤
qm < qm+1 = +∞ such that for 1 ≤ j ≤ m, r∗(q) = rj on [qj, qj] and r∗(q)
is strictly increasing elsewhere.
Graphically, as illustrated in Figure 4.1, Proposition 4.2 suggests a ladder
shape of r∗(q). That is, r∗(q) alternates between a strictly increasing piece
and a constant piece with the constant piece corresponding to a kink point of
g(·). Clearly, if we can compute the threshold values and determine the ex-
pressions of the strictly increasing pieces of r∗(q), then the whole expressions
of r∗(q) can be obtained easily. We will address how to determine qj−1 and
q
j
as well as compute r∗(q) on (qj−1, qj) in the third part of this subsection.
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Figure 4.1: Illustration of r∗(q)
(b) Preservation. Now we turn our attention to the optimal value func-
tion f(q). Despite the fact that Π(r, q) may be neither differentiable in r nor
in q, we show that the number of kink points of f(q) are less than or equal
to g(r) and the candidate kink points of f(q) are exactly r1, ..., rm. That is,
f(q) has certain similar properties as g(r), which is desirable in a dynamic
optimization setting.
The preservation of kink points relies critically on the following observa-
tion.
Lemma 4.2. f+(q) is continuously differentiable on (−∞, Q) and f−(q) is
continuously differentiable on (Q,+∞).
We would like to point out that the only assumptions required for Lemma
4.2 to hold (or even extend to the whole domain of q) are the concavity of
f+(q) and f−(q) and the continuous differentiability of Π±(r, q) with respect
to q.
An immediate consequence of Lemma 4.2 is that f(q) is also continuously
differentiable on (−∞, Q) and (Q,+∞). On the other hand, f(q) = pi(q) +
g(q), when q ∈ (Q,Q) and the kink points of f(q) are then solely determined
by the kink points of g(q). The following result further claims that f(q) is
differentiable at Q and Q unless Q,Q ∈ {r1, ..., rm}.
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Proposition 4.3. f(q) has at most m kink points. The possible kink points
are r1, ..., rm.
In the extreme case when m = 0, then f(q) is continuously differentiable
even if the objective function is neither differentiable in the decision vari-
able r nor in the parameter q. In contrast, many envelope theorems that
study the differentiability properties of the value function of a parameterized
optimization problem (see, for example, Milgrom and Segal, 2002; Clausen
and Strub, 2012) assume the objective function to be differentiable in the
parameter.
(c) Computation. To address the issue of computation, we need to
impose the following assumption in the remaining of this subsection on the
functional forms of each continuously differentiable piece of g(r).
Assumption 4.3. For 1 ≤ j ≤ m + 1, gj(r) has the following functional
form on [rj−1, rj]. There exist nj ≥ 1 and rj−1 = r(0)j < r(1)j < ... < r(nj−1)j <
r
(nj)
j = rj such that
gj(r) =

g
(1)
j (r), r
(0)
j ≤ r ≤ r(1)j ,
...
g
(nj)
j (r), r
(nj−1)
j ≤ r ≤ r(nj)j ,
where g
(i)
j (r), 1 ≤ i ≤ nj, are functions defined on R and have analytical
forms such that the following optimization problems
max
r
{Π±(r, q) + g(i)j (r)},
can be solved in O(1) time.
One example satisfying Assumption 4.3 is the case when Π±(r, q) and
g
(i)
j (r) are all quadratic functions. For convenience, for 1 ≤ j ≤ m + 1,
we call r
(i)
j , 1 ≤ i ≤ nj (except r(nm+1)m+1 = rm+1 = +∞) the breakpoints of g(r)
and denote n =
∑m+1
j=1 nj − 1 to be the total number of breakpoints of g(·).
Note that the breakpoints include the kink points we defined in Assumption
4.1. The key difference here is that at a breakpoint, the analytical forms
of the function on the two sides of the breakpoint are different. However,
different analytical forms may still result in the left derivative at the break-
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point having the same value as the right derivative. When the left derivative
does not equal to the right derivative at the breakpoint, we then call this
breakpoint as a kink point.
By Proposition 4.2, on (qj−1, qj), r
∗(q) is strictly increasing and rj−1 <
r∗(q) < rj. As a result, there exist qj−1 = q
(0)
j < q
(1)
j < ... < q
(nj−1)
j < q
(nj)
j =
q
j
, such that for 1 ≤ i ≤ m, on (q(i−1)j , q(i)j ), r(i−1)j < r∗(q) < r(i)j . This
suggests that on (q
(i−1)
j , q
(i)
j ),
f(q) = max
r
{Π(r, q) + g(i)j (r)},
r∗(q) = arg max
r
{Π(r, q) + g(i)j (r)}.
Note that this observation also applies to r+(q) and r−(q) on the regions
where they are strictly increasing. Applying Proposition 4.1, by comparing q
with the threshold valuesQ,Q, whether Π(r, q) = Π+(r, q), Π(r, q) = Π−(r, q)
or r∗(q) = q can be determined unambiguously in the above problem. This
leads to the following result to bound the breakpoints of f(q).
Proposition 4.4. f(q) has at most n+m+2 breakpoints. The candidates for
the breakpoints are q
(i)
j , 1 ≤ j ≤ m + 1, 0 ≤ i ≤ nj (except q(0)1 = q0 = −∞
and q
(nm+1)
m+1 = qm+1 = +∞) and Q,Q.
In actual computation, however, the breakpoints are not known before
hand. Algorithm 1 provides a way to both compute the breakpoints and de-
termine the analytical form of the function between the breakpoints. To see
the computational complexity, first note that by Assumption 4.3, the opti-
mization problem inside the loops only needs O(1) time to solve. Consequent-
ly, the expressions for r±(q) can be determined in O(
∑m+1
j=1 nj) + O(m) =
O(n + m) time. Finding Q, Q clearly depends on the number of analytical
pieces of r±(q) and takes O(n+m) time. Finally, by Proposition 4.4 there are
at most n+m+ 2 breakpoints, r∗(q) and f(q) can be computed in O(n+m)
time. In summary, the overall computational complexity is O(n+m).
4.3.2 Dynamic Programming Algorithm
In this subsection, we verify that Assumptions 4.1-4.3 hold in our dynamic
pricing problem and we show how to utilize Algorithm 1 as a subroutine in
our dynamic programming algorithm.
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Algorithm 1
for j = 1, ...,m+ 1 do
for i = 1, ..., nj do
solve
r
(i)
j,±(q) = arg max
r
{Π±(r, q) + g(i)j (r)}
set
q
(i−1)
j,± = {q : r(i)j,±(q) = r(i−1)j }
q
(i)
j,± = {q : r(i)j,±(q) = r(i)j }
end for
end for
let
r±(q) =
{
r
(i)
j,±(q), q ∈ [q(i−1)j,± , q(i)j,±], j = 1, ...,m+ 1, i = 1, ..., nj
rj, q ∈ [q(nj)j,± , q(0)j+1,±], j = 1, ...,m
set
Q = sup{q : q − r+(q) < 0}
Q = inf{q : q − r−(q) > 0}
let
r∗(q) =

r+(q), q < Q,
q, Q ≤ q ≤ Q,
r−(q), q > Q.
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To verify Assumption 4.2, we need the following technical condition on the
problem parameters.
Assumption 4.4.
η− − η+ ≤ 2at − 2αat+1, ∀ 1 ≤ t ≤ T − 1.
Assumption 4.4 holds under the plausible setting when consumers have
short memories (α is small) and the direct price effect dominates the reference
price effect (η+ < η− ≤ at). We will impose Assumption 4.4 throughout this
subsection. However, one should keep in mind that Assumption 4.4 is merely
a sufficient condition to guarantee that Assumption 4.2 holds. As we will
show in Section 4.4 that Assumption 4.2 can be verified in an on-line fashion
as the algorithm implements and may still hold even if Assumption 4.4 fails.
Even though the per-period profit function Πt(r, q) is not jointly concave
in r and q, the following proposition shows iteratively that under Assumption
4.4, the function Gt is strongly concave.
Proposition 4.5. Suppose Assumption 4.4 holds. Then for 2 ≤ t ≤ T + 1,
Gt is strongly concave with concavity constant At =
2αat+η−
2(1−α) . That is, Gˆt(r) =
Gt(r) +Atr
2 is also a concave function. Furthermore, there exist rt, rt, such
that Gt(r) follows the form
Gt(r) =
{
gt(r), r ∈ [rt, rt],
−∞, r ∈ (−∞, rt) ∪ (rt,+∞),
where gt(r) a continuous function defined on the whole real line.
Before verifying Assumptions 4.1-4.3, we show how one can solve problem
(4.3) from the solutions to problem (4.4). The following lemma helps us
in establishing the connections among problems (4.3), (4.4) and (4.5). Let
p∗c(q) =
q−αr∗c (q)
1−α .
Lemma 4.3. The solution to problem (4.5): r∗c (q) is single-valued and con-
tinuous in q. Furthermore, both r∗c (q) and p
∗
c(q) are monotonically increasing
in q.
Now we construct the solutions to problem (4.3) from the solutions to
problem (4.4) in the following two steps.
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From r∗(q) to r∗c (q): By monotonicity of p
∗
c(q), when α > 0, we know
there exist qL, qU , qL < qU such that for q < qL, p
∗
c(q) = Lt and
r∗c (q) =
q−(1−α)Lt
α
, for qU < q, p
∗
c(q) = Ut and r
∗
c (q) =
q−(1−α)Ut
α
, while
for qL < q < qU , Lt < p
∗
c(q) < Ut. When α = 0, we can set qL = −∞
and qU = +∞. It follows that
r∗c (q) =

q − (1− α)Lt
α
, q ∈ (−∞, qL),
r∗(q), q ∈ [qL, qU ],
q − (1− α)Ut
α
, q ∈ (qU ,+∞),
(4.9)
and
fc(q) =

Πt(
q − (1− α)Lt
α
, q) + gt(
q − (1− α)Lt
α
), q ∈ (−∞, qL),
f(q), q ∈ [qL, qU ],
Πt(
q − (1− α)Ut
α
, q) + gt(
q − (1− α)Ut
α
), q ∈ (qU ,+∞).
(4.10)
Finally, when α > 0, qL and qU can be computed through qL = sup{q :
r∗(q) > q−(1−α)Lt
α
} and qU = inf{q : r∗(q) < q−(1−α)Utα }.
From r∗c (q) to rt(q) : First, note that when α > 0, the price constraint is e-
quivalent to r ∈ [ q−(1−α)Ut
α
, q−(1−α)Lt
α
]. If [ q−(1−α)Ut
α
, q−(1−α)Lt
α
]∩ [rt, rt] =
∅, then Gt+1(q) = −∞. That is, the effective domain for Gt+1(q) is
[αrt + (1 − α)Lt, αrt + (1 − α)Ut]. When α = 0, clearly, the effective
domain for Gt+1(q) is simply [Lt, Ut].
Let us restrict our attention to the effective domain of Gt+1(q), i.e.,
q ∈ [αrt + (1− α)Lt, αrt + (1− α)Ut].
If rt ≤ r∗c (q) ≤ rt, then clearly rt(q) = r∗c (q).
If r∗c (q) < rt, since r
∗
c (q) ∈ [ q−(1−α)Utα , q−(1−α)Ltα ] (or (−∞,+∞) if α = 0)
and q is in the effective domain, we must have rt ∈ [ q−(1−α)Utα , q−(1−α)Ltα ]
(or (−∞,+∞) if α = 0) as well. Thus, rt is a feasible solution. From
Proposition 4.5, we know that the objective function in problem (4.3)
is concave and consequently we have rt(q) = rt. Similarly, if r
∗
c (q) > rt,
then rt(q) = rt.
Finally, let q
r
= max{sup{q : r∗c (q) < rt}, αrt + (1 − α)Lt} and qr =
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min{inf{q : r∗c (q) > rt}, αrt + (1−α)Ut}, by monotonicity of r∗c (q) and
the discussion above, it follows that
rt(q) =

rt, q ∈ [αrt + (1− α)Lt, qr),
r∗c (q), q ∈ [qr, qr],
rt, q ∈ (qr, αrt + (1− α)Ut],
(4.11)
and
Gt+1(q) =

−∞, q ∈ (−∞, αrt + (1− α)Lt),
Πt(rt, q) + gt(rt), q ∈ [αrt + (1− α)L, qr),
fc(q), q ∈ [qr, qr],
Πt(rt, q) + gt(rt), q ∈ (qr, αrt + (1− α)Ut]
−∞, q ∈ (αrt + (1− α)Ut,+∞).
(4.12)
The above two steps allow us to compute rt(q) and Gt+1(q) from r
∗(q) and
f(q) if the expressions for the latter two are known. An illustration of r2(q)
is provided in the figure below. In Figure 4.2, r2(q) is plotted on its effec-
tive domain [αr2 + (1 − α)L, αr2 + (1 − α)U ] = [qr, qr] and different colors
correspond to different linear pieces. One can clearly see the structure of
the constrained solution r∗c (q) as characterized in (4.9) and the structures
of the unconstrained solution r∗(q) as demonstrated in Proposition 4.1 and
Proposition 4.2.
Indeed, the structure demonstrated in Figure 4.2 is what guarantees an
efficient computation for the expressions of r∗(q) and f(q). Next, we will
verify that Assumptions 4.1-4.3 hold and such structure is preserved through
dynamic programming. Assumption 4.1 (a) clearly holds since Πt(r, q) can be
expressed as a minimum of two quadratic functions that is strictly concave in
r and from the proof of Lemma 4.3, we know Πt(r, q) is strictly supermodular
as well. Proposition 4.5 already proves that Assumption 4.2 (a) is satisfied.
In the following, we show that the remaining assumptions also hold.
Proposition 4.6. q − r∗(q) satisfies the single crossing property.
Proposition 4.6 verifies that Assumption 4.2 (b) holds. The proof relies
on a careful analysis of both the right and left derivative of the objective
function in (4.4).
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Figure 4.2: Illustration of r2(q)
Next, we show iteratively that for 2 ≤ t ≤ T + 1, gt(r) consists of finite
number of quadratic pieces. Combined with Proposition 4.5, this shows
that Assumption 4.1 (b) holds. Also, as Πt(r, q) consists of two quadratic
functions, Assumption 4.3 holds as well.
Proposition 4.7. If gt(r) consists of nt + 1 quadratic pieces, and it has nt
breakpoints and mt kink points (mt ≤ nt), then gt+1(r) consists of at most
nt +mt + 7 quadratic pieces, and it has at most nt +mt + 6 breakpoints and
mt + 4 kink points. That is,
nt+1 ≤ nt +mt + 6, mt+1 ≤ mt + 4.
Proposition 4.7 not only shows that gt(r), 2 ≤ t ≤ T , are all piece-wise
quadratic functions, but also provides a bound on the growth of the number
of both breakpoints as well as kink points.
With all the assumptions satisfied, we are ready to present Algorithm 2
that solves the dynamic pricing problem (4.3).
To see the computational complexity, step 1 in Algorithm 2 clearly requires
O(nt+1) time by our analysis of Algorithm 1 and Proposition 4.7. Similar-
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Algorithm 2
Initialize r2 = αr1 + (1 − α)L1, r2 = αr1 + (1 − α)U1, n2 = 1, m2 = 1,
g2(r) = Π1(r1, r) and
G2(r) =
{
g2(r), r ∈ [r2, r2],
−∞, r ∈ (−∞, r2) ∪ (r2,+∞).
for t = 2, ..., T do
step 1: Implement Algorithm 1 to solve problem (4.4) and output
r∗(q) and f(q).
step 2: Compute r∗c (q) and fc(q) from r
∗(q) and f(q) according to
(4.9) and (4.10).
step 3: Compute rt(q) and Gt+1(q) from r
∗
c (q) and fc(q) according to
(4.11) and (4.12).
set rt+1 = αrt + (1− α)Lt, rt+1 = αrt + (1− α)Ut and
gt+1(q) =

Πt(rt, q) + gt(rt), q ∈ (∞, qr),
fc(q), q ∈ [qr, qr],
Πt(rt, q) + gt(rt), q ∈ (qr,+∞).
end for
ly, since the number of quadratic pieces of gt+1(q) and the number of the
linear pieces of rt+1(q) are bounded by nt+1, step 2 and step 3 can also be
computed in O(nt+1) time. Note that by Proposition 4.7, mT+1 = O(T )
and nT+1 = O(T
2). Therefore, the overall computational complexity is then
O(
∑T
t=2 nt+1) = O(T
3).
4.4 Numerical Study
In this section, we implement the algorithm developed in Section 4.3 and the
heuristic developed in Hu (2012) in a case study to demonstrate how they
can be used to solve a practical industry problem with real data. Based on
the examples from the case study, we compare the efficiency of our algorithm
to the heuristic. Finally, we show that our exact algorithm (Algorithm 2)
may still be applied even when Assumption 4.4 fails.
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4.4.1 Case Study
In the following, we present our case study by utilizing the data set provided
by Boatwright et al. (1999) of the Borden sliced cheese in 12 oz packages sold
by retailers across the nation in the Bayesm Package of the R software. The
data contains the weekly sales as well as prices of the product for up to 68
weeks. As noted by Greenleaf (1995), the linear reference price model has
a multi-collinearity problem. One way to alleviate this issue is to perform
linear regression with regularization, e.g., ridge regression, lasso or more
generally elastic net (see James et al., 2013, for more details). For the purpose
of demonstration, we choose lasso in our case study as the regularization
method since it usually results in a better fit and fixes the wrong sign in
parameter estimates better than ridge regression. Furthermore, we let the
minimum historical price be the initial reference price for a more conservative
result and we use the estimation procedure employed in Greenleaf (1995) to
estimate α. The results for 6 selected retailers are reported in Table 4.1.
Table 4.1: Parameter Estimates and Profits Comparison
Stores αˆ bˆ aˆ ηˆ+ ηˆ− Π∗ Πs Πh
Hartford - Stop & Shop 0.93 19811.72 -5271.96 0.00 687.33 1135400 1134700 496360
(average markup of 23.3%) (108020) (107800) (46356)
Boston - Star Market 0.54 6209.50 -1585.68 0.00 1294.39 413380 412050 249740
(average markup of 40.0%) (79217) (78162) (66268)
Indianapolis - Kroger Co 0.93 5019.04 -319.66 2708.75 2946.91 797670 632370 724130
Chicago - Omni 0.00 35082.59 -11799.80 10032.22 0.00 1966400 1774700 878280
(average markup of 23.0%), (169480) (150530) (122640)
Balti/Wash - Giant Food Inc 0.04 13103.80 -2350.83 5259.24 0.00 1788300 1071900 1087700
Jacksonvile - Publix 0.66 3792.61 -765.08 1223.92 352.78 303880 280950 286600
Profits under marginal cost adjustments are in parenthesis.
Π∗: Profits under optimal pricing strategy.
Πs: Profits under the pricing strategy that ignores reference price effects.
Πh: Profits under the historical prices.
In addition to the estimates of the parameters b, a, η+, η− and α, we also
report the profit under optimal pricing strategy Π∗ computed through our
exact and heuristic algorithms, the profit under the pricing strategy that
ignores reference price effects Πs (computed under the static demand model)
and the profit under the historical prices Πh. For Π∗, we compute it according
to our exact algorithm when Assumption 4.4 is satisfied. Otherwise, the
heuristic in Hu (2012) is applied to obtain an approximation.
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From Table 4.1, we can see that demands faced by different retailers can
have significantly different characteristics. The first three retailers face loss-
averse demands while the latter three face gain-seeking demands. Also notice
that the demands for the first and second retailers satisfy Assumption 4.4
while the demands for the fourth retailer satisfy Assumption 3.1.
By comparing the profits, we can see that retailers’ profits can be greatly
improved in many scenarios by using the reference price models rather than
the static demand models. Note that we are only presenting a basic frame-
work in this chapter and many other features such as competitors prices,
seasonal effects, marginal costs, etc., are not taken into consideration since
they are not available in the data set. This could be the primary reason that
in most cases, the optimal pricing strategy results in unbelievable increase in
profits.
In Figure 4.3 and Figure 4.4, we compare the price paths under the optimal
pricing strategy, the pricing strategy that ignores reference price effects (stat-
ic prices) and that of the historical prices for two retailers respectively. Panel
(a) in both figures confirms that ignoring marginal costs can indeed result in
an overly underpriced optimal prices for these two retailers. Unfortunately,
we do not have the data on marginal costs and it is quite possible that some
retailers account for marginal costs when setting up prices while others might
employ a “loss-leader” strategy to drive store traffic. As a compromise, for
those stores that the average optimal prices are overly underpriced compared
to the average historical prices, we test several marginal costs (equivalently
average markup levels) and choose the one that results in a similar average
optimal prices and historical prices. For instance, for the retailer “Boston -
Star Market”, we find that an average markup level of 40% produces close
average prices as well as price paths (see panel (b) in Figure 4.3 for illus-
tration). For the retailer “Indianapolis - Kroger Co”, on the other hand, we
find that average optimal prices are already above average historical prices
and consequently no adjustment is made.
The recomputed profits based on the marginal cost adjustments are re-
ported in the parenthesis in Table 3.1 and the price paths are shown in panel
(b) in Figure 4.3 and Figure 4.4 for the respective retailers in panel (a). For
both retailers, the optimal prices and static prices are now in close range of
the historical prices and the resulting profits are also in a comparable range.
With comparable prices, the underlying reasons in the profits gaps may then
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be explained intuitively using the existing results in the literature. In the
case of retailer “Boston - Star Market”, since it faces a loss-averse demand,
deep price cuts in the historical prices (see Figure 4.3) can be very costly
(see Section 2.4). On the other hand, the retailer “Chicago - Omni”, is not
exploiting gain-seeking effects in those periods with flat prices (see Figure
4.4) and consequently missing the opportunities to increase its profits (see
Section 3.4).
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Figure 4.3: Comparison of the price paths for retailer: Boston - Star Market
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Figure 4.4: Comparison of the price paths for retailer: Chicago - Omni
Even under marginal cost adjustment, the profit comparisons in Table 3.1
for the store “Hartford - Stop & Shop” can still be deemed as unrealistic,
which requires the attention of additional features. We remark here that, if
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data available, other features that are independent from the price and refer-
ence price can be easily incorporated to improve the reference price model.
The addition of other features in the regression model will only result in
a time varying intercepts, i.e., bt, for which the optimal prices can still be
computed efficiently by our algorithms.
4.4.2 Efficiency and Robustness
In the following, we check the efficiency and robustness of our algorithms
based on some of the examples provided in our case study. All experiments
below are performed in MATLAB 2014a on a desktop with an Intel Core i5-
3770 CPU (3.20 GHz) and 8 GB RAM running 64-bit Windows 7 Enterprise.
In Table 2, we compare the computational efficiency of Algorithm 2 devel-
oped in Section 4.3 with the heuristic in Hu (2012). Specifically, we compare
to the heuristic at different accuracy levels, one with ε = 0.01 and another
more accurate one with ε = 0.001. For each algorithm, we report the CPU
time (in seconds) of the computations under the time horizon ranging from
10 periods to 40 periods. The first thing to note from Table 4.2 is that Al-
Table 4.2: Comparison of the Computational Time for retailer: Boston -
Star Market
Algorithm 2 Heuristic (ε = 0.01) Heuristic (ε = 0.001)
Length of Horizon Time (s) Time (s) Time (s)
T = 10 0.066 0.505 10.913
T = 20 0.077 0.996 20.161
T = 30 0.093 1.428 30.084
T = 40 0.139 1.922 40.154
gorithm 2, being an exact algorithm, is much more computationally efficient
than the heuristic with the running time far less than a second. Although
the theoretical guarantee for the running time of Algorithm 2 is of the order
O(T 3), in our computational studies it scales much better. The computa-
tional time for our heuristic, on the other hand, scales linearly with respect
to time horizon for a given ε as Hu (2012) shows. While this has an advan-
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tage in computing long time horizon problems, errors may accumulate over
time and reducing such errors would require relatively significant amount of
computational time.
Next, we show that our exact algorithm can still be applied even if the
technical condition in Assumption 4.4 fails. Indeed, Assumption 4.4 is merely
a sufficient condition to guarantee that Assumption 4.2 holds in our dynamic
pricing problem and in order to present a neat and interpretable condition we
have been quite conservative in the derivation. In actual implementation, it
is not necessary to verify Assumption 4.4 beforehand. Instead, since explicit
expressions are computed during each iteration, one can verify Assumption
4.2 directly in an online fashion. For instance, we have applied Algorithm 2
to the retailer “Indianapolis - Kroger Co” for which Assumption 4.4 fails. We
find that Assumption 4.2 is not violated while implementing the algorithm.
As a result, Proposition 4.7 still holds and the efficiency of the algorithm is
guaranteed. Table 4.3 summarizes the growth of breakpoints of the value
function Gt(q) for the first 20 iterations. As one can see that the growth is
quadratic in t.
Table 4.3: Growth of the number of breakpoints of Gt(q)
t = 2 t = 4 t = 6 t = 8 t = 10 t = 12 t = 14 t = 16 t = 18 t = 20
Indiannapolis - Kroger Co 1 9 21 39 68 104 151 211 299 446
Boston - Star Market 1 9 17 25 33 41 49 57 65 73
In comparison, the growth of breakpoints of Gt(q) for retailer “Boston -
Star Market”, where Assumption 4.4 holds, is also illustrated in Table 4.3.
Interestingly, the growth is linear instead of quadratic. That is, in addition
of being a simple sufficient condition, the stronger property imposed by As-
sumption 4.4 seems to have the potential of eliminating many breakpoints,
which also explains the efficiency of Algorithm 2 demonstrated in Table 4.2.
4.5 Conclusion
In this chapter we examine the computational side of a dynamic pricing
problem with a memory-based reference price model. In this model, demand
depends on both current selling price and reference price, where the latter
evolves according to an exponentially smoothing process of past prices. We
identify several key structural properties to ensure such non-smooth dynamic
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optimization problems can be solved exactly in strongly polynomial time. In
the loss-averse case, we characterize the sufficient conditions to guarantee
those structural properties and develop a strongly polynomial time algorithm
to solve for the optimal prices.
To complement our theoretical results, a case study is presented to demon-
strate how our algorithms can be applied in a practical setting. Based on
the examples in the case study, we show that our exact algorithm can be
very efficient and may still be applied even when the technical conditions are
violated.
Our work is only a start in looking at the computational side of the op-
timization models that incorporate reference price effects. We are exploring
several related topics. First, further improvement of the current algorithms
and heuristic is important and interesting. Efficient algorithms become per-
tinent as we incorporate these models into decision support systems which
usually involve many products and other operations decisions.
Secondly, there is a rapidly growing literature on integrated inventory and
pricing models (see Federgruen and Heching, 1999; Chen and Simchi-Levi,
2004a,b; Huh and Janakiraman, 2008; Geunes et al., 2009; Chen and Simchi-
Levi, 2012). Incorporating reference price effects into such models may sig-
nificantly complicate algorithm design. Efficient algorithms in these settings
may then provide even more benefits to the firms facing inventory as well as
pricing decisions.
Finally, we would like to examine the possibility of extending our algo-
rithms to the model with multiple products (see Chapter 5 for a model for-
mulation). Indeed, in settings with multiple products, the state space grows
in dimensions and it is not clear whether the number of quadratic pieces in
the value functions will still be bounded by a polynomial number.
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Chapter 5
Dynamic Pricing of Multiple Products
5.1 Introduction
So far, we have been focusing solely on the setting in which a monopolist
manages a single product. However, in practice, the demand of a produc-
t can be affected by the prices of other products as well. For example, if
a retailer is selling both Coke and Pepsi, then one would naturally expect
the demand for Coke will be low if the retailer runs a promotion for Pepsi.
Capturing such cross-price effects is a central task in building up a multi-
product model. The multinomial logit model and its variants are commonly
used in the literature to explicitly model the purchase behavior of consumers
when they face multiple substitutable products. As we mentioned in Section
2.1, researchers have managed to incorporate the effects of reference prices
into such models and a lot of empirical studies are conducted (comparative-
ly, as we point out below, empirical studies for linear models are scarce).
However, even single-period multi-product price optimization problems that
ignore reference price effects can be non-trivial and a stream of literature
has been devoted to these problems over the last two decades (see Gallego
and Wang, 2014, and the references therein). Another popular model is the
linear demand models which capture the cross-price effects directly at the
aggregate level and such models are widely used both empirically and ana-
lytically. Yet, empirical studies that incorporate reference price effects into
the multi-product linear demand models are still lacking. Indeed, it would
be a challenge to empirically disentangle the direct cross-price effects with
the indirect ones, which could be caused by the fact that the formation of
reference price is affected by prices of different products.
Nevertheless, a few linear models have been proposed to study reference
price effects in a multi-product setting. Kopalle et al. (1996) propose two
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such models. Their first model directly generalizes the exponential smooth-
ing model of the single-product setting by adding cross-price effects terms
in the demand function and assuming that consumers have a reference price
for each product which is independent with each other. Their second mod-
el introduces reference brand formulation (see Hardie et al., 1993) which
uses the price of the product consumers purchased last time as a reference
price. Asvanunt (2007), on the other hand, argues that consumers make their
purchasing decision on the store’s overall price level, which is a weighted av-
erage price of different products sold at the store. Consequently, in Asvanunt
(2007), consumers use a uniform reference price when deciding which product
to choose.
In terms of the analysis of dynamic pricing problems, multi-product set-
ting has brought significant challenges and structural results are quite limited
in the literature. Kopalle et al. (1996) show in their exponential smoothing
model that constant pricing strategies are not optimal when demands for each
of the product are gain-seeking while constant pricing strategies outperfor-
m high-low pricing strategies when demands are all loss-averse or loss/gain
neutral. Popescu and Wu (2005) adopt the exponential smoothing model in
Kopalle et al. (1996) and prove that the optimal prices converge to constant
prices for the two products case with both products having loss/gain neutral
demands. They conjecture that the result extend to more than two products
but are unable to prove analytically. Indeed, to the best of our knowledge,
it is not established whether constant pricing strategies are optimal in the
long-run even for loss/gain neutral demands with more than two products.
The main difficulty behind such analysis is the enlargement of state space.
As Popescu and Wu (2005) point out “few general techniques exist for prov-
ing global stability in high dimensions”. As we will see, for loss-averse case,
there is an additional difficulty in the switching behavior of the optimal price
path. In other words, the technique developed in Fibich et al. (2003) (also see
Section 2.4) to separate the solution of the non-smooth dynamic program-
ming problem to the corresponding smooth dynamic programming problems
does not extend to the multi-product setting. The model proposed in As-
vanunt (2007), however, circumvents these difficulties because a single state
variable (store level reference price) is sufficient to describe the system. As a
result, Asvanunt (2007) manages to prove the optimality of constant pricing
strategies in the loss/gain neutral case.
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This chapter mainly builds upon the exponential smoothing model in a
multi-product setting proposed in Kopalle et al. (1996). We give an explicit
solution to the dynamic pricing problems in a continuous-time framework
with loss/gain neutral demands, which generalizes the solution of Fibich et al.
(2003) in a single-product setting. With the explicit solution, we prove the
conjecture of Popescu and Wu (2005) that for any finite number of products,
the optimal prices converge to a unique steady state. As we have pointed
out earlier, similar techniques to deal with loss-averse demands cannot be
extended to multi-product setting. Instead of seeking optimal solutions, we
propose for two-product case a semi-myopic solution (see Section 5.3.2) that
generalizes the notion of myopic solution and can in some scenarios achieve
optimality. We further develop some novel techniques to show the global
stability of the resulting system.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section 5.2 we
present the mathematical model in a continuous-time framework that ex-
tends the exponential smoothing model in the single-product setting to the
multi-product setting. The dynamic pricing problem is analyzed in Section
5.3. Section 5.4 gives concluding remarks and possible directions for future
research. All technical proofs are relegated to Appendix D.
5.2 Model
We consider a monopolist selling N products and consumers form a reference
price ri for product i, 1 ≤ i ≤ N . Following Kopalle et al. (1996), we assume
that the reference price for each of the product evolves independently and
according to an exponential smoothing process. Similar to (2.15), given the
price pi(t) and the reference price ri(t) for product i at time t, the reference
price evolves according to
dri(t) = α¯[pi(t)− ri(t)]dt, α¯ > 0. (5.1)
For notational convenience, we denote r = (r1(t), ..., rN(t))
>, p =
(p1(t), ..., pN(t))
> and r˙ = (dr1(t)
dt
, ..., drN (t)
dt
)>, then (5.1) can be written more
compactly as
r˙ = α¯(p− r). (5.2)
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The demand function for product i is modeled as
Di(t) = bi − aipi(t) +
N∑
j=1,j 6=i
θijpj(t)
+ η+i max{ri(t)− pi(t), 0}+ η−i min{ri(t)− pi(t), 0},
where θij models the cross-price effects between products i and j. One s-
tandard assumption here is that
∑
j 6=i θij < ai, which ensures the demand of
product i is more sensitive to the change in its own price than to the change
in the prices of all other products (see, for example, Talluri and Van Ryzin,
2005). For ease of exposition, we further assume that θij = θji. Note here
that when θij > 0, products i and j are substitutes while θij < 0 indicates
that they are complements.
The instantaneous profit for the firm is
Π(r,p) =
N∑
i=1
pi(t)Di(t),
and the corresponding dynamic pricing problem is: given initial reference
prices r0 = (r1(0), ..., rN(0))
>, the firm seeks to maximize its long-run profit,
i.e.,
max
p
∫ +∞
0
e−γtΠ(r,p)dt
s.t. r˙ = α¯(p− r),
(5.3)
where γ is the discount factor.
5.3 Analysis
This section analyzes the dynamic pricing problem (5.3) of multiple products.
For the loss/gain neutral case, we derive an explicit solution, which helps us to
construct a semi-myopic solution for the loss-averse case with two products.
We further prove that the reference price path under the semi-myopic pricing
strategy will converge to a region of steady states.
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5.3.1 Loss/Gain Neutral Demands
In this subsection, we assume the demands for all the products are loss/gain
neutral. That is, η+i = η
−
i := ηi, for 1 ≤ i ≤ N . In this case, the instanta-
neous profit can be written in matrix form as
Π(r,p) = p>Rp + r>Kp + b>p, (5.4)
where b = (b1, ..., bN)
>,
R =

−(a1 + η1) θ12 . . . θ1N
θ21 −(a2 + η2) . . . θ2N
...
...
. . .
...
θN1 θN2 . . . −(aN + ηN)

and
K =

η1 0 . . . 0
0 η2 . . . 0
...
...
. . .
...
0 0 . . . ηN
 .
Before we state our main result, we first examine the properties of the
matrix M := α¯(α¯+ γ)I + α¯(α¯+ γ
2
)R−1K, where I is the identity matrix. As
we will see shortly this matrix is critical for our development of the explicit
solution to (5.3).
Lemma 5.1. The matrix M defined by M = α¯(α¯+ γ)I + α¯(α¯+ γ
2
)R−1K is
positive definite.
We denote ξ1, ..., ξN (not necessarily all distinct) and v1, ...,vN to be the N
eigenvalues and the corresponding eigenvectors of M with V := (v1, ...,vN).
By Lemma 5.1, we know that ξi > 0 for 1 ≤ i ≤ N and we can define
λi =
γ−
√
γ2+4ξi
2
. Finally, we let rs to be the unique solution of the linear
equations
Mrs = −1
2
α¯(α¯ + γ)R−1b. (5.5)
In Proposition 5.1, we give an explicit expression to the solution of the
problem (5.3) using above defined notations .
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Proposition 5.1. The optimal price path p∗(t) that solves problem (5.3) is
given by
p∗(t) =rs+
V

(1 + λ1
α¯
)eλ1t 0 . . . 0
0 (1 + λ2
α¯
)eλ2t . . . 0
...
...
. . .
...
0 0 . . . (1 + λN
α¯
)eλN t
V−1(r0 − rs),
and the corresponding reference price path under the optimal pricing strategy
is
r∗(t) = rs + V

eλ1t 0 . . . 0
0 eλ2t . . . 0
...
...
. . .
...
0 0 . . . eλN t
V−1(r0 − rs). (5.6)
Alternatively, we can write the state feedback optimal prices (optimal pricing
strategy) as
p∗(r) = r +
1
α¯
VΛV−1(r− rs), (5.7)
where
Λ =

λ1 0 . . . 0
0 λ2 . . . 0
...
...
. . .
...
0 0 . . . λN
 .
From the explicit solution in Proposition 5.1, we can make several obser-
vations.
First, when N = 1 the optimal price path in Proposition 5.1 reduces to
p∗(t) = rs + (1 +
λ
α¯
)e−λt(r0 − rs),
which is exactly the explicit solution provided in Fibich et al. (2003) of the
single-product problem.
Second, as t → ∞, the optimal pricing strategy p∗(t) converges to the
steady state rs characterized by the equation (5.5). This formally settles the
conjecture about global stability raised in Popescu and Wu (2005). How-
ever, unlike the single-product case discussed in Fibich et al. (2003) and
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Popescu and Wu (2007), the optimal price path of product i, p∗i (t) and the
corresponding reference price path r∗i (t) may not be monotonic in t.
Third, if there is no reference price effect, then ηi = 0 for i = 1, ..., N or
K = 0. As a result, M = α¯(α¯+γ)I and its eigenvalues ξi = α¯(α¯+γ) for any
i = 1, ..., N and eigenvectors V = [v1, ...,vN] = I. By solving the quadratic
equation, λi = −β for any i = 1, ..., N . It follows that
p∗(t) = rs = −1
2
R−1b,
which naturally reduced to the optimal solution of the problem in the absence
of reference effects, namely
p∗>Rp∗ + b>p∗ = max
p
[p>Rp + b>p].
5.3.2 Loss-Averse Demands: Two Products Case
When the demands of the products are loss-averse, i.e., η−i > η
+
i , problem
(5.3) becomes much more challenging due to the non-smoothness in higher
dimensional space. Even for some simpler variant of the two products prob-
lem, the so-called “single-product heterogeneous consumers problem”, where
there is no cross-price effects and firm can only charge the same price for the
two consumer groups (products), it is claimed that “global stability is not
guaranteed (Popescu and Wu, 2005)”.
The main challenge in generalizing the results in single-product setting
is the resulting switched dynamic system even under myopic pricing strate-
gies. In a very general form, a switched dynamic system is described by the
following equation
x˙(t) = fσ(t)(x(t)),
where σ(t) ∈ P and the family of functions {fp : p ∈ P} is assumed to
be sufficiently regular, say, continuously differentiable. The time dependent
function σ(t) is called a switching signal and its evolution can be implicitly
depending on the evolution of the state x(t).
Readers are referred to Liberzon (2003) for a reference in the topic of
switched dynamic system. As we will discuss in detail later, proving stability
in switched dynamic system is generally much more difficult. Furthermore,
94
due to the potential switches, the technique developed by Fibich et al. (2003)
to derive the explicit expression for the optimal pricing strategy does not work
even for the two products case. Therefore, obtaining explicit solutions as in
Fibich et al. (2003) is quite difficult, if not impossible.
In this subsection, we address the difficulty by proposing a suboptimal
solution called semi-myopic solution which generalizes the myopic solution
in a sense that it seeks to maximize the accumulated profit over some time
horizon instead of simply maximizing the instantaneous profit and ignoring
the whole future altogether. Like the myopic solution, the resulting dynamic
system of the semi-myopic solution is still a switched dynamic system. We
manage to utilize the special structures of the vector field to prove the global
stability of the resulting switched dynamic system under the semi-myopic
solution.
First, we define the semi-myopic solution. A price path p(t), t ≥ 0, with
the corresponding reference price path r(t), t ≥ 0, is said to be semi-myopic
if for any s ≥ 0, there exists a T > s such that p(t), s ≤ t ≤ T is the optimal
solution to
max
p
∫ T
s
e−γtΠ(r,p)dt
s.t. r˙ = α¯(p− r),
where the initial and terminal states in the above problem are required to
be r(s) and r(T ) respectively. Intuitively speaking, at any point of time,
semi-myopic solution at least maximizes the accumulated profit for a certain
amount of duration.
We use a dynamic programming approach to construct one such myopic
solution. The HJB equation to problem (5.3) can be written as
γV (r) = max
p
[α¯∇V (r)>(p− r) + Π(r,p)], (5.8)
where ∇V (r) denotes the gradient of the value function V (·). Unfortunately,
the HJB equation (5.8) is not well-defined everywhere since Π(r,p) is not
differentiable and consequently ∇V (r) may not exist everywhere. Therefore,
one should interpret the value function V (·) satisfying the HJB equation (5.8)
in the viscosity sense (see Bardi and Capuzzo-Dolcetta, 1997, for a reference
in the topic of viscosity solutions). That is, at non-differentiable points of
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V (r), ∇V (r) is replaced by the superdifferential and subdifferential of V (r)
at r and V (r) is solved as a viscosity subsolution and a viscosity supersolution
respectively.
Finding viscosity solution to (5.8) is usually very difficult. Instead, we
adopt the idea in Fibich et al. (2003) to consider the smooth counterparts of
the problem (5.8). For notational brevity, we let
Π++(r,p) = p1[b1 − a1p1 + θp2 + η+1 (r1 − p1)]
+ p2[b2 − a2p2 + θp1 + η+2 (r2 − p2)],
where θ := θ12 = θ21 > 0. Note that if θ = 0, then the two products are com-
pletely independent and we can explicitly solve two single product problems
separately. Π+−(r,p), Π−+(r,p), Π−−(r,p) can be defined similarly with the
first and second signs in the superscript denoting whether we are taking η+1
or η−1 and η
+
2 or η
−
2 respectively. In addition, we denote
Π+r2(r1, p1) = p1[b1 − a1p1 + θp2 + η+1 (r1 − p1)] + r2(b2 − a2r2 + θp1),
Πr1+(r2, p2) = p2[b2 − a2p2 + θp1 + η+2 (r2 − p2)] + r1(b1 − a1r1 + θp2),
where r2 and r1 in the superscripts emphasize the fact that we have enforced
p2 = r2 and p1 = r1 respectively. Again, Π
−r2(r1, p1) and Πr1−(r2, p2) can be
defined similarly.
Following the above notations, we consider the following set of HJB equa-
tions
γV ++(r) = max
p
[α¯∇V ++(r)>(p− r) + Π++(r,p)]
γV +−(r) = max
p
[α¯∇V +−(r)>(p− r) + Π+−(r,p)]
γV −+(r) = max
p
[α¯∇V −+(r)>(p− r) + Π−+(r,p)]
γV −−(r) = max
p
[α¯∇V −−(r)>(p− r) + Π−−(r,p)]
γV +r2(r1) = max
p1
[α¯∇V +r2(r1)(p1 − r1) + Π+r2(r1, p1)]
γV −r2(r1) = max
p1
[α¯∇V −r2(r1)(p1 − r1) + Π−r2(r1, p1)]
γV r1+(r2) = max
p2
[α¯∇V r1+(r2)(p2 − r2) + Πr1+(r2, p2)]
γV r1−(r2) = max
p2
[α¯∇V r1−(r2)(p2 − r2) + Πr1−(r2, p2)]
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and denote the solutions to the corresponding HJB equations as p++(r),
p+−(r), p−+(r),p−−(r), p+r21 (r1), p
−r2
1 (r1), p
r1+
2 (r2) and p
r1−
2 (r2) respectively.
Note that all the HJB equations above are well-defined since the instanta-
neous profit functions, say Π++(r,p), are continuously differentiable. Apply-
ing our results in Section 5.3.1, all the solutions admit explicit expressions
and they are linear in states. To construct our semi-myopic solution, we
divide the state space into the following regions:
I++ := {r|p++1 (r)− r1 < 0, p++2 (r)− r2 < 0}
I+− := {r|p+−1 (r)− r1 < 0, p+−2 (r)− r2 > 0}
I−+ := {r|p−+1 (r)− r1 > 0, p−+2 (r)− r2 < 0}
I−− := {r|p−−1 (r)− r1 < 0, p−−2 (r)− r2 < 0}
I+r2 := {r|p++2 (r)− r2 ≥ 0, p+−2 (r)− r2 ≤ 0, p+r21 (r1)− r1 < 0}
I−r2 := {r|p−+2 (r)− r2 ≥ 0, p−−2 (r)− r2 ≤ 0, p−r21 (r1)− r1 > 0}
Ir1+ := {r|p++1 (r)− r1 ≥ 0, p−+1 (r)− r1 ≤ 0, pr1+2 (r2)− r2 < 0}
Ir1− := {r|p+−1 (r)− r1 ≥ 0, p−−1 (r)− r1 ≤ 0, pr1−2 (r2)− r2 > 0}
S : the remaining region.
Since all the solutions are linear in states, the above regions are character-
ized by linear inequalities and are therefore polyhedron. With the explicit
solutions, after cumbersome algebraic computations, one can verify that, for
instance, I++ and I+− will not overlap.
We construct the semi-myopic solution by proposing the following pricing
strategy, denoted as pSM(r).
pSM(r) =

p++(r), r ∈ I++,
p+−(r), r ∈ I+−,
p−+(r), r ∈ I−+,
p−−(r), r ∈ I−−,
(p+r21 (r1), r2), r ∈ I+r2 ,
(p−r21 (r1), r2), r ∈ I−r2 ,
(r1, p
r1+
2 (r2)), r ∈ Ir1+,
(r1, p
r1−
2 (r2)), r ∈ Ir1−,
r, r ∈ S.
(5.9)
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The rationale behind pSM(r) is that depending on which region the state lies
in, we choose optimal prices by assuming that all the future states will remain
in the same region. For instance, if r ∈ I++, then pSM(r) = p++(r), where
p++(r) is the optimal solution if all the future states remain in I++. Unfortu-
nately, the state evolving according to the dynamics r˙ = α¯(p++(r)− r) may,
at some future point, leaves the region I++ and whenever this happens, we
call it a switch. An illustration of the state space regions and the switching
behavior is provided in Figure 5.1.
S
S
SI--
SI++
SI+-
SI+r2
SIr1-
SI-+
SI-r2
SIr1+
Figure 5.1: State space regions and a switching path
The following proposition established the desired property of pSM(r) .
Proposition 5.2. For any initial reference price r0, the price path generated
by pSM(r) is a semi-myopic solution and we call pSM(r) a semi-myopic pric-
ing strategy. In addition, if for some r0, no switch occurs along the reference
price path generated by pSM(r), then the corresponding price path is optimal.
Note that if r0 ∈ S, then under pSM(r), r(t) = r0 ∈ S for all t ≥ 0, i.e.,
no switch occurs. Proposition 5.2 then implies that the price path generated
by pSM(r) is optimal for all r0 ∈ S. This motivates us to examine the global
stability of the following dynamic system generated by semi-myopic pricing
strategy:
r˙ = α¯(pSM(r)− r). (5.10)
Although our semi-myopic pricing strategy could be suboptimal due to the
potential switches, if we can establish the fact that for any initial state r0,
the reference price path under pSM(r) will converge to certain point in S,
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then such strategy will, in the long run, bring us to a state where optimality
can be achieved.
Establishing global stability for switched systems is, in general, non-trivial.
While there is a vast amount of literature studying the stability issue of
switched systems (see DeCarlo et al., 2000, for a review), most of the results
extend the classic Lyapunov stability theory by proposing multiple Lyapunov
functions to demonstrate stability. However, even for non-switched systems,
“Lyapunov functions can be hard to come by (p.141 in Stokey et al., 1989)”
and for switched systems, it is pointed out by DeCarlo et al. (2000) that
“despite the variety and significance of the many results on hybrid system
stability, general necessary and sufficient conditions in terms of the structure
of the vector fields have evaded discovery.”
In the following, we utilize the special structures of our problem to prove
the global stability of (5.10). Since we are concerned with the two-product
case, the discussions below will be restricted to two dimensional dynamic
systems, i.e., planar system.
Lemma 5.2. Consider a matrix
A =
[
a b
c d
]
with the property that A  0 and b, c < 0. Let v1 = (v11, v12) and v2 =
(v21, v22) be two eigenvectors of A, then the following must hold
v11v12 > 0, v21v22 < 0.
In other words, the line with one eigenvector as the direction passes through
the first and third quadrants while the line with the other eigenvector as the
direction passes through the second and forth quadrants.
Recall the definition of the matrix M in Lemma 5.1 where it depends on
the parameters ηi, i = 1, ..., N for loss/gain neutral demands. Here, we define
M++ by letting N = 2 and η1 = η
+
1 , η2 = η
+
2 . The matrices M
+−,M−+,M−
can be defined in a similar fashion. Note that M++ will have the same
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eigenvectors as
1
α¯(α¯ + γ/2)
(M++ − α¯γ
2
I)
=
1
(a1 + η
+
1 )(a2 + η
+
2 )− θ2
[
a1(a2 + η
+
2 )− θ2 −θη+2
−θη+1 a2(a1 + η+1 )− θ2
]
,
which satisfies the condition in Lemma 5.2. Thus, M++ will have two eigen-
vectors respectively in the first (third) quadrants and the second (forth)
quadrants. The same property can be established for M+−,M−+,M−. Us-
ing the above property of the matrices, we show that if the state path enters
any of the regions I++, I+−, I−+ or I−−, it will converge to a unique steady
state of that region without going out again. We formally state this result
with respect to the region I++ in Lemma 5.3. The results and proofs for the
regions I+−, I−+ and I−− are similar.
Lemma 5.3. Denote ∂I++ to be the boundary of I++. For any r0 ∈ ∂I++
and r˙(0) ∈ I++, we have r(t) ∈ I++ for any t > 0 and
lim
t→∞
r(t) = r++s ,
where r++s is the steady state to the system r˙ = α¯(p
++(r)− r).
Using Lemma 5.3, we can then establish the global stability of the system
(5.10).
Proposition 5.3. Starting from any initial state r0, the reference price path
generated according to (5.10) can have at most two switches. As a result,
there exists a T ≥ 0, such that for all t > T , r(t) stays in any one of the
nine regions illustrated in Figure 5.1 and converges to a steady state in S.
We provide in Figure 5.2 a numerical example to illustrate the stability
result in Proposition 5.3. In Figure 5.2, the reference price paths evolving
according to (5.10) are plotted for each initial reference price lying on the
boundaries of the square region. One can see that all reference price paths
converge to the steady states region S in the middle. It is also clear from the
figure that many reference price paths have a sudden change in their evolving
directions which indicates a switching behavior.
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−
2 = 11, θ = 10, α¯ = 0.5, γ = 0.2
Figure 5.2: Steady state region and reference price paths
5.4 Conclusion
In this chapter we consider a dynamic pricing problem of multiple products.
If demands for all the products are loss/gain neutral, we can solve the optimal
prices for all the products explicitly. Our solution is a generalization of the
solution in Fibich et al. (2003), which we use to show that in the long run the
optimal prices as well as reference prices converge to a unique steady state.
If the demands are loss-averse, then the dynamic pricing problem for the
multiple products becomes considerably more difficult. Not only the myopic
pricing strategy can result in a switched dynamic system, due to the potential
switching behavior, no existing method can be applied to solve for the optimal
prices. To address these difficulties, we propose a semi-myopic solution,
whose expressions can be explicitly computed. Our semi-myopic solution not
only generalizes the myopic solution, but is also optimal if no switch occurs
along the reference price path generated by the solution. We further prove
that the dynamic system resulted from the semi-myopic solution is globally
stable. The techniques we used in proving stability are potentially useful
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for establishing the stability property of other switched dynamic systems as
well.
We believe our results in this chapter open up a few future research di-
rections. First of all, as we have pointed out, the semi-myopic solution we
constructed is optimal if no switch occurs along the state path. Can such
regions where no switch occurs be identified (the so-called “positively invari-
ant set”)? Based on this step, one can then further explore what would be
the optimal prices outside of these invariant sets.
It would be useful to both numerically and analytically quantify the opti-
mality gap of our semi-myopic solution. Due to the curse of dimensionality,
solving problem (5.3) numerically becomes a daunting task even for a smal-
l number of products. Deriving computationally efficient upper bounds on
(5.3) will then facilitate performance evaluation.
Finally, a challenging yet interesting direction is to explore the case of
gain-seeking demands and more generally a mixture of gain-seeking as well
as loss-averse demands for multiple products. Although we have established
the complicated behavior of the price dynamics in Chapter 3, whether our an-
alytical results can be carried over to the multi-product settings by imposing
similar assumptions as Assumption 3.1 is still an open question.
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Chapter 6
Future research
In an effort to capture the relationship between demand and prices more
accurately in a market with repeated purchases and quantify its impact, this
thesis studies reference price models and the resulting dynamic pricing prob-
lems from several perspectives. Chapter 2-4 focuses on a single-product set-
ting. Empirically, we compare different reference price models and examines
the implication of behavioral asymmetry. Analytically, we characterize the
structures of the optimal pricing strategy under the exponential smoothing
reference price models when demands are gain-seeking. Computationally, we
provide efficient algorithms to compute the optimal prices for the exponential
smoothing reference price models.
For tractability, our analytical results and computational algorithms only
consider the exponential smoothing reference price models, while our em-
pirical comparisons suggest that in many cases the peak-end model and the
adaptation-rate-based model can provide a better fit to the data. This open-
s up two interesting research directions. First, we have seen in Chapter 2
that the optimality of constant pricing strategies is quite robust to different
reference price models under loss-averse demands. It is then natural to ask
for gain-seeking demands whether some of the analytical results developed in
Chapter 3 can be extended to the other two reference price models. Second,
developing computationally efficient algorithms for the peak-end model and
the adaptation-rate-based model is practically important since as reported in
Natter et al. (2007), the adaptation-rate-based model is already implemented
in the decision support system of bauMax, an Austrian retailer. Table 6.1
summarizes the existing results and the blank space represent open research
questions.
Chapter 5 represents another direction of extension: dynamic pricing with
multiple products. This is a largely unexplored yet important area and many
open questions remain to be answered. First, several linear demand models
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Table 6.1: Summary of Results
Structures of optimal pricing strategies Computational algorithms
Loss-averse case Gain-seeking case
ES Popescu and Wu (2007) Chapter 3 Chapter 4
PE Nasiry and Popescu (2011)
ARB Section 2.6
ES: exponential smoothing model
PE: peak-end model
ARB: adaptation-rate-based model
for multiple products that incorporate reference price effects have been pro-
posed. An empirical comparison of these models would not only shed light on
how reference prices come into play in a multi-product setting but also give
a guidance on developing analytical results and computational algorithms.
Second, when there is behavioral asymmetry, the resulting dynamic pricing
problem is a high-dimensional non-smooth dynamic programming problem
and is quite challenging. Characterizing the structures of the optimal pricing
strategies and studying the long-run behavior of the prices are crucial for
developing simple heuristics of such complicated problems. Finally, efficient
algorithms and implementations of the algorithms in a practical setting would
be very useful to advance the usage of more realistic models that incorporate
consumers behavior considerations among practitioners.
The topics covered in this thesis is by no means comprehensive. As we
mentioned in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4, the coordination of pricing and in-
ventory decisions is another wide area of research. Due to the increased
complexity, most results in the literature are restricted to exponential s-
moothing model and loss-averse demands. It would be interesting to see how
the results would change if alternative reference price models are employed.
Competition among the firms, is another important factor not discussed in
this thesis. While Fibich et al. (2003) examine the Cournot competition
in a continuous-time framework, analyzing price competitions is limited to
numerical simulations (Kopalle et al., 1996). Analytical results in this area
would provide helpful implications in how reference price effects change the
competitive behaviors among the firms.
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Appendix A
A.1 Proof of Proposition 2.5
To solve the HJB equation (2.18), we start from solving a finite horizon
problem by following Zhang (2011). That is, let
V (r, t) = max
p(s)
[∫ T
t
e−γtp(s)D(r(s), p(s))ds
]
be the value of optimal accumulated profit (profit-to-go function) from time
t to the end of horizon T when the initial reference price is r. Notice that
the value function in our problem (2.17) V (r0) = limT→∞ V (r0, 0).
From standard theory in stochastic optimal control, V (r, t) then satisfies
the HJB equation
γV (r, t)
= max
p
[
pD(r, p) +
∂V (r, t)
∂t
+ α¯(p− r)∂V (r, t)
∂r
+
σ2r
2
∂2V (r, t)
∂r2
] (A.1)
Using first order condition in (A.1) and with a slight abuse of notation, we
can solve p as
p∗(r) =
b+ ηr
2(a+ η)
+
α
2(a+ η)
∂V (r, t)
∂r
.
Substitute the above equation into (A.1), it follows
σ2
2
r
∂2V
∂r2
+
∂V
∂t
− γV + α
2
4(a+ η)
(
∂V
∂r
)2
+
[
−αr + α(b+ ηr)
2(a+ η)
]
∂V
∂r
+
(b+ ηr)2
4(a+ η)
= 0.
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Introducing a few new notations, this can be written concisely as:
∂V
∂t
−γV +Ar∂
2V
∂r2
+B
(
∂V
∂r
)2
+(p10+p11r)
∂V
∂r
+p20+p21r+p22r
2 = 0, (A.2)
where
A =
σ2
2
B =
α2
4(a+ η)
p10 =
αb
2(a+ η)
p11 = −α + αη
2(a+ η)
p20 =
b2
4(a+ η)
p21 =
bη
2(a+ η)
p22 =
η2
4(a+ η)
.
If we assume function V (r, t) has the following form:
V (r, t) = Q(t)r2 +R(t)r +M(t), (A.3)
then we get the following ordinary differential equations (ODEs):
dQ
dt
− γQ+ 4BQ2 + 2p11Q+ p22 = 0, (A.4)
dR
dt
− γR + 2AQ+ 4BQR + 2p10Q+ p11R + p21 = 0, (A.5)
dM
dt
− γM +BR2 + p10R + p20 = 0, (A.6)
with terminal condition Q(T ) = R(T ) = M(T ) = 0.
We first explicitly solve ODE (A.4) by rewriting it as:
dQ
dt
= −4B(Q−Q1)(Q−Q2)
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where Q1 < Q2 are the two distinct roots of the equation:
4BQ2 − (γ − 2p11)Q+ p22 = 0.
Namely:
Q1 =
γ − 2p11 −
√
(γ − 2p11)2 − 16Bp22
8B
,
Q2 =
γ − 2p11 +
√
(γ − 2p11)2 − 16Bp22
8B
.
Therefore:
dQ
(Q−Q1)(Q−Q2) = −4Bdt
⇒ dQ
Q1 −Q2
[
1
Q−Q1 −
1
Q−Q2
]
= −4Bdt
⇒ ln Q−Q1
Q−Q2 = −4B(Q1 −Q2)t+ C
⇒ Q−Q1
Q−Q2 = D · e
−4B(Q1−Q2)t, (A.7)
where C and D = eC are constants to be determined. By Q(T ) = 0, we can
solve
D =
Q1
Q2
e4B(Q1−Q2)T .
Substitute D back into (A.7), it follows
Q(t) =
Q1e
4B(Q1−Q2)T −Q1e4B(Q1−Q2)t
Q1/Q2e4B(Q1−Q2)T − e4B(Q1−Q2)t . (A.8)
With the expressions for Q(t), expressions for R(t) and M(t) can then be
obtained by solving (A.5) and (A.6). Consequently, p∗(r) can be determined
as well. One can easily verify using Theorem 4.1 in chapter VI of Fleming
and Rishel (1982) that p∗(r) solved in this way is indeed optimal and V (r, t)
is given by (A.3).
The solution to (2.18) is then obtained by letting T →∞. Since Q1 < Q2,
we have Q := Q1 = limT→∞Q(t), where by substituting the expressions for
B, p11 and p22
Q =
γ
2α¯2
(a+ η) +
2a+ η
2α¯
− a+ η
2α¯2
∆
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and ∆ is given by:
∆ =
√
γ2 + 2α¯
2a(γ + α¯) + γη
η + a
.
Correspondingly, one can also obtain R := limT→∞R(t) as
R =
2p10Q+ p21 + 2AQ
γ − 4BQ− p11
=
2α¯2b+ αb(γ −∆))
α¯2(γ + ∆)
+
α¯(2a+ η) + (a+ η)(γ −∆)
α¯2(γ + ∆)
σ2
=
[
b
α¯
+
σ2(a+ η)
α¯2
]
γ −∆
γ + ∆
+
[
b+
σ2(2a+ η)
2α¯
]
2
γ + ∆
.
Similarly, M := limT→∞M(t) can be computed but the expressions for M is
not needed for our following analysis.
Now, we have explicitly solved (2.18), where V (r) = Qr2 + Rr + M and
the optimal pricing strategy is
p∗(r) =
b+ ηr
2(a+ η)
+
α¯(2Qr +R)
2(a+ η)
. (A.9)
Substitute (A.9) into the reference price dynamics (2.16), we have the fol-
lowing SDE:
dr∗(t) = α
[
2α¯Q− 2a− η
2(a+ η)
r∗(t) +
α¯R + b
2(a+ η)
]
dt+ σ
√
r∗(t)dW (t)
:= λ(µ− r∗(t)) + σ
√
r∗(t)dW (t),
(A.10)
where
λ = α¯
2a+ η − 2α¯Q
2(a+ η)
, µ = α¯
α¯R + b
2λ(a+ η)
.
Interestingly, under the optimal pricing strategy, the reference price dy-
namics (A.10) is again a square-root diffusion process. It is easy to show
that λ, µ > 0 and thus the steady state distribution is a gamma distribution
whose shape parameter is 2λµ
σ2
and rate parameter is 2λ
σ2
(see, for instance,
Cox et al., 1985).
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A.2 Proof of Proposition 2.6
By Proposition 2.5, R∗s follows a gamma distribution, its mean and variance
can then be computed as
E[R∗s] =
2λµ
σ2
σ2
2λ
= µ,
var(R∗s) =
2λµ
σ2
(
σ2
2λ
)2 =
µ
2λ
σ2.
Substitute the expressions for Q,R and λ into µ, with cumbersome algebraic
manipulations, one can further obtain
µ =
(γ + α¯)b
2a(γ + α¯) + γη
+
σ2
2a(γ + α¯) + γη
[
a+ η
α¯
(
γ
2
− ∆
2
)
+
2a+ η
2
]
.
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Appendix B
B.1 Proof of Lemma 3.1
Let us first consider the unconstrained problem: maxp Π(r, p). Recall that
Π(r, p) = max{Π+(r, p),Π−(r, p)}
= max
η−≤η≤η+
p(b− ap+ η(r − p)),
where the last equality is due to the linearity of the function p(b−ap+η(r−p))
in η.
We can then rewrite maxp Π(r, p) as
max
η−≤η≤η+
max
p
−(a+ η)p2 + ηrp+ bp.
Clearly, the inner maximization problem has a unique optimal solution
p(r, η) = ηr+b
2(a+η)
with the optimal objective value v(r, η) = (ηr+b)
2
4(a+η)
. Note
further that ∂
2v
∂r∂η
= ηr(a+η)+a(b+ηr)
2(a+η)2
> 0, which indicates that v(r, η) is su-
permodular. Since either η = η+ or η = η−, the supermodularity of v(r, η)
implies the existence of R such that for r ≤ R, v(r, η−) ≥ v(r, η+) and for
r ≥ R, v(r, η+) ≥ v(r, η−). At R, v(r, η−) = v(r, η+) and thus R can be
computed explicitly as R = b
a+
√
(a+η+)(a+η−)
. As a result, the unconstrained
solution is exactly what presents in (3.5).
Observe that when r > R, we have pm(r) = η
+r+b
2(a+η+)
≤ r. To see this,
suppose pm(r) > r, then
Π(r, pm(r)) = pm(r)(b− apm(r) + η−(r − pm(r)))
> pm(r)(b− apm(r) + η+(r − pm(r))) = v(r, η+),
which contradicts with the fact that Π(r, pm) = v(r, η+) for r > R. Therefore,
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when r > R, pm(r) can never violate the upper bound U . On the other hand,
by a similar argument for r ≤ R, pm(r) = η−r+b
2(a+η−) ≥ r. Moreover, pm(r) is
increasing in r and is equal to U at RU . Thus, if R ≤ RU , then η−r+b2(a+η−) ≤ U
on [0, R] and the unconstrained solution specified above is optimal.
However, if R > RU , then for r ≤ R
v(r, η−) =

(η−r + b)2
4(a+ η−)
, r ≤ RU ,
− (a+ η−)U2 + η−rU + bU, RU ≤ r ≤ R,
and we need to compare again between v(r, η−) and v(r, η+) on [RU , R]. It is
straightforward to show that R′ is the unique positive solution of v(r, η−) =
v(r, η+) and when r < R′, v(r, η−) > v(r, η+), when r > R′, v(r, η−) <
v(r, η+). Therefore, we arrive at the second form of pm(r).
B.2 Proof of Proposition 3.1
Suppose that a periodic orbit of period 2: {r0, r1} exists, where r0, r1 ∈ [0, U ]
and r0 6= r1. First we observe either r0 ≤ R, r1 > R holds or r0 > R, r1 ≤ R
holds. To see this, suppose that, on the contrary, ri ≤ R for i = 0, 1, then
pm(ri) ≥ ri by the definition of R, which further implies r1−i = αri + (1 −
α)pm(ri) ≥ ri. Therefore, r1−i = ri for i = 0, 1, leads to contradiction with
r0 6= r1. Similarly, it is also impossible that ri ≥ R for i = 0, 1. In the
following we assume, without loss of generality, that r0 ≤ R, r1 > R. Then,
r0, r1 satisfy the following equations:
r1 = αr0 + (1− α) η
−r0 + b
2(a+ η−)
,
r0 = αr1 + (1− α) η
+r1 + b
2(a+ η+)
.
Thus, r0, r1 can be explicitly solved as
r0 =
[(1 + α)η+ + 2a+ 2η− + 2αa]b
(4a+ 3η− + 2αa+ αη−)η+ + 4αη− + 4αa2 + 4a2 + 2αaη−
,
r1 =
[(1 + α)η− + 2a+ 2η+ + 2αa]b
(4a+ 3η− + 2αa+ αη−)η+ + 4αη− + 4αa2 + 4a2 + 2αaη−
.
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We have shown that if a periodic orbit of period 2 exists, then it must be
given by the unique solution identified above and has to satisfy r0 ≤ R and
r1 > R. On the other hand, given r0 and r1 specified by above expressions
with r0 ≤ R, r1 > R. Then, by our construction, r1 = αr0 + (1 − α)pm(r0)
and r0 = αr1 + (1 − α)pm(r1), which implies {r0, r1} is a periodic orbit of
period 2. Overall, a periodic orbit of period 2 exists if and only if
[(1 + α)η+ + 2a+ 2η− + 2αa]b
(4a+ 3η− + 2αa+ αη−)η+ + 4αη− + 4αa2 + 4a2 + 2αaη−
≤ R,
[(1 + α)η− + 2a+ 2η+ + 2αa]b
(4a+ 3η− + 2αa+ αη−)η+ + 4αη− + 4αa2 + 4a2 + 2αaη−
> R.
With cumbersome algebraic manipulations, the above two inequalities can
be simplified to
4(1− α2)a2 + 4(1− α− α2)aη+ + 4aη− − (1 + α)2(η+)2 + 4η+η− ≥ 0,
4(1− α2)a2 + 4(1− α− α2)aη− + 4aη+ − (1 + α)2(η−)2 + 4η+η− > 0.
Observe that the second inequality is naturally satisfied when the first in-
equality is satisfied. Thus, we have arrived at condition (3.7).
B.3 Proof of Proposition 3.2
By translating R to the origin and scaling η
−R+b
2(a+η−) − η
+R+b
2(a+η+)
to 1, then αr +
(1 − α)pm(r) is equivalent to the following discontinuous map studied in
Rajpathak et al. (2012).
f(r) =
{
Ar + µ, r ≤ 0,
Br + µ− 1, r > 0.
Denote {r0, r1, ..., rn−1} be the periodic orbit (if exists) of the above system.
Then it is easy to see that r0 < r1 < ... < rn−1 (r0 > r1 > ... > rn−1) if and
only if r0 < r1 < ... < rn−2 ≤ 0 and rn−1 > 0 (r0 > r1 > ... > rn−2 > 0
and rn−1 ≤ 0 ). If we denote each point rt, 0 ≤ t < n, to be L if rt ≤ 0
and R if rt > 0, then the periodic orbit can be coded as {L,L, ...,L︸ ︷︷ ︸
n−1
,R}
({R,R, ...,R︸ ︷︷ ︸
n−1
,L}), which is exactly the so-called prime pattern in Rajpathak
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et al. (2012). Applying Theorem 1 in Rajpathak et al. (2012), we arrive at
conditions (3.8) and (3.9) that guarantee each type of periodic solution with
period n respectively.
B.4 Proof of Lemma 3.2
We first prove that V (r) is increasing and convex in r. To see this, define
the following value iteration for i ≥ 0:
Vi+1(r) = max
p∈[0,U ]
Π(r, p) + γVi(αr + (1− α)p),
with V0(r) = 0. We inductively show that Vi(r) is increasing and convex
in r for all i ≥ 0. Clearly, V0(r) trivially has the property. For i > 0,
suppose Vi(r) is increasing and convex in r. Since Π(r, p) is increasing in r,
we immediately have Vi+1(r) is also increasing in r.
To see convexity of Vi+1(r), it is sufficient to show that Π(r, p) is convex
in r. Indeed, recall that Π(r, p) = max{Π+(r, p),Π−(r, p)}, where Π±(r, p) =
p[b−ap+η±(r−p)]. As both Π+(r, p) and Π−(r, p) are convex in r, Π(r, p) is
also convex in r. By Proposition 2.1.15 in Simchi-Levi et al. (2014), Vi+1(r)
is also convex. By Theorem 4.6 in Stokey et al. (1989), limi→∞ Vi(r) = V (r).
Thus, V (r) is both increasing and convex in r.
Since V (r) is increasing and convex in r while both Π+(r, p) and Π−(r, p)
are increasing and convex in r, by applying again Proposition 2.1.15 in
Simchi-Levi et al. (2014) to problems (3.11a) and (3.11b) respectively, we
have V +(r) and V −(r) are also increasing and convex.
On the other hand, as ∂
2Π+(r,p)
∂r∂p
= η+ > 0 and ∂
2Π−(r,p)
∂r∂p
= η− > 0, Π+(r, p)
and Π−(r, p) are supermodular in r and p. Moreover, since V (·) is convex,
by Theorem 2.2.6 in Simchi-Levi et al. (2014), V (αr + (1 − α)p) is also
supermodular. As a result, p+(r) and p−(r) are increasing in r.
B.5 Proof of Lemma 3.3
Clearly, as V −(r) = V − is constant and V +(r) is increasing, there are three
cases. If V +(r) ≥ V − for all r ∈ [0, U ], then R0 = 0. If V +(r) ≤ V − for all
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r ∈ [0, U ], then R0 = U . If neither of the above cases is true, then we must
have V +(0) < V − and V +(U) > V −. As V +(r) is continuous and increasing,
there must exists 0 < R0 < U , such that if r ≤ R0, then V (r) = V − and
p∗(r) = p− and if r > R0, then V (r) = V +(r) and p∗(r) = p+(r).
Next, we show that whenever p∗(r) = p−, then p∗(r) = p− > r and
whenever p∗(r) = p+(r), then p∗(r) = p+(r) < r. Recall from Section 3.2
that p∗(r) 6= r for any r ∈ [0, U ]. Now suppose p∗(r) = p+(r), but p∗(r) > r,
then V +(r) ≥ V −. However,
V +(r) = Π+(r, p+(r)) + γV (p+(r))
<Π−(r, p+(r)) + γV (p+(r)) ≤ Π−(r, p−) + γV (p−) = V −,
a contradiction. The same claim can be made when p∗(r) = p−.
Finally, if R0 = 0 or R0 = U , then p
∗(0) = p+(0) < 0 or p∗(U) = p−(U) >
U , both lead to a contradiction. So we must have 0 < R0 < U .
B.6 Proof of Proposition 3.3
We first introduce some notations to formalize the idea discussed in Section
3.4. Let V0(r) = V
−, then there exists R1 = sup{r ∈ [R0, U ] : p+(r) < R0} ∈
(R0, U ] such that for r ∈ (R0, R1), p+(r) = p1(r) = η+r+b2(a+η+) and
V +(r) = V1(r) = max
p∈[0,U ]
Π+(r, p) + γV0(p) =
(η+r + b)2
4(a+ η+)
+ γV −.
If R1 = U , then our proposition holds with N = 0.
More generally, for k ≥ 2, if Rk−1 < U , define Rk = sup{r ∈ [R0, U ] :
p+(r) < Rk−1} ∈ (R0, U ]. Note that p+(Rk−1) < Rk−1 by Lemma 3.3 and it
follows Rk > Rk−1. We further define
Vk(r) = max
p∈[0,U ]
Π+(r, p) + γVk−1(p),
pk(r) = arg max
p∈[0,U ]
Π+(r, p) + γVk−1(p).
(B.1)
By our construction, on [Rk−1, Rk), Rk−2 ≤ p+(r) < Rk−1. Thus, if V (r) =
V +(r) = Vk−1(r) on [Rk−2, Rk−1), then V (p+(r)) = Vk−1(p+(r)) on [Rk−1, Rk)
and there is no loss of optimality by replacing problem (3.11a) with problem
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(B.1) above. Therefore, we have inductively shown that V (r) = V +(r) =
Vk(r) and p
∗(r) = p+(r) = pk(r) on [Rk−1, Rk).
Next, we inductively show that Vk(r) has the following parametric form:
Vk(r) =
1
2
Akr
2 +Bkr + Ck,
with Ak ≤ η+. We have already shown the base case for k = 1, with
A1 =
(η+)2
2(a+ η+)
=
η+m2
γ
≤ η+,
B1 =
η+b
2(a+ η+)
=
m2b
γ
.
With inductive hypothesis,
Vk+1(r) = max
p∈[0,U ]
{Π+(r, p) + γVk(p)}
= max
p∈[0,U ]
{−(a+ η+ − 1
2
γAk)p
2 + (b+ η+r + γBk)p+ γCk}.
By Lemma 3.3, pk+1(r) < U . Combined with Ak ≤ η+, we know above
problem is a concave maximization problem with an interior solution. Thus,
the optimal solution can be derived from first order condition:
pk+1(r) =
b+ η+r + γBk
2(a+ η+)− γAk .
We can then express
Vk+1(r)
=− (a+ η+ − 1
2
γAk)pk+1(r)
2 + (b+ η+r + γBk)pk+1(r) + γCk
=
(η+)2/2
2(a+ η+)− γAk r
2 +
(b+ γBk)η
+
2(a+ η+)− γAk r +
(b+ γBk)
2/2
2(a+ η+ − γAk) + γCk.
Thus,
Ak+1 =
(η+)2
2(a+ η+)− γAk ≤
(η+)2
2(a+ η+)− γη+ ≤ η
+,
Bk+1 =
(b+ γBk)η
+
2(a+ η+)− γAk .
115
Combined with the expressions for A1, B1, it is not difficult to see that
Ak =
η+
γ
mk+1,
Bk =
1
γ
n∑
i=0
i∏
j=0
mk+1−jb.
Consequently, we can compute
pk(r) =
η+r + b+
∑k−1
i=0 (
∏i
j=0mk−j)b
2(a+ η+)−mkη+ .
If Rk = U , the above analysis has shown that our proposition holds with
N = k − 1.
Finally, we show that the construction of the sequence Rk cannot continue
forever. In other words, there exists N ≥ 0 such that RN+1 > U . We prove
by contradiction. Suppose for any k ≥ 1, Rk ≤ U . Then the following
relation between Rk and Rk+1 must hold for any k ≥ 1: for r ∈ [Rk, Rk+1],
p+(r) ≤ Rk and for r ∈ [Rk+1, U ], p+(r) ≥ Rk. Since Rk is a bounded
increasing sequence, there exists R¯ ≤ U such that
lim
k→∞
Rk = R¯.
From the above relation, we conclude that for r ∈ [Rk+1, R¯], p+(r) ≥ Rk. In
particular, p+(R¯) ≥ Rk for any k ≥ 1. Taking limits on both sides, we obtain
p+(R¯) ≥ R¯,
leading to a contradiction with Lemma 3.3 which states p∗(r) = p+(r) < r
for any r ∈ [R,U ].
B.7 Proof of Proposition 3.4
From Lemma 3.3, we know that R0 < r
∗ ≤ U . Thus, there exists 2 ≤
n ≤ N + 2 such that r∗ ∈ [Rn−2, Rn−1]. Let p∗1(r∗) = p+(r∗), then p∗1(r∗) ∈
[Rn−3, Rn−2] and p∗1(r
∗) < r∗. Inductively, for 1 ≤ i ≤ n − 2 if p∗i (r∗) ∈
[Rn−2−i, Rn−1−i], then let p∗i+1(r
∗) = p+(p∗i (r
∗)) and it follows that p∗i+1(r
∗) ∈
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[Rn−3−i, Rn−2−i] if i ≤ n− 3 or p∗i+1(r∗) ∈ [0, R0] if i = n− 2. Furthermore,
it holds p∗i+1(r
∗) < p∗i (r
∗). Finally, let p∗n(r
∗) = p−(p∗n−1(r
∗)) = p−. Then
p∗n(r
∗) = r∗. We have constructed the periodic orbit {r∗, p∗1(r∗), ..., p∗n−1(r∗)}
with the property r∗ > p∗1(r
∗) > ... > p∗n−1(r
∗).
Next we show that start from any initial reference price r0 ∈ [0, U ], the
optimal reference price path r∗t converges to the periodic orbit in at most
N+2 periods. Clearly, for any r0 ∈ [0, R0], r∗1 = p−(r0) = r∗, and r∗t will then
follow the periodic orbit. For 0 ≤ i ≤ N and any r0 ∈ [Ri, Ri+1], it follows
that r∗1 = p
+(r0) ∈ [Ri−1, Ri] if i ≥ 1 or r∗1 = p+(r0) ∈ [0, R0] if i = 0. Again,
inductively, for 1 ≤ t ≤ i it holds that r∗t = p+(r∗t−1) ∈ [Ri−t, Ri−t+1]. Finally,
r∗i+1 ∈ [0, R0] and r∗i+2 = p−(r∗i+1) = r∗ and the reference price path from then
on follows the periodic orbit. In the worst case when r0 ∈ [RN , RN+1], we
know that r∗N+2 = r
∗.
B.8 Proof of Proposition 3.5
The basic idea is to find the condition such that p+(r) ≤ R0 for any r ∈
[R0, U ]. If this holds, then for any r0 ∈ [R0, U ] it follows that r∗1 = p+(r0) ∈
[0, R0], r
∗
2 = p
−(r∗1) = pH = r
∗ and r∗3 = p
+(r∗2) = pL, which shows the
existence of the high-low pricing strategy {pH , pL}.
However, both R0 and the number of linear pieces as well as the “jumping”
points of p+(r) are unknown. Instead, we strive to find an upper bound: p¯(r)
on p+(r) and a lower bound R0 on R0 such that condition (3.12) guarantees
p¯(r) ≤ R0 for all r ∈ [R0, U ], which then implies p+(r) ≤ p¯(r) ≤ R0 ≤ R0 for
all r ∈ [R0, U ].
First, we claim that the constant K is an upper bound on mk for k ≥ 1.
Clearly, for k = 1, it holds m1 = 0 ≤ K. Suppose for k ≥ 1, we have
mk ≤ K. Then, we want to show that
mk+1 =
γη+
2(a+ η+)−mkη+ ≤
γη+
2(a+ η+)−Kη+ ≤ K.
The second inequality above is equivalent to:
η+K2 − 2(a+ η+)K + γη+ ≤ 0,
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and it is straightforward to see that K indeed satisfies the inequality above.
Note that here K < 1. Using the bound on mk and the expression of p
∗(r)
in Proposition 3.3, we can then bound p+(r) as
p+(r) ≤ η
+r + b+
∑∞
i=0K
i+1b
2(a+ η+)−Kη+ =
η+r + 1
1−K b
2(a+ η+)−Kη+ = p¯(r)
Next, we claim that R0 = R =
b
a+
√
a(a+η+)
provides a lower bound for
R0. It is sufficient to show that p
∗(r) ≥ pm(r) for any r ∈ [0, R) because if
R > R0, then on (R0, R) we have p
∗(r) = p+(r) < r < pm(r), leading to a
contradiction. Indeed, if p∗(r) < pm(r) for some r ∈ (0, R), then as pm(r)
maximizes Π(r, p) and multiple solutions occur only when r = R, we must
have
Π(r, p∗(r)) < Π(r, pm(r)).
Since V (r) is increasing in r, it follows V (p∗(r)) < V (pm(r)), which implies
p∗(r) is not optimal, leading to a contradiction.
Finally, as p¯(r) is also increasing, condition (3.12) is derived by simply
requiring
p¯(U) =
η+U + 1
1−K b
2(a+ η+)−Kη+ ≤ R0 = R =
b
a+
√
a(a+ η+)
,
to ensure p¯(r) ≤ R for all r ∈ [R0, U ].
B.9 Proof of Proposition 3.6
The idea is similar to the proof of Proposition 3.5. We claim that Rk ≤ Rk.
The base case for k = 0 is shown in Proposition 3.5. Suppose Rk−1 ≤ Rk−1.
Following the proof of Proposition 3.3, denote
pk+1(r) =
η+r + b+
∑k
i=0(
∏i
j=0mk+1−j)b
2(a+ η+)−mk+1η+ .
By our construction, as p+(r) = pk+1(r) on [Rk, Rk+1] and
Rk = sup{r ∈ [R0, U ] : p+(r) = pk+1(r) < Rk−1},
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while for any r < Rk,
pk+1(r) < Rk−1 ≤ Rk−1.
Thus, Rk ≤ Rk.
Condition (3.13) then implies, p∗2(r
∗) ∈ [Ri, Ri+1] for 0 ≤ i ≤ k − 1.
Therefore, by counting the maps from [Ri, Ri+1] to [Ri−1, Ri], it is easy to
see that the length of period is at most k + 2.
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Appendix C
C.1 Proof of Proposition 4.1
Define Q = sup{q : q − r∗(q) < 0} and Q = inf{q : q − r∗(q) > 0}. By
the single crossing property of q − r∗(q) in Assumption 4.2, we have Q ≤ Q.
Furthermore, when q < Q, q − r∗(q) < 0, when q > Q, q − r∗(q) > 0 and
when Q ≤ q ≤ Q, q − r∗(q) = 0.
As a result, when q < Q,
r∗(q) = arg max
r
{Π(r, q) + g(r)}
= arg max
r>q
{Π(r, q) + g(r)}
= arg max
r>q
{Π+(r, q) + g(r)}
= r+(q).
Similarly, when q > Q, it holds r∗(q) = r−(q).
C.2 Proof of Lemma 4.1
First note that the strict supermodularity of Π(r, q) in Assumption 4.1 implies
the strict supermodularity of Π+(r, q). Thus, r+(q) is increasing in q. For
1 ≤ j ≤ m, define q
j
= sup{q : r+(q) < rj} and qj = inf{q : r+(q) > rj}.
By definition, it is clear that when q
j
≤ q ≤ qj, r+(q) = rj.
For 1 ≤ j ≤ m+ 1 and any qj−1 < q < qj, we then have rj−1 < r+(q) < rj.
Thus, there is no loss of optimality in considering the problem
r+(q) = arg max
r
{Π+(r, q) + gj(r)}.
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Note here that the objective function is now continuously differentiable and
strictly supermodular. There is no constraint imposed on r and consequently,
r+(q) is always an interior solution. By Strict Monotonicity Theorem in
Edlin and Shannon (1998), we then have r+(q) is strictly increasing in q on
qj−1 ≤ q ≤ qj, 1 ≤ j ≤ m+ 1.
C.3 Proof of Proposition 4.2
Clearly, r∗(q) = q on [Q,Q] and is consequently strictly increasing.
On (−∞, Q], r∗(q) = r+(q) and by Lemma 4.1, r+(q) can only take con-
stant values {rj|rj ≤ Q, 1 ≤ j ≤ m} on the corresponding interval [qj, qj]
and strictly increasing elsewhere.
Similarly, on [Q,+∞), r∗(q) = r−(q) and by Lemma 4.1, r−(q) can only
take constant values {rj|rj ≥ Q, 1 ≤ j ≤ m} on the corresponding interval
[q
j
, qj] and strictly increasing elsewhere.
C.4 Proof of Lemma 4.2
By Assumption 4.2 (a), f(q) is concave. Combined with Proposition 4.1,
this implies that f+(q) and f−(q) are concave on (−∞, Q) and (Q,+∞)
respectively.
Now that f+(q) is concave and Π+(r, q) is continuously differentiable. By
Theorem 1 in Milgrom and Segal (2002), f+(q) is differentiable and
df(q)
dq
= Π+q (r
+(q), q).
That is, f+(q) is continuously differentiable on (−∞, Q). The same argument
applies to f−(q).
C.5 Proof of Proposition 4.3
By Proposition 4.1 and Lemma 4.2, we have already proved that f(q) is
continuously differentiable when q < Q and q > Q. Also, note that when Q <
q < Q, f(q) = pi(q) + g(q). Since pi(q) is continuously differentiable, whether
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f(q) is continuously differentiable or not only depends on whether g(q) is
continuously differentiable or not on Q < q < Q. However, r1, r2, ..., rm
are all the kink points of g(q). Therefore, we can conclude that the only
possible kink points of f(q) are Q,Q and r1, r2, ..., rm. Next, we conclude
that r1, r2, ..., rm are the only possible kink points of f(q).
To show that r1, r2, ..., rm are the only possible kink points, we only need
to show that when Q /∈ {r1, r2, ..., rm} and Q /∈ {r1, r2, ..., rm}, f(q) is con-
tinuously differentiable at Q and Q. Without loss of generality, we next show
for the case when Q /∈ {r1, r2, ..., rm}, f(q) is continuously differentiable at
Q.
Since Q /∈ {r1, r2, ..., rm} and −∞ = r0 < r1 < ... < rm < rm+1 = +∞, we
know there exists 1 ≤ j ≤ m + 1, such that rj−1 < Q < rj. By continuity
of r∗(q) and Proposition 4.1, rj−1 < r∗(Q) = r+(Q) = Q < rj. Thus,
r+(Q) = Q is the solution to:
f+(Q) = max
r
{Π+(r,Q) + gj(r)}.
By the first order condition, Q satisfies
Π+r (Q,Q) +
dgj(r)
dr
(Q) = 0. (C.1)
Now, since rj−1 < Q < rj, the right derivative at Q is
lim
q↓Q
df(q)
dq
=
dpi(Q)
dq
+
dgj(Q)
dq
.
On the other hand, the left derivative at Q is
lim
q↑Q
df(q)
dq
= Π+q (Q,Q).
Using equation (C.1), we then have
lim
q↓Q
df(q)
dq
=
dpi(Q)
dq
− Π+r (Q,Q).
122
Using total derivative, we then have Π+r (q, q) + Π
+
q (q, q) =
dpi(q)
dq
. That is,
lim
q↓Q
df(q)
dq
= lim
q↑Q
df(q)
dq
,
which shows that f(q) is continuously differentiable at Q. The differentiabil-
ity at Q can be proved similarly.
C.6 Proof of Proposition 4.5
Suppose that Gt(r) is strongly concave with concavity constant At =
2αat+η−
2(1−α) .
We will next show first that Gt+1(r) is also strongly concave. The argument
we use also implies the base case G2(r) is strongly concave.
Let Gˆt(r) = Gt(r) + Atr
2 and Bt =
2at+η+
2(1−α) , then the Bellman equation
(4.3) can be rewritten as
Gˆt+1(q) = max
r
{Πt(r, q)− Atr2 +Btq2 + (At+1 −Bt)q2 + Gˆt(r)}.
By inductive hypothesis, Gˆt(r) is concave. To prove Gˆt+1(q) is also concave,
it is sufficient to prove that the objective function is jointly concave in r and
q. We prove this by showing that Πt(r, q)− Atr2 + Btq2 is a jointly concave
function and At+1 −Bt ≤ 0.
Note that Πt(r, q) = min{Π+t (r, q),Π−t (r, q)}, where
Π±t (r, q) = −
at + η
±
(1− α)2 q
2+
2αat + (1 + α)η
±
(1− α)2 qr−
α2at + αη
±
(1− α)2 r
2+
bt
1− αq−
btα
1− αr.
From the expression above, we can obtain the Hessian of Π±t (r, q)−Atr2+Btq2
as
1
(1− α)2
[
−2(at + η±) + 2(1− α)2Bt 2αat + (1 + α)η±
2αat + (1 + α)η
± −2(α2at + αη±)− 2(1− α)2At
]
.
Substitute the expressions of At and Bt, it can be verified that above matrices
are diagonally dominant and consequently, Π±t (r, q)−Atr2 +Btq2 are jointly
concave. Thus, Πt(r, q)− Atr2 +Btq2 is also jointly concave.
123
To guarantee At+1 −Bt ≤ 0, we need
2αat+1 + η
−
2(1− α) ≤
2at + η
+
2(1− α) ,
which is guaranteed by Assumption 4.4.
Finally, note that Gˆ2(r) = Π1(r1, r)+B1r
2 +(A2−B1)r2. By the fact that
Π1(r1, r) − A1r21 + B1r2 is jointly concave as shown above, Π1(r1, r) + B1r2
is concave in r. Thus, Gˆ2(r) is also concave in r.
To show the second claim, first recall that
G2(r) =
{
g2(r), r ∈ [αr1 + (1− α)L1, αr1 + (1− α)U1],
−∞, r ∈ (−∞, αr1 + (1− α)L1) ∪ (αr1 + (1− α)U1,+∞),
which shows that the claim holds for the base case. Now suppose for t ≥ 2,
Gt(r) =
{
gt(r), r ∈ [rt, rt],
−∞, r ∈ (−∞, rt) ∪ (rt,+∞).
When α > 0, the price constraint is equivalent as r ∈ [ q−(1−α)Ut
α
, q−(1−α)Lt
α
].
If [ q−(1−α)Ut
α
, q−(1−α)Lt
α
]∩ [rt, rt] = ∅, then Gt+1(q) = −∞. That is, we can let
rt+1 = αrt + (1 − α)Lt and rt+1 = αrt + (1 − α)Ut. When α = 0, clearly,
rt+1 = Lt and rt+1 = Ut. In summary, we then have
Gt+1(r) =
{
gt+1(r), r ∈ [rt+1, rt+1],
−∞, r ∈ (−∞, rt+1) ∪ (rt+1,+∞).
C.7 Proof of Lemma 4.3
Since the objective function is strict concave in r and continuous, Maximum
Theorem (Ok, 2007) guarantees that r∗c (q) is single-valued and continuous in
q.
For the second part, it is shown in Chen et al. (2013) that Π(r, q) is super-
modular. Also, note that the constraint set [ q−(1−α)Ut
α
, q−(1−α)Lt
α
] is ascending
with q. Therefore, by Theorem 2.2.8 in Simchi-Levi et al. (2014), r∗c (q) is in-
creasing in q. To show the monotonicity for p∗c(q), by variable transformation,
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problem (4.5) is equivalent to the following problem
fc(q) = max
p
{Πt(q − (1− α)p
α
, q) + gt(
q − (1− α)p
α
) : p ∈ [Lt, Ut]},
p∗c(q) = arg max
p
{Πt(q − (1− α)p
α
, q) + gt(
q − (1− α)p
α
) : p ∈ [Lt, Ut]},
where Πt(
q−(1−α)p
α
, q) = p(bt−atp+η+( q−pα )++η−( q−pα )−) can also be shown to
be supermodular by Lemma 2 in Chen et al. (2013). Meanwhile, by concavity
of gt(·), gt( q−(1−α)pα ) is supermodular in (p, q). Thus, p∗c(q) is monotonically
increasing in q.
C.8 Proof of Proposition 4.6
Define
θ(r, q) = ∂+r [Πt(r, q) + gt(r)]
= −2(α
2at + αη)
(1− α)2 r +
2αat + (1 + α)η
(1− α)2 q −
btα
1− α + ∂
+gt(r),
where η = η+ if r ≥ q and η = η− if r < q, and
θ(r, q) = ∂−r [Πt(r, q) + gt(r)]
= −2(α
2at + αη)
(1− α)2 r +
2αat + (1 + α)η
(1− α)2 q −
btα
1− α + ∂
−g(r),
where η = η+ if r > q and η = η− if r ≤ q. Note that by concavity
of the objective function, θ(r, q) and θ(r, q) are both decreasing in r and
θ(r, q) ≤ θ(r, q).
Following the notation in the proof of Proposition 4.5, let gˆt(q) = gt(q) +
Atq
2. By Proposition 4.5, gˆt(q) is concave as well. It follows that
θ(q, q) =
2αat + η
+
1− α q −
btα
1− α + ∂
+gt(q),
=
2αat + η
+
1− α q −
btα
1− α − 2Atq + ∂
+gˆt(q)
= −η
− − η+
1− α q + ∂
+gˆt(q)− btα
1− α
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and
θ(q, q) =
2αat + η
−
1− α q −
btα
1− α + ∂
−gt(q)
=
2αat + η
−
1− α q −
btα
1− α − 2Atq + ∂
−gˆt(q)
= ∂−gˆt(q)− btα
1− α,
where in the last equations we substituted the strong concavity constant
At =
2αat+η−
2(1−α) . As a result, both θ(q, q) and θ(q, q) are decreasing in q and
η− > η+ implies θ(q, q) is actually strictly decreasing and θ(q, q) < θ(q, q).
Let Q = sup{q : θ(q, q) > 0} and Q = inf{q : θ(q, q) < 0}. By θ(Q,Q) ≥
0 ≥ θ(Q,Q) > θ(Q,Q), we have Q < Q. We consider the following three
cases.
Case 1: If q < Q, then θ(q, q) > 0 and θ(r, q) > 0 for r ≤ q. Thus, r∗(q) > q.
Case 2: If q > Q, then θ(q, q) < 0 and θ(r, q) < 0 for r ≥ q. Thus, r∗(q) < q.
Case 3: If Q ≤ q ≤ Q, then θ(q, q) ≤ 0 and θ(q, q) ≥ 0. That is θ(r, q) ≤ 0
for r ≥ q and θ(r, q) ≥ 0 for r ≤ q. Thus, r∗(q) = q.
In summary, for q′ > q′′, if q′′ > r∗(q′′), then q′ > q′′ > Q and q′ > r∗(q′).
That is, the single-crossing property holds for q − r∗(q).
C.9 Proof of Proposition 4.7
By Proposition 4.4, f(q) has at most nt+mt+2 breakpoints. On top of this,
qL, qU , qr and qr are the new breakpoints by computing gt+1(q) from f(q).
Thus, nt+1 ≤ nt +mt + 6.
By Proposition 4.3, f(q) has at most mt kink points. On top this, qL, qU ,
q
r
and qr are the only new candidate kink points by computing gt+1(q) from
f(q). Thus, mt+1 ≤ mt + 4.
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Appendix D
D.1 Proof of Lemma 5.1
For convenience, given matrices A,B, we denote A  0 if A is positive
definite and A  B if A−B is positive definite. For the matrix of our
interest, we have the following relationship
α¯(α¯ + γ)I + α¯(α¯ +
γ
2
)R−1K
α¯(α¯ + γ
2
)(I + R−1K)
=α¯(α¯ +
γ
2
)K−
1
2 [K
1
2 (K−1 + R−1)K
1
2 ]K
1
2
The last equality shows that I + R−1K is similar to the matrix
K
1
2 (K−1 + R−1)K
1
2 . Since −R−K is a symmetric strictly diagonally dom-
inant matrix with nonnegative diagonal entries and is consequently pos-
itive definite, i.e. −R−K  0. Therefore, from −R  K, we have
(−R)−1 ≺ K−1 which shows K12 (K−1 + R−1)K12 is positive definite. By
similarity of matrices, α¯(α¯ + γ
2
)(I + R−1K) is also positive definite and our
claim holds.
D.2 Proof of Proposition 5.1
We start by considering the finite horizon problem, i.e.,
max
p
∫ T
0
e−γtΠ(r,p)dt.
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By (5.1), p = 1
α¯
r˙ + r, and we can write the integrand as
Φ(r˙, r, t) := e−γt[(
1
α¯
r˙ + r)>R(
1
α¯
r˙ + r) + r>K(
1
α¯
r˙ + r) + b>(
1
α¯
r˙ + r)],
The Euler-Lagrange equation d
dt
(∂Φ
∂r˙
) = ∂Φ
∂r
yields
r¨− γr˙− [α¯(α¯ + γ)I + α¯(α¯ + γ
2
)R−1K]r− 1
2
α¯(α¯ + γ)R−1b = 0, (D.1)
where r¨ denotes d
2r
dt2
. In addition, the natural boundary condition
∂
∂r˙
Φ(r˙(T ), r(T ), T ) = 0 yields
[
2
α¯2
Rr˙ +
1
α¯
(2R + K)r +
1
α¯
b]|t=T = 0. (D.2)
Introducing new variables s = r˙ and recall the definition of the matrix M,
(D.1) can be rewritten as first order ODEs[
r˙
s˙
]
=
[
0 I
M γI
][
r
s
]
+
[
0
1
2
α¯(α¯ + γ)R−1b
]
, (D.3)
and the natural boundary condition (D.2) can be simplified as
[r˙ +
α¯
2
(2I + R−1K)r +
α¯
2
R−1b]|t=T = 0. (D.4)
Note that if λ satisfies [
0 I
M γI
][
r
s
]
= λ
[
r
s
]
,
then
Mr = (λ2 − γλ)r.
That is, λ2 − γλ is an eigenvalue of M, say ξi. Since ξi > 0, we can solve
λ′i =
γ +
√
γ2 + 4ξi
2
, λi =
γ −√γ2 + 4ξi
2
,
and the corresponding two linearly independent eigenvectors are[
v
λ′ivi
]
,
[
v
λivi
]
,
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where vi is the eigenvector of M corresponding to ξi.
The ODEs (D.3) can then be solved explicitly as[
r(t)
s(t)
]
=c′1
[
v1
λ′1v1
]
eλ
′
1t + c1
[
v1
λ1v1
]
eλ1t + ...+
c′N
[
vN
λ′NvN
]
eλ
′
N t + cN
[
vN
λNvN
]
eλN t +
[
rs
0
] (D.5)
where (rs,0) is a particular solution to the non-homogeneous system and
c′1, c1, ..., c
′
N , cN are constants to be determined from boundary conditions.
We next show that when T → ∞ the natural boundary condition (D.4)
implies lim
t→∞
r(t) <∞, which in turn implies c′1 = c′2 = ... = c′N = 0. First, we
note that when t is large enough, the value of ri(t) will be mainly dominated
by c′kvkie
λ′kt for some k, where λ′k is the largest eigenvalue and vki is the i-th
component of vk. Similarly, r˙i(t) will also be dominated by c
′
kvkiλ
′
ke
λ′kt and
consequently has the same sign as ri(t), i.e. ri(t)si(t) ≥ 0. If we left multiply
r(t) on both side of (D.4), then
[r>r˙ +
α¯
2
r>(2I + R−1K)r +
α¯
2
R−1br]|t=T = 0.
However, if lim
t→∞
ri(t) = ∞ for some i, then r>(2I + R−1K)r > r>r → +∞
as t → +∞ and will dominate the linear term R−1br. In the mean time
r>r˙ =
N∑
i=1
ri(t)si(t) ≥ 0 for any t. Thus,
lim
T→∞
[r>r˙ +
β
2
r>(2I + R−1K)r +
β
2
R−1br]|t=T = +∞,
a contradiction.
Hence, when T →∞, we have derived the solution to (D.1) as
r∗(t) = c1v1eλ1t + ...+ cNvNeλN t + rs, (D.6)
where c = (c1, ..., cN)
> can be solved by
c =V−1(r0 − rs) (D.7)
with the particular solution or the steady state rs being the solution to the
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equation (5.5). Substitute (D.7) into (D.6), we then arrive at (5.6). The
expressions for the price path and the pricing strategy (5.7) are immediate
consequence of (5.6) and (5.2).
In the remaining, we verify the sufficient conditions for the solution of
Euler-Lagrange equation (D.1) to be the maximizer of (5.3) (see Liberzon,
2011, for a reference on the topic of calculus of variation).
First of all, note that ∂
2Φ
∂r˙2
= e−γt 2
α¯2
R is negative definite for any t ≥ 0.
Thus, the strengthened Legendre condition is satisfied.
Second, the Jacobi equation of the variational problem is
x¨− γx˙−Mx = 0, (D.8)
which is exactly the homogeneous version of equation (D.1). From our pre-
vious analysis, (D.8) admits a set of N linearly independent solutions
x1 = (e
λ′1t − eλ1t)v1, ...,xN = (eλ′N t − eλN t)vN.
Equivalently, we have
det(
[
x1 ... xN
]
) 6= 0
for any t > 0. Therefore, there is no conjugate point to t = 0 in (0,∞).
Finally, we check the Weierstrass excess function.
E(w, r˙, r, t) =Φ(w, r, t)− Φ(r˙, r, t)− (w − r˙)> ∂
∂r˙
Φ(r˙, r, t)
=e−γt[(
1
α¯
w + r)>R(
1
α¯
w + r)− ( 1
α¯
r˙ + r)>R(
1
α¯
r˙ + r)
+
1
α¯
r>K(w − r˙) + 1
α¯
b>(w − r˙)
− 2
α¯2
(w − r˙)>Rr˙− 1
α¯
(w − r˙)>(2R + K)r− 1
α¯
(w − r˙)>b]
=e−γt
1
α¯2
(w − r˙)>R(w − r˙) < 0
The last inequality is due to the negative definite property of matrix R.
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D.3 Proof of Proposition 5.2
Since we can translate any time point s ≥ 0 back to s = 0, it is sufficient
to show that for any initial reference price r0, there exists T such that the
price path pSM(t), 0 ≤ t ≤ T and reference price path rSM(t), 0 ≤ t ≤ T
generated by pSM(r) maximizes
max
p
∫ T
0
e−γtΠ(r,p)dt
s.t. r˙ = α¯(p− r),
r(T ) = rSM(T ).
(D.9)
Without loss of generality, we assume r0 ∈ I++. The other cases can be
proved similarly. We let T be the first time rSM(t) exits I++, i.e., the first
time switching occurs. In this case, the objective value of the above problem
under pSM(t), 0 ≤ t ≤ T is∫ T
0
e−γtΠ++(rSM(t),pSM(t))dt,
since rSM(t) ∈ I++ for all 0 ≤ t ≤ T and by definition pSMi (t) − rSMi (t) =
p++i (r
SM(t)) − rSMi (t) < 0 for i = 1, 2. Note that on 0 ≤ t ≤ T , pSM(t) =
p++(t), where p++(t), t ≥ 0, denotes the price path generated by p++(r) and
is optimal to the infinite horizon problem
max
p
∫ ∞
0
e−γtΠ++(r,p)dt
s.t. r˙ = α¯(p− r).
(D.10)
We first show that pSM(t), 0 ≤ t ≤ T is optimal to the problem
max
p
∫ T
0
e−γtΠ++(r,p)dt
s.t. r˙ = α¯(p− r),
r(T ) = rSM(T ).
(D.11)
Suppose p′(t), 0 ≤ t ≤ T and the corresponding reference price path
r′(t), 0 ≤ t ≤ T satisfying r′(T ) = rSM(T ) generate a higher value than∫ T
0
e−γtΠ++(rSM(t),pSM(t))dt, then we can construct a solution to the infi-
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nite horizon problem (D.10) as follows:
p˜(t) =
{
p′(t), 0 ≤ t ≤ T,
p++(t), t > T.
It follows that∫ ∞
0
e−γtΠ++(r, p˜)dt =
∫ T
0
e−γtΠ++(r,p′)dt+
∫ ∞
T
e−γtΠ++(r,p++)dt
>
∫ T
0
e−γtΠ++(r,p++)dt+
∫ ∞
T
e−γtΠ++(r,p++)dt,
where we have suppressed the dependency of reference price path r on the
corresponding price path for brevity. This leads to a contradiction to p++(t)
being optimal to problem (D.10).
Next, we show that pSM(t), 0 ≤ t ≤ T is optimal to the problem (D.9).
Indeed, for any pricing path p(t), it holds∫ T
0
e−γtΠ(r,p)dt ≤
∫ T
0
e−γtΠ++(r,p)dt ≤
∫ T
0
e−γtΠ++(rSM(t),pSM(t))dt,
where the first inequality is due to the fact that η+i < η
−
i , i = 1, 2 and the
second inequality is due to the optimality of pSM(t) to (D.11).
If no switch occurs, i.e., rSM(t) ∈ I++ for all t ≥ 0, then letting T = ∞,
the second claim follows from above analysis.
D.4 Proof of Lemma 5.2
Since the matrix is two dimensional, we can write the eigenvalues and eigen-
vectors explicitly. Namely, let λ1, λ2 be the two eigenvalues, then
λ1 =
a+ d
2
+ [
(a+ d)2
4
− (ad− bc)] 12 ,
λ2 =
a+ d
2
− [ (a+ d)
2
4
− (ad− bc)] 12 ,
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and
v1 =
[
λ1 − d
c
]
,
v2 =
[
λ2 − d
c
]
.
It follows that
(λ1 − d)(λ2 − d)
=
(a− d)2
4
− [ (a+ d)
2
4
− (ad− bc)]
=− bc < 0.
Thus, if λ1 − d < 0, then v11v12 > 0, v21v22 < 0, otherwise swapping the
notations of v1,v2, the result still holds.
D.5 Proof of Lemma 5.3
Following the convention of our notations, we let Λ++ to be the matrix Λ
defined in Proposition 5.1 when N = 2, η1 = η
+
1 , η2 = η
+
2 and V
++ to be
the matrix of eigenvectors of M++. By Proposition 5.1, the dynamics (5.10)
restricted to the region I++ can be explicitly written as
r˙ = V++Λ++(V++)−1(r− r++s ). (D.12)
Clearly, M++ has the same eigenvectors as V++Λ++(V++)−1 and we claim
that one of their eigenvectors, say v = (v1, v2) satisfies v + r
++
s ∈ I++. Note
that we can always let x = r− r++s to shift the whole system such that the
steady state is the origin. Therefore, to simplify the presentation, we assume
without loss of generality that r++s = 0. In this case, it is equivalent to show
v ∈ I++, where
I++ = {r|p++1 (r)− r1 < 0, p++2 (r)− r2 < 0}
= {r| 1
α¯
V++Λ++(V++)−1r < 0}.
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Since V++Λ++(V++)−1v = λv, where λ < 0 is a diagonal element of Λ++,
v ∈ I++ if and only if v1 > 0, v2 > 0. By Lemma 5.2, M++ has exactly one
such eigenvector.
As I++ is described by two linear inequalities, we can use two extreme
rays l1 and l2 to represent its boundary ∂I
++ (see Figure D.1). If r0 ∈ l1,
I++
Sl1
Sl2
Sv
Sr0
Figure D.1: Illustration of the proof
there are two possible ways that r(t) can leave the region I++ as illustrated
by two dashed lines in Figure D.1. The first way is to cross back at l1. That
is, there exists t′ > 0, such that r(t′) ∈ l1 and r˙(t′) 6∈ I++. As r0, r(t′) ∈ l1,
there exists a positive constant k > 0 such that r(t′) = kr0. Consequently,
r˙(t′) = V++Λ++(V++)−1r(t′) = kV++Λ++(V++)−1r0 = kr˙(0) ∈ I++,
a contradiction.
The second way is to cross l2. However, before that, it must cross the
eigenvector v ∈ I++. In other words, there exists t′ > 0 such that r(t′) = kv
for some k > 0. As a result,
r˙(t′) = V++Λ++(V++)−1r(t′) = kV++Λ++(V++)−1v = kλv,
and
r(t) = ekλ(t−t
′)v,
for any t ≥ t′. Thus, r(t) will stay in I++ for all t ≥ t′ which contradicts
with the fact that it will cross l2.
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In summary, as r(t) can neither cross l1 nor l2, it has to stay in I
++ for all
t ≥ 0 and follows the dynamics (D.12), which results in limt→∞ r(t) = rs++.
D.6 Proof of Proposition 5.3
There are three cases. First, if r0 ∈ S, then r(t) = r0 for any t and our claim
holds.
Second, if r0 ∈ I+r2 , I−r2 , Ir1+ or Ir1− (here we suppose r0 ∈ I+r2 without
loss of generality), then either
lim
t→∞
r(t) = rs
+r2 ,
where rs
+r2 ∈ S is the steady state to the system r˙1 = α¯(p+r21 (r1)−r1), r˙2 = 0,
or there exists t′ such that r(t′) ∈ ∂I++ or r(t′) ∈ ∂I+−. By Lemma 5.3,
when r(t′) ∈ ∂I++ or r(t′) ∈ ∂I+−, it then follows
lim
t→∞
r(t) = r++s or lim
t→∞
r(t) = r+−s .
Finally, if r0 ∈ I++, I+−, I−+ or I−− (again we assume r0 ∈ I++ without
loss of generality), then either
lim
t→∞
r(t) = r++s
or there exists t′ such that r(t′) ∈ I+r2 or r(t′) ∈ Ir1+ and we are back to
the second case. Thus, with at most two switches, the reference price path
converges to a steady state in S.
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